



**HAMPSTEAD SCHOOL**

Learning together Achieving together

**Y12 – Y13**

**Summer Bridging Tasks**

**2023**

**A Level History**

Name: \_\_\_\_\_

- You should spend some time during the summer holidays working on the activities in this booklet.
- You will be required to hand in this booklet in your first lesson at the start of Year 12 and the content will be used to form the basis of your first assessments.
- You should try your best and show commitment to your studies.

## Year 12 Summer Work- Germany

1. Go back over Chapters 1-15 and make notes on all of them.
2. Plan an answer to every essay question in the book.
3. Analyse all sources from each chapter in the book.
4. Prepare for an assessment in Week 2 of September.

### Optional extra documentaries:

<https://youtu.be/U3LOIMnC8fE>

<https://www.ushmm.org/learn/holocaust/path-to-nazi-genocide/the-path-to-nazi-genocide/full-film>



## Year 12 Summer Work- Stuarts

1. Ensure notes are all done Chapter 1-16.
2. Revise these topics as if you were ready to take an exam on them.
3. Complete the Timeline Towers on the period 1649-1660
4. Complete the challenge readings below.

**Challenge/Optional extensions:**

- Protectorate
  - Easier reading – Mark Kishlansky Ch.8
  - Hard reading – Ronald Hutton
- Restoration
  - Easier reading – Mark Kishlansky Ch.9
  - Hard reading – Tim Harris

abolish lawyers and institute the Mosaic code were repulsed – and passed thirty ordinances during its five-month existence.

Even the nominated saints were divided over questions of religion. The radicals in the assembly wanted to abolish all semblance of the national church, including tithes, uniformity in doctrine, and predefined 'scandalous sins'. The moderates wanted a comprehensive Protestant church. The most vexing issue was over tithes. Tithes raised complex religious and civil problems. The sects argued that they should not be forced to contribute to a church to which they did not belong, but they proposed no alternative for maintaining ministers in the large national church. Moreover, tithes were property. Landowners had bought them, and to abolish tithes would be to confiscate private wealth. The tithe debate drove a wedge between the small knots of radicals and moderates who dominated the five months of sittings.

Attendance in both Parliament and Council was sparse, and majorities fortuitous. After the opening ceremony Cromwell never appeared, and even Harrison ultimately drifted away. Patience with the Nominated Parliament shortened with the autumn days. In December the radicals unexpectedly had the numbers to push through several bills on church reform. This frightened the moderates sufficiently for them to plan a counterstroke. On 12 December they arrived *en bloc* early in the morning to be assured of a majority and then simply voted to resign their power. They collected the mace and the Parliament rolls and delivered them to an astonished Cromwell. 'Whither it came, thither it went,' was Sir Arthur Haselrig's sarcastic post-mortem.

For a second time in less than a year, civil authority returned into the hands of the Army, and for a second time Cromwell refused to lead a military government. Instead he turned to the plan proposed by Lambert for a written constitution, the *Instrument of Government* (1653). The *Instrument* established a government composed of a Lord Protector, a Parliament and a Council. Originally Lambert and other officers hoped that Cromwell would accept the title of king, but he steadfastly refused and thus the expedient of the Protectorship was introduced. The *Instrument* began with no statement of sovereignty, though it was based on classical principles of mixed government. The failure of monarchy under Charles, of a form of aristocracy under Barebones, and of a form of democracy under the Rump weighed heavily in the thinking behind the *Instrument*. Power was divided among Protector, Council and Parliament in ways that checked the potential

abuses of each. In addition, the *Instrument* specifically protected religious rights. All 'peaceful' Christians, except Catholics and episcopalians, would have freedom of worship which neither Protector nor Parliament could abrogate.

The Protector embodied executive power. All legal matters ran in his name, he controlled the military, and he superintended diplomacy. Parliament was a single chamber composed of 460 members, including thirty each from Scotland and Ireland. County seats predominated, and borough representation was sharply constricted. All adult males with property worth £200 could give voices in county selections – a compromise which both expanded participation and confined it to men of substance. Members chosen were to be 'of known integrity, fearing God, and of good conversation'. The *Instrument* provided for triennial parliaments of at least five months' duration. It charged Parliament with the power to make and change law and to introduce all revenue measures except the annual maintenance of the standing army. Bills passed by Parliament but not signed by the Protector became law after twenty days, though the *Instrument* could not be amended without the Protector's consent. The Council was small, composed of between thirteen and twenty-one members who served for life. It was charged with advising the Protector on civil and military matters and legislating with him until the first parliament came into session. Its chief responsibilities were to judge elections and to choose successive Lord Protectors. The *Instrument* also provided for a standing army of 30,000 men, a sufficient navy, and a paltry annual income for government of £200,000.

The *Instrument* combined elements of proposals for constitutional reform that had surfaced since 1647. It borrowed from the Army's platforms, from the Leveller *Agreements of the People*, and from the writings of republicans. But to its opponents it was nothing other than 'monarchy bottomed by the sword'. Cromwell attempted to refute this judgement immediately. At his installation the Protector wore a plain black outfit with grey worsted stockings, and the Council he and the officers appointed contained only four Army commanders. Viscount Lisle and the Earl of Mulgrave gave the body some social cachet, and five of its members had long-standing connections with Cromwell, including its President, Henry Lawrence, who had once been Cromwell's landlord. The choices were both uninspired and undistinguished: a support staff for a strong man.



In the months before the first Protectoral Parliament met, Cromwell and his Council ruled England effectively. Judges, military commissioners, justices of the peace, myriad assessors and collectors were appointed to serve the new government. The plums were given to the Barebones moderates, though the Cromwellian regime was as eager as its predecessors to bring the traditional governing class to the table. Ordinances established long-delayed legal and religious reforms, and over twenty financial measures were passed.

The Protector's first parliament met on 3 September 1654 – the anniversary of the great victories of Dunbar and Worcester. As he told the assembled members, he hoped the session would be one of 'healing and settling'. The electors had returned a group heavily Presbyterian, with a sprinkling of known opponents to the regime like the republicans Vane and Haselrig. Together they were likely to open old religious and political wounds. Presbyterians were eager to re-establish the boundaries of the national church and to control the growth of the sects. The republicans were eager to challenge the powers of the Protector and the authority of the *Instrument of Government*. Indeed the first action of the session referred the *Instrument* to a committee to dissect it clause by clause. Immediately Cromwell intervened. He demanded that all members take an 'oath of recognition' that government was in the hands of a single person and Parliament before they could return to their seats.

Over seventy members – mainly republicans – refused. They argued that only a parliament had the authority to constitute government and that the *Instrument* was the work of a clique of Army officers. Their exclusion poisoned the session from the start, and they continued to denounce the Protector and the Army. Even those members who remained had serious reservations about critical elements in the *Instrument*. In debates over a new government bill, the Presbyterians attempted to narrow the parameters of freedom of worship. Other members questioned the need for so large a military establishment and the right of the Protector to control it. Criticisms built to a climax as the five-month term of the parliament neared its close and bills were readied for presentation. Cleverly, Cromwell avoided the confrontation by calculating the months by the moon rather than the calendar and dissolved the session twelve days early.

With Parliament concluded, the Protector ruled with his Council and attempted to repair the damage of the addled session. The regime itself had little support. In the West Country known royalists had been re-

turned to Parliament and close supporters of the government had been spitefully rejected. The godly were rancorously divided between church and sect. The older sects like the Fifth Monarchists blasted the regime in a barrage of pamphlets and sermons. Cromwell was the little horn of the devil, they revealed, a warrior of the Antichrist. Newer sects challenged the very foundations of Protestantism. The Quakers, led by George Fox, grew from a few itinerant preachers and scattered congregations in the north of England into a potent movement. They attracted the middling sort in rural communities and were genuine democrats – the only sect that for a time accepted women as absolute equals. They practised a form of social levelling that included a refusal to doff caps, to take oaths, and to address social superiors formally. The Quakers preached universal redemption through the power of the inner light of the Holy Spirit. They rejected the existence of heaven, of hell and of a personal God. Most controversially, they denied that the Bible was the word of God. Rather they were ecstatic believers, and their doctrine of perfectibility led them to provocative demonstrations of purity such as going naked, fasting near to death, and attempting to perform miracles. In one of their most sensational acts, John Naylor, a Quaker leader, rode into Bristol on a Sunday in 1656 in imitation of the entry of Christ into Jerusalem. He was savagely punished for his blasphemy.

Few were waving palms in the Army. Throughout the sitting of Parliament there had been steady pressure to disband a portion of the bloated military establishment. The *Instrument* had provided for an army of 30,000, though there were nearly twice that many on the muster rolls. Cromwell adopted the popular expedient of lowering military taxation, but he was not prepared to slice the Army in half. Indeed, the cuts he made were for other purposes. Not all of the Army commanders accepted Cromwell's pre-eminence, and some, like the parliamentary republicans, were dismayed by his assumption of regal airs. He had already had a falling out with Harrison, and the Leveller John Wildman had resurfaced with his charges of Cromwellian perfidy. When opposition came out in the open, the Protector dealt with it firmly. Cromwell cashiered several senior officers, including John Okey and Robert Overton, both original New Model colonels, for publicly opposing the Protectorate. The soldiers were nervous as well. Local communities were hostile both to their presence and to the practice of radical religion within their ranks. Arrears mounted, and

as always the pressure for disbandment turned soldiers' thoughts to grievances.

In this context the regime faced the first serious royalist conspiracy in England since the Second Civil War, Penruddock's Rising in Wiltshire. Though Cromwell was targeted for assassination, his secretary, John Thurloe, ran such an effective security operation that there were never serious threats. Rumours of coordinated royalist plans reached Thurloe at the beginning of 1655. A general rising was set for the beginning of March, but failed to come off when the government arrested several of the key figures. In Wiltshire, however, a force led by Colonel John Penruddock managed to seize control of Salisbury and capture two assize judges and the county sheriff. They proclaimed Charles II and terrorized the countryside for several days before a detachment of New Model regulars and local forces hunted them down. To ensure the pacification of the West Country, Cromwell placed Major-General John Desborough in command of the militia and charged him with meting out retribution. The rebels were convicted of treason and a small number were hanged. Desborough remained as a regional military governor, and over the next several months Cromwell appointed major-generals to oversee all of the localities.

The major-generals were part of a plan to reduce the overall size and structure of the military and thereby to effect economies. But they quickly became a means in which a reforming centre gained control over recalcitrant localities. The nation was ultimately divided into a dozen administrative districts, with the cost borne by 'the decimation' – a tax of 10 per cent on the value of royalist estates. Cromwell ordered the major-generals to keep the peace by disarming the disaffected, patrolling the highways, and warding off beggars. He also enjoined them to 'encourage godliness and virtue' – an open-ended commission that led some to suppress alehouses, Sunday sports and popular festivities. In Wales Major-General Berry found 'vices abounding and magistrates fast asleep'. Few were more zealous than Major-General Pride, whose territory included Southwark, the red-light district to the south of London. It was said that he prohibited the popular pastime of bear-baiting 'not because it gave pain to the bears, but because it gave pleasure to the spectators'.

Though their tenure lasted barely a year, the major-generals were detested in the localities. They were outsiders who imposed alien values without regard to the fabric of local society. They imprisoned former

royalists and dealt sternly with uncooperative gentry. They displaced the commissions of the peace in which local men, even the new men of the Cromwellian regime, filtered the rigour of the law through the prism of familial and communal relations that they knew so well. The major-generals enforced a moral reformation whether the localities wanted one or not. Some deluded themselves into believing that they were popular; others, like Major-General Whalley, that they were effective: 'it's the best way that ever was devised for the peace and safety of the nation'. Like the Nominated Parliament, the experiment was an attempt to establish godly rule over an unregenerate nation. Like the Nominated Parliament, it failed. It was a product of Cromwell's belief that government was 'for the people's good, not what pleases them'.

But Cromwell was not beyond pleasing the people when godly zeal and popular prejudice intersected. Shortly after the conclusion of the hostilities with the Dutch in 1654, he laid plans for a war with Spain. For Cromwell's generation, Spain was the nation of Antichrist, the most potent Catholic power on earth. In the Parliaments of the 1620s members had advocated war with Spain on the open seas, a 'blue water' policy that was now put into effect in Cromwell's Western Design to seize a large island in the West Indies, disrupt Spanish trade, and, if possible, capture a treasure fleet. Eventually, naval forces achieved all three goals, though the initial assault on the island of Hispaniola was a failure and the commanders had to settle with taking Jamaica. But the great dream of financing the war by capturing the silver fleet proved chimerical. The game turned out to be more expensive than the prize, and Cromwell was forced to summon his second parliament in 1656 to pay for the war.

To avoid a repetition of the fiasco in 1654, when members had had to be expelled, the Council used its power of judging elections to exclude republicans and other opponents of the regime at the beginning. Though the uproar on the left was predictable, in fact the members who sat in the parliament of 1656 were representative of the conservative mainstream that supported the regime. They urged Cromwell again to accept the crown. Monarchy was a known form of government, they argued, and the erection of the house of Cromwell would settle the endless constitutional experiments. Along with the offer of the crown, the members prepared the *Humble Petition and Advice* which made significant modifications to the *Instrument of Government*. It created a bicameral legislature, adding an Other House of life peers appointed

by the Protector and Council which would be able to check the excesses of the single-chamber assembly established in the *Instrument*.

To ensure that Cromwell would accept the crown, it was tied to the new constitution in a single bill. At first, Cromwell hesitated. Though he had no desire to be king in name, he knew that he would be king in fact. He had apparently set his mind to agreeing when a number of senior Army officers informed him that they would not serve a monarch. In the end he chose loyalty to his comrades-in-arms. He averted a crisis by persuading Parliament to decouple the crown from the constitutional reforms. Cromwell accepted the *Humble Petition and Advice* in May 1657 and appointed Army cronies, relatives and some of the more socially distinguished supporters of the regime to the Other House. But the *Humble Petition and Advice* did not provide for vetting the elected members of the Commons, and when Parliament reconvened in 1658 many of those who had been excluded in the first session took their seats and attacked the new settlement. Frustrated and disgusted, Cromwell dissolved Parliament.

By now it was apparent that the regime was held together by Cromwell alone. Within his personality resided the contradictions of the Revolution. Like the gentry, he desired a fixed and stable constitution; like the zealous, he was infused with a millenarian vision of a more glorious world to come. As an MP from 1640, he respected the fundamental authority that Parliament represented; as a member of the Army, he understood power and the decisive demands of necessity. In the 1650s many wished him to become king; yet, like Caesar, he refused the crown, preferring the authority of the people to the authority of the sword. He was now fifty-nine years old, and the hardships of an active life weighed upon him. The failure to establish a settled form of government and the failure to resolve the vexing questions of religious freedom absorbed his diminishing energies. In August 1658 his favourite daughter died, and thereafter his will to live seemed visibly to weaken. When George Fox, the Quaker leader, came to visit him at the end of the month he 'saw and felt a waft of death go forth against him; and when I came to him he looked like a dead man'. His health deteriorated rapidly. He named his eldest son, Richard, to succeed him and died on 3 September 1658, the anniversary of his greatest military triumphs.

## The Restoration Settlements

1659–1667

*No one will ever know how it started. At 2 a.m. on Sunday 2 September 1666 Thomas Farrinor awoke to the smell of smoke in the rooms above his bakery in Pudding Lane. His investigation discovered a fire consuming the shop, and in shock he led his family to safety and raised the alarm. It was heard in the inn whose stable was behind his garden, and guests in nightdress peered through their windows to see flames licking away at the wooden structure. It had been a hot summer, London was bone dry, and for the past week warm breezes had blown from the east. They now caught the flames, and embers landed among the inn's haystacks. As the onlookers rubbed sleep from their eyes, three more buildings were struck by shards of burning wood and a serious fire had begun. Within an hour City authorities were on the scene and water-pumping machines were being wheeled into action. The Mayor, Sir Thomas Bloodworth, had seen many fires that seemed more threatening than this and he was peeved to have been roused from sleep to view it. Before returning to bed he judged dismissively, 'A woman might piss it out.' It would become his epitaph.*

*The east wind first carried the blaze on to London Bridge, where it rapidly destroyed a third of the buildings on the main thoroughfare between the City and Southwark on the other side of the Thames. The bridge acted as a fire-break to the south, but the flames destroyed the largest of the City's pumping mechanisms and made battling it with water more difficult. The conventional means of fire-fighting was to clear a path too wide for the flames to jump and then to extinguish the sparks that blew across. But in London it was law that anyone who pulled down another man's dwelling must pay for it to be erected again, and, with the fire only a few hours old, the Mayor was reluctant to act without authority. By the time it came – delivered by Samuel Pepys from the mouth of King Charles II – the sun was up and the*

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whipping winds were carrying 'whirlwinds of tempestuous fire'. Panic had set in as churches and warehouses along the river erupted. Pepys saw an arch of flame a mile long that night, and the diarist John Evelyn witnessed it consuming 'churches, public halls, exchange, hospitals, monuments and ornaments, leaping after a prodigious manner from house to house and street to street'. The good news that day was that the conflagration had been halted in the north at the great Leadenhall, which simply resisted the flames. The bad news was that there was now only one direction in which it could move: west towards the Guildhall, Cheapside and St Paul's Cathedral.

Tuesday 4 September was a day every Londoner would always remember. Finally the effort to halt the fire's spread was coordinated. Trained bands from the surrounding counties arrived to maintain order. They established camps at Moor Fields and Spitalfields and on the Artillery grounds for the tens of thousands of refugees. They helped unclog the roads to the north that teemed with families fleeing with their possessions on their backs. Most importantly, they freed the City's own levies for fire-fighting. From five in the morning till midnight the Duke of York rode from site to site encouraging and directing the efforts. The King, against the advice of his counsellors, was in the thick of the smoke, grimy and bespattered, handing out gold coins to workmen who were now demolishing everything that stood in the direct path of the oncoming inferno. It was all to no avail. Across Cheap Street it flew, aided by the debris of the houses the workers had demolished, consuming St Mary-le-Bow and sending the Bow bells to the ground, where they melted from the heat. On to Goldsmiths Row the fire roared, 'before it pleasant and stately homes, behind it ruinous and desolate heaps'. Grocers' Hall, Merchant Taylors' Hall, Drapers' Hall and then the great Guildhall itself: all were consumed in huge balls of flame whose vacuum imploded towers and walls as if they were made of papier mâché. There was now no hope to break the fire at St Paul's Churchyard. It consumed the Stationers' Hall and the shops of dozens of booksellers as an appetizer to the meal ahead. At 8 p.m. the massive timbers that supported the cathedral's roof were alight, and soon rivulets and then streams of lead were pouring down Ludgate Hill as the largest church in Britain burned. 'All the sky was of a fiery aspect, like the top of a burning oven.'

When it was over, two days later, the toll was incomprehensible: over 13,000 buildings, 87 churches, 44 company halls, 4 bridges and, with

few exceptions, all of the great landmarks of an ancient and proud city were gone. One hundred thousand people were homeless, and the cost of rebuilding was reckoned at over £10 million, or eight times the annual revenue of the monarch. How had it happened, who was to blame? It was the work of enemies – Dutch or French, with whom England was currently at war. It was the work of Catholics. There was so much xenophobic hysteria that during the initial frenzy a number of foreigners were spontaneously lynched. But, as ministers of all stripes were quick to proclaim from pulpit and press, a catastrophe this extensive could have only one source. It had begun on a Sunday, it followed by less than a year the most devastating outbreak of plague in the nation's history. Plague and fire, war and destruction: these were God's weapons. It was the persecution of the godly, claimed the dissenters; it was the toleration of the Catholics, moaned the Anglicans. It was the King's mistresses; it was the nation's sins. The reign of Charles II had begun so well, but now there was a judgement upon the land.

The death of Oliver Cromwell in 1658 was a moment of re-evaluation of the Revolution's achievements and failures. Support had been intense though shallow; opposition ran silent and deep. Cromwell's personality, his grip over the military, and the realization that he could provide order to an exhausted nation all propped up the regime. No one else could provide the same benefits without much greater costs. Thus the political chaos of 1659 was not unexpected by those who contemplated the future. To the committed revolutionaries it was only one more challenge which God would provide the means of meeting. Many were still in positions of power or influence, although many more had decamped, defected or died. In truth the Revolution was awash in contradiction, and the second generation of revolutionaries had neither the vision nor the experience of their predecessors. They had not suffered monarchical tyranny nor felt the threat to lives and property that had propelled the Civil War forward. Their grievances were different: the lack of moral discipline that years of reformation had still not overcome; the failure to settle a single form of government that would put an end to the bickering of politicians; the arrears of pay that mounted despite legislative provision for the military. Their loyalties were divided, their support ripe to be plucked by any leader who could yoke together vision and power.

To those who for years had sought a restoration of the monarchy, the

death of Cromwell was also a godsend, though of a wholly different kind. They welcomed the disorder, played upon it, and did their best to manipulate public opinion against every expedient. Agents crossed the narrow channel from the Spanish Netherlands with instructions to shore up secret supporters and to suborn discontented government officials. They still planned for a military rising, despite the years of catastrophe and the hopelessness of confronting veteran regiments with untrained countrymen. The most they could hope for was anarchy in London, a tax revolt which led to the breakdown of the military command. Not in their wildest dreams did they imagine that the restoration was so close or that it would be achieved with such ease.

The Restoration of Charles II was both an event and a process. The King's peaceful accession to the throne of England in 1660 put an end to twenty years of internecine war. What were left were the intractable problems that had created the conflict and the bitter legacy it had engendered. If he had had his way, Charles would have put an end to them as well. Unlike his father, he was capable of living with contradiction and was more than willing to absorb those, like the Presbyterians, who could be absorbed. He wished his reign to be a time of healing, just as he wished his life to be one of pleasure. The first Restoration settlement bore his stamp. The second settlement bore the stamp of the country: bitter, divided, attempting to make sense out of what to so many now seemed sheer madness. The motivation of Lord Lieutenants, justices of the peace and members of the Cavalier Parliament, elected in 1661, was to ensure that it would never happen again. They would impose oaths on the conscientious and disabilities upon the ambitious; there would be penalties for those who persisted in dissenting from the church or published in their defence. Their restoration, unlike the King's, would not admit of ambiguities.

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The peaceful accession of Richard Cromwell, the new Lord Protector, in 1658 had been a hopeful sign. The regime's enemies waited expectantly for a collapse that did not come. Oliver's funeral procession rivalled that of Queen Elizabeth I, and his son succeeded him without incident. European heads of state recognized the transition – indeed the French court went into mourning. Addresses of loyalty flowed in from the localities, and the Army pledged support to the new head of state.

But Richard Cromwell was not born to rule. A thoroughly decent man who had been deliberately kept out of the fray of war and politics, Richard had married into a Hampshire landed family and briefly lived as a local gentleman. He became Lord Protector at the age of thirty-one and possessed neither the ambition nor the ruthlessness necessary to hold the government together. His Council was riven by factions that Oliver had self-consciously manipulated but which were beyond Richard's grasp. More ominously, the Army was divided and restless.

The Protectorate contained three separate armies. The army in England, militarily idle though politically active, was under the command of Richard's brother-in-law, General Charles Fleetwood. It was a crucial if precarious position – Major-Generals Harrison and Lambert were cashiered while holding it – for the army in England was the sentinel against royalism. Richard's younger brother, Henry, commanded the second army, in Ireland. Had ability been more respected than birth, Henry would have succeeded his father. He possessed Oliver's self-assurance and impetuosity, though in Henry it was un-mixed with periodic bouts of introspection. In Scotland, General George Monck led the third army. A veteran of the Continental wars, Monck had served the King, Parliament and the Protectorate in turn. Taciturn and able, Monck's career had the consistency of the professional soldier: he preferred the winning side.

These distinct commands were no problem while Oliver was Lord General, but Richard lacked military experience. Moreover, the English army was no longer the well-muscled New Model. It had been thinned of veterans by natural wastage and constant purges, and weakened by divisions between the senior and junior officers. Fleetwood and Major-General John Desborough were the main military props of Richard's government. They conducted their business from Wallingford House in Whitehall and maintained the loyalty of the highest-ranking officers. The junior commanders held their own meetings at St James's Palace. Their men pressured them for arrears of pay – nearly forty weeks overdue – and for political and religious reforms. The soldiers' loyalty to Fleetwood was not welded in the forge of battle, for few had seen an engagement.

Agitation for arrears was only one of the government's financial problems. The Spanish war persisted, as did the deficit spending that kept it going. Government indebtedness approached £2 million and necessitated the summoning of Parliament. The Council decided to



revert to the traditional franchise for the selections, in the hope of attracting gentry support. Although this led to accusations of packing, the parliament of 1659 was no different in political composition from its immediate predecessors. The Presbyterians controlled it, and the Commons contained the same small knot of republicans determined to ensnarl this Parliament as they had the last. Sir Arthur Haselrig, who had opposed every regime since the dissolution of the Rump, led them. Truculent and self-regarding – liveried servants attended his coach – Haselrig had spent nearly two decades mastering the techniques of obstruction. He was unrivalled at impeding debate, stalling committees and thwarting bills. Though it might be said of his public life that he had prevented some evil, it could not be said that he had done any good. Now he determined to make mischief, to bring down the parliament and if possible the Protectorate. To these ends, Haselrig seconded every expression of opposition from those who represented what was coming to be called ‘the good old cause’. He organized a filibuster against the recognition of Richard Cromwell. He backed parliamentary attacks upon the Army, and then he supported military grievances against Parliament. He opposed the elevation of Fleetwood to Lord General while he entered into negotiations with the Wallingford House leaders to bring Richard down. Month after month he stymied the Council’s efforts to govern, until the Army precipitated a crisis. At the end of April 1659 Fleetwood and Desborough forced Richard to dissolve Parliament, and by July Richard and his brother Henry had been ousted and the Army was purged of their supporters. After intense negotiations, military leaders, including the reinstated Lambert, decided to recall the Rump.

The year that followed made instability a byword, with governments coming and going in dizzying succession – a total of seven in less than twelve months. It was a year of high anxiety: paranoid, bewildered, chaotic. ‘My fears are greater than my hopes,’ wrote the normally optimistic Secretary Thurloe. The summer was long remembered as the ‘great fear’. Once the Protectorate fell, the gloom that had descended upon royalists at Richard’s accession briefly lifted. The Sealed Knot, their secret conspiratorial society, resumed activities and a national rising was planned for August. Though it failed to come off, Sir George Booth, a former parliamentary Presbyterian, raised a force of 6,000 and occupied most of Cheshire before being routed by Lambert. As royalist hopes revived, radical fortunes diminished. Baptists and Quakers were

persecuted in the localities, and the resumption of power by the Rump revived fears of further religious backtracking. Even republicans despaired. The Rump might lay claim to the original authority of the Long Parliament, but it was no republican government. Theorists like James Harrington, whose *Oceana* (1656) had outlined a republican government based upon the redistribution of wealth, opposed the Rump’s unchecked single-chamber rule. Ideologues like John Milton saw republicanism as a force for moral reformation and feared that the rapid transitions in government would lead to the return of a king.

Though Haselrig and his faction claimed that the Rump was the legitimate representative of the people, when it reassembled in July it contained only forty-two members. It had been brought back to power through an alliance with the Army, though it was not an alliance of mutual interest. The soldiers demanded their pay and protection for religious radicals; the officers demanded the appointment of a select senate and the election of a new parliament. Haselrig’s efforts to purge the Army high command and recruit members rather than hold new elections – the only practical way to avoid a rejection of the republic at the poll – had predictable results. In October, Lambert forcibly dissolved the Rump and instituted government by a Committee of Safety.

Military rule was now unadorned and unabashed. It was also uncontrolled. Generals who could barely govern their own regiments struggled for power. By virtue of his action against Booth, Lambert emerged as a potential leader, but he had limited influence over his junior officers and no support in London. Moreover, he was opposed by the army in Scotland. Monck and his officers viewed the mounting chaos in England uneasily. Both the Rump and Wallingford House had attempted to infiltrate his regiments, and Monck did all he could do to isolate newly arrived officers from the core of his loyal commanders. When news reached Edinburgh of the dissolution of Parliament, Monck declared against it. Shorn of support from even the military, the Committee of Safety collapsed and for the third time the Rump occupied Westminster Hall. With 7,000 soldiers, Monck began a march to London on 1 January 1660 as cries for a free parliament echoed round the nation.

The Rump’s third incarnation was brief. While Haselrig initiated a thoroughgoing purge of the Army, the taxpayers of London revolted. They refused to sanction rule by the Rump and demanded new elections to a free parliament. Incredibly, the Rump again voted to recruit

new members. By the time Monck arrived in London, civil government was in total confusion. Rumours were rife that there would be a new parliament, that Monck would be declared Lord Protector, or that Charles II would be recalled. But Monck was reluctant to enter the fray. He knew that if he supported the Rump in its confrontation with the City he jeopardized the soldiers' pay. He knew that if he enforced the City's call for a 'free parliament' those elected would vote to restore monarchy. 'Obedience is my great principle,' he once proclaimed – only it was no longer clear to whom it was owed. After a day of agonizing uncertainty, on 11 February Monck threw in his lot with the City and dissolved the Rump Parliament. That night lived in memory as 'the roasting of rumps', when exuberant celebrations made 'all the night as light as day'. Standing on Strand Bridge, the diarist Samuel Pepys counted thirty-one bonfires, and his journey home was accompanied by the rich smell of seared meat. Two weeks later the secluded members of the Long Parliament were readmitted to their seats. They made Monck Lord General; appointed a Council of State that included Sir Thomas Fairfax and the old Presbyterian leader Denzil Holles; set a date for new elections; and, thus exhausted, dissolved.

The Convention Parliament opened on 25 April 1660. Although former royalists had been barred, over a hundred were chosen to sit in the Commons, while the House of Lords, with the exception of the bishops, was restored entirely. Early test cases before the Committee of Privileges demonstrated the strength of sentiment for a royal restoration. The Revolution had collapsed. Despite the coordinated efforts of the Presbyterians to control the pace of reaction, they were overwhelmed by royalist and back-bencher gentry who wished to rush headlong. The experience of the previous year had taught them that there was no time to lose. The House of Lords declared that government consisted of king, Lords and Commons, and passed a motion that Charles should be invited home. On 1 May the two Houses voted to restore the King. The only significant question that remained was, On what terms would he be restored?

Governments had changed so quickly at the end of 1659 that it was impossible for royalist agents to know whom to approach. They trawled indiscriminately in all waters except those of the republicans and the English army, netting moderate Presbyterians and, after the revival of the Rump, hooking some prominent Cromwellians. Negotiations between royalist go-betweens and Monck, however, were

tentative and inconclusive. The general's support was vital, for, however strong was sentiment, it was no match for force. As ever, Monck's views were difficult to fathom, his principles hard to ascertain. He said little, and nearly all of it was contradictory. Having assured Haselrig that he would defend the Commonwealth, Monck then restored the purged royalist parliamentarians. Having promised his soldiers that he would hold firm against monarchy, he dismissed republicans from his ranks. The situation was too fluid for someone with such strong instincts for survival. He urged Charles to renounce retribution and requested justice for his soldiers and toleration for his religion. But his terms were not specific. In the Army, the soldiers clamoured for indemnity, secure possession of the royal and episcopal lands they had purchased, and safety from subsequent prosecution. Presbyterian preachers and propagandists agitated for a comprehensive church and security of tenure for their ministers. In the end, Monck settled for a dukedom.

If Monck was naturally cautious, Charles II kept his own counsel from experience. As he sat idly by in the Spanish Netherlands, ending up at Breda, the situation in England rapidly deteriorated. Yet Charles developed no plan to regain his throne. He had no military options, and few political ones. His counsellors were divided over the terms that could be accepted. One group, led by Henry Jermyn and the Queen Mother, Henrietta-Maria, urged Charles to agree to anything. The possession of his kingdoms was all that mattered; unpalatable conditions could be repudiated later. Another group, led by Sir Edward Hyde, soon to be Earl of Clarendon, cautioned Charles to negotiate every detail carefully. The success of his reign depended upon the terms by which he was restored. The division of opinion was conducted with all of the intrigue that passes for power at the court of an exiled king. The opportunists appealed to Charles's taste for dissimulation; the legalists to his habit of indolence. As he waited, the two positions converged. One after another the conditions for restoration evaporated: 'The nation runneth unto the King as Israel to bring back David.' On 4 April, in accord with Monck's wishes, Charles issued the Declaration of Breda, which offered a general pardon, liberty of conscience, and security of property as to be established by Parliament. Once the Convention met, even these concessions seemed superfluous. The biggest obstacle to an immediate restoration was adverse winds.

Thousands of onlookers accompanied Charles to his place of departure. He boarded the *Naseby*, flagship of what was now his navy,



and rechristened it *Royal Charles*. Two days later the King knelt on English soil, his every move cheered by tens of thousands of his subjects. General Monck was the first to be received, embraced for his loyalty at the crucial moment. The town of Dover celebrated all night with bonfires and a clamour that dizzied the King. This was no staged reception orchestrated by the Master of Revels but the genuine enthusiasm of ordinary people who thronged simply for sight of him. The way to Canterbury, where Charles prayed at the cathedral, was lined with cottagers, freeholders and gentry alike. Flowers were strewn in his path, and traditional Sabbath entertainments sanctioned by the Book of Sports, though long officially proscribed, were enjoyed again in his honour.

The trip to London, fortuitously timed to the royal birthday, occurred in the same atmosphere of joy. Women cast posies of sweet herbs at the royal carriage; shouts of 'God save King Charles' cascaded from village to village. At Blackheath the King reviewed Monck's troops, drawn up for the occasion in 'splendid and glorious equipage'. He paraded through them on horseback, and gave no indication of the mixed feelings that he must have felt at seeing the backbone of the Cromwellian regime so arrayed. On Tuesday 29 May he entered the capital. All that day the streets ran with wine and open house was kept in the palaces along the Thames and in the apartments of diplomats and men of influence. At night the sky glowed orange with bonfires in which rumps of meat were roasted in scorn and effigies of Cromwell were burned in derision. 'I stood in the Strand and beheld it and blessed God,' John Evelyn confided to his diary.

Charles II arrived in London on his thirtieth birthday. All his life he had been buffeted by fortune. Heir to the throne, he achieved adolescence and exile at once. He came of age in Europe, a child of diplomatic intrigue, broken promises and unfulfilled hopes. A king in name only, he was governed first by his overbearing mother, and then by the foreign hosts off whom he sponged and the English exiles who used him for their own advancement. Most of all he was haunted by the ghost of his father and the contradictory conclusions to be drawn from his death: either that no sacrifice was too great or that no compromise was. Of necessity, Charles II had developed a thick skin and a cynical political realism. He believed he could read character from a person's face, and that was usually all of the effort he put into his judgements. His insouciance was more apparent than real – a seeming distance from

things that had once been taken away – though there is no doubt that he was inattentive to government. He worked hardest at earning the sobriquet 'merry monarch'. His thick lips, arched eyebrows and sparkling black eyes proclaimed his sensuous nature. Charles acknowledged fourteen illegitimate children and dallied openly with his mistresses. Like his interest in science, his affairs were diversions that allowed him to avoid political confrontation: the first gave birth to the Royal Society; the second to the Duke of Monmouth.

Charles's desire for settlement was immediately apparent in his choice of counsellors and officers of state. These were divided nearly evenly between former supporters and opponents. The core of the Privy Council was those ministers who had been with him in exile: Clarendon as Chancellor, the Earl of Southampton as Treasurer, and Sir Edward Nicholas as Secretary. But important posts were given to former Cromwellians, including the appointment of Monck as captain-general of the army and Edward Montagu as vice-admiral, under Charles's brother, James, Duke of York. Former parliamentarians like Holles and the Earl of Manchester were also accommodated. The King showed himself equally catholic in showering earldoms and baronies upon those who had sustained his exile and those who made possible his return. Monck leapt from commoner to Duke of Albemarle in a single bound.

Nor did Charles wish to wreak vengeance on those most responsible for what was being called 'the usurpation'. He urged the Convention to pass the Act of Indemnity and Oblivion which excepted less than a hundred persons or estates from complete pardon. The savagery felt by those royalists aching for revenge was done to the corpses of Cromwell, Ireton and Bradshaw, which were disinterred, dismembered and disgraced. Cromwell's head, set on a pole outside Westminster Hall, was on view for a quarter-century. Those who escaped into exile were hunted by assassins. There were eleven public executions, including those of the millenarian General Thomas Harrison and the republican Thomas Scot, who wished his epitaph to be 'Here lies Thomas Scot who adjudged to death the late king.' Sated or not, the blood lust was at an end.

The Restoration took place in stages. It involved negotiation and compromise among a variety of groups and interests whose power was unequal and unstable. The Convention Parliament worked rapidly and efficiently to complete the first settlement. It was carried along on a tide

of euphoria too strong for either parliamentary or royal pressure groups to resist. It made pragmatic decisions designed to deal in a direct way with large and obvious problems. The first was the law. All acts signed by Charles I were reconfirmed, and all legal proceedings of the past twenty years were declared valid. Anything less would have resulted in chaos – civil plaintiffs and criminals demanding that their cases be reopened. But this meant the end of prerogative jurisdictions such as Star Chamber and the regional councils. It also meant that Charles would be required to abide by the Triennial Act and summon regular parliaments. The second obvious problem was the military. Not even the staunchest royalists contemplated providing Charles with a standing army. Yet members of the Convention knew that every previous disbandment scheme had resulted in revolt. Before ordering demobilization they passed an Indemnity Ordinance and levied a special assessment to pay the soldiers full arrears in return for swearing oaths of loyalty to the new regime. Miraculously, the Army disappeared. Regiments melted into town and countryside as if England had not just experienced the longest period of military occupation since the Norman Conquest. The invincible parliamentary armies left two incompatible legacies: pride at the accomplishments that made England an international power and prejudice against the demands of a professional army. For the next century, prejudice would hold sway.

With good reason, Charles had assigned the difficult decisions on indemnity, land-holding and religion to the Convention Parliament in the Declaration of Breda. Each held its own hornets' nest, and even the wary could not approach them without being stung.

There was much wrangling over the individuals to be excepted from the Act of Pardon, as the King demanded justice only for his father's death. But many other fathers had died, and the royalist peers had particular scores to settle. To the regicides proper were added central figures of the revolutionary regimes – Lambert, Haselrig and Vane were the most prominent – though the military escaped lightly, thanks to the intervention of Monck. The act also contained clauses mandating a collective national amnesia, forbidding the provocative slanders and opprobrious labels which nevertheless became such a feature of local life for the next thirty years.

The land settlement was too complex to be solved by act of Parliament. Not since the dissolution of the monasteries had so much land passed through so many hands in so brief a period. It was easy to

restore the crown estates and the lands of the church, though hard to evict tenants and to void leases. It was equally simple to return land awarded to prominent parliamentarians and Cromwellians that had been confiscated from royalists. The problem was what to do about land that had been sold under duress or repurchased on mortgage. The finances of many families had been ruined by their loyalty to the King. They had sold bits of ancestral estates on the open market to pay composition fines, decimation taxes or just their quarterly bills. They would receive no relief and were to become the backbone of the sullen former royalists who vented their frustrations in petty acts of revenge.

The religious settlement proved most difficult of all, and the Convention contributed very little to it. The commitment to toleration of tender consciences that Charles had conceded to Monck dissolved when placed in the hands of acidulous Anglicans and Presbyterians. It was hard for anyone to describe the nature of the church as it existed in 1660, except that it was neither national nor episcopal. It was about to become both. Yet there were genuine questions as to the form and content of such a church. These were not the pragmatic issues at which the Convention excelled, and there was probably a parliamentary sigh of relief when the theological issues were shunted to a conclave of learned divines. In October they proposed an interim arrangement – the Worcester House Declaration – which created a mixed episcopal and Presbyterian structure. The Convention's one contribution to the religious settlement was Solomonic. Throughout the 1640s and '50s Anglican ministers had been dispossessed of their livings for a variety of functional, political and moral lapses. They now petitioned to be reinstated as vigorously as did their replacements to be confirmed. By act of Parliament, the ejected ministers were reinstituted provided that they paid compensation to those whom they replaced. A few high-profile personalities were deprived of their places altogether, yet less than 10 per cent of parish clergy were affected. A lasting religious settlement was left to the parliament that was to be convened in the following year.

The initial Restoration settlement eased the resumption of monarchical government in England. In less than five months of work the Convention reinstituted king, lords and bishops and disbanded the Army. Charles II reclaimed his crown without condition, but it was a different crown from the one that had tumbled into the basket in 1649. Parliament, church and king were now inextricably tied together. By

withstanding attacks from monarch and army, Parliament had made good its claim to be the representative of the people, even if the concept of representation and the definition of the people remained elusive. If it had ever been an event, Parliament was now an institution. By enduring assaults upon its structure and doctrine, the episcopal church proved an essential part of the spiritual life of the nation. Its place as the mean between extremes of papists and Puritans gave Anglicanism, as it would soon be called, the essential identity it had lacked. By surviving overthrow and exile, the monarchy laid claim to the hearts of the people. Though it retained its trappings of divinity – Charles II enthusiastically provided the miracle cure of the king's touch – monarchy was revealed as a system of government rather than the reign of a king. It was a system of government that the English people had self-consciously chosen when they had the choice: a system best able to provide security, stability and prosperity.

The settlements in Ireland and Scotland were at once more simple and more complex. In Ireland, the Cromwellian regime had pursued the same policy of plantation as had the Stuarts, but with greater success. Lord Lieutenants ruled as viceroys, their deputies oversaw government of the Protestant communities, and the Catholics were controlled by the sword. Charles II was proclaimed in Dublin two weeks after he was in England, and at first he chose to leave most of the Cromwellian personnel in place. Land, not personnel, proved the main issue in Ireland. The Cromwellian conquest had been effected by hiving off huge areas, clearing them of Catholic landowners, and awarding possession to soldiers who risked their lives and 'adventurers' who risked their money. Some of this land had been owned by Protestant families dispossessed during the rebellion – those refugees whose baleful tales so heated the blood of the conquerors – some of it by Catholics who had not joined the Confederacy. Moreover, the same lands were the subject of dispute between 'old' and 'new English' the resolution of which Charles I had promised in the Graces. After several frustrating years of judging claims, the Duke of Ormond concluded that there would be insufficient land to satisfy rightful claimants if there were two Irelands. The original plan was to confirm the holdings of the soldiers and adventurers and to try to satisfy others through compensation. This had the advantage of keeping owner-occupiers in place and enhancing the prospect of a permanent Protestant plantation. It had the disadvantage of rewarding parliamentarians and

Cromwellians at the expense of former royalists. Even after modification, the Irish land settlement left a bitter legacy for Catholics and Protestants alike.

The problems in Scotland were different. There Charles II had been king since he had taken the Presbyterian Covenant in 1650. None of his three kingdoms had proved more devoted to the Stuarts than Scotland, from which the Second Civil War and the attack on the Commonwealth in 1650 had been launched. But it could not be forgotten that it was in Scotland that the civil wars had begun. Moreover, the King had his own experiences to draw upon – two years of doleful domination by flinty lairds and hectoring ministers that had ended in ignominy. Like his grandfather, James I, his opposition to the Presbyterian kirk was visceral. Charles exacted revenge by imprisoning leaders of the Cromwellian regime and ordering the execution of Argyll. He also reimposed 'the government as it is settled by law'. The *status quo ante bellum* in Scotland meant conciliar control of a subservient parliament, royal control of an all-powerful privy council, and the restoration of episcopacy. In this Charles could draw upon the divisive nature of Scottish politics, in which rivalries of region and clan were generally stronger than those of ideology. In 1662 the Scots repudiated the Covenant and readmitted the bishops without a lead from London. The Recissory Act (1661), which obliterated the work of every Scottish parliament since 1633, was passed against the wishes of the English privy council for fear that it went too far too fast.

These initial settlements more closely represented the interests of the King than what came later. Following the condign punishment of the ringleaders, Charles genuinely wished to start anew, to banish all memory of the recent past. He was willing to govern with the cooperation of his subjects and to leave critical decisions about the future of church and state to Parliament. He favoured an inclusive episcopal church as long as the censorious Presbyterians were kept under control. If anything, he showed less interest in Ireland and Scotland than had his father. The governments of the periphery were useful dumping-grounds for unwanted politicians – Monck refused to take the bait of the lieutenancy of Ireland – and training-grounds for the young and ambitious, but the King made no effort at integration. Even the ready-made opportunity to include Scots and Irish representatives in the Commons was fumbled away. Ireland was too tainted by Roman

Catholicism, Scotland by Genevan Calvinism for either to become part of a unified kingdom.

The second phase of settlement was more divisive than the first. The artificial unity maintained by the Convention Parliament as long as the security of the monarchy was in doubt quickly disappeared. In its place came contentions that revealed the weak hand of the King. The full Privy Council was too unwieldy to set policy. The balanced factions cancelled each other's views and the body grew to over fifty members. This led to the creation of a very small 'cabinet council' of principal advisers led by the Earl of Clarendon.

Clarendon's aspiration had been to serve Charles I – a task for which he was eminently suited. His was the acceptable face of 'Thorough', that of a pragmatist who revered the common law. He supported both the king's prerogatives and the subjects' liberties and broke ranks with the reformers in the Long Parliament only when he determined that they were more concerned with fixing blame than abuses. From the mid-1640s Clarendon effectively became Charles II's guardian and assumed a solemnity that was in comic contrast to his libertine ward. Charles treated him like an overbearing though indispensable governess. Doggedly loyal, Clarendon upheld the Stuart cause during the long and dismal exile and had his reward in 1660. Both his religious and his political views were frozen in the attitudes of 1641. Thus he was more accepting of Presbyterians than Catholics and more optimistic that the House of Commons would accept royal policies. He immediately became the focal point for criticism: from the bishops for supporting toleration too strongly and from the Presbyterians for not supporting it strongly enough. Young royalists thought he was too soft on the old revolutionaries, Cromwellians that he was too uncompromising. His reputation for integrity was shaken first by the revelation that his daughter had secretly married the Duke of York and then by the realization that the Portuguese queen he had sponsored was barren. He survived one impeachment in 1663 but not a second four years later, and he ended his days in exile completing his *History of the Civil Wars in England*.

The second Restoration settlement began with the Cavalier Parliament (1661–78). Charles summoned Parliament to affirm the coronation and provide for his financial security. The elections took place at the confluence of a rushing tide of royalism and a receding one of Presbyterianism. Winning candidates in electoral contests campaigned

upon their record of loyalty. The greater gentry returned to the hustings, and borough patrons were aggressive in controlling corporate seats. The result was a young and inexperienced House of Commons and a House of Lords dominated by the elevations of Charles II and his father. More than half of the House of Commons had impeccable royalist credentials; nearly a quarter had been punished for their loyalty. As a group they were embittered by the experiences of the past two decades. The years out of favour, when they had been deprived of places, dignities and worth, may have scarred their psyches but had taught them invaluable lessons. Time had not so much healed their wounds as made plain why they had received them. Thus the legislative programme they favoured, which brought them into conflict with the King and earned them a reputation for vindictiveness, was designed more to cauterize than to poison.

The first acts of the Cavalier Parliament provided a history lesson in the causes of the Civil War. To repudiate the influence of the mob, they made it a crime to gather more than twenty signatures to a petition or have a delegation larger than ten deliver it. The House of Lords restored the bishops to their seats and reversed the attainder of Strafford. Next, it was essential to reassert loyalty to church and king, because religion and politics were inseparable. Thus all MPs were required to take the sacrament according to the rites of the Church of England. Parliament ordered the Solemn League and Covenant burned by the common hangman in every town of the realm. The two Houses passed statutes making it treason to derogate royal authority or link the king's name with Catholicism. There were even proposals brought in to re-establish the prerogative courts of Star Chamber and the Council of the North, though these failed. Parliament then turned the clock back on its own independence by modifying the Triennial Act which had received Charles I's signature and whose principles were embodied in every constitutional experiment of the Interregnum. The new act (1664) dropped the clauses which mandated that writs be issued in the absence of a royal directive and made advisory the requirements that parliaments be triennial and of a set minimum duration. Finally, a new Licensing Act (1662) regulated printing and censored works. Licensing was assigned to the church, and enforcement to the watchful eye of the Surveyor of the Press, Sir Roger L'Estrange, a rancorous controversialist with a financial interest in restricting printing.

While this legislation represented a rather tardy closing of the barn

door, the Houses also worked industriously to provide stronger locks for the future. The great structural weakness of the Stuart monarchy was fiscal. The theory that the king should finance government from his ordinary revenues smacked hard against the realities of the seventeenth-century state. The resistance of the English governing classes to a level of taxation appropriate to support their monarchy had created the constitutional crises of the 1620s and '30s. The civil wars, however, demonstrated that the economy could absorb rates unimaginable in the past. Beginning in 1642 the armies alone were costing the equivalent of nearly three subsidies *a month*, and Oliver Cromwell was thought to have eased the burden when he reduced it to the equivalent of two. The operational costs of government were met by consumption taxes, especially through the introduction of the excise, which, like customs, was easy to regulate and collect. Though the governments of Commonwealth and Protectorate engaged in near-constant warfare, supported a standing army of over 50,000 and garrisoned Ireland and Scotland, their fiscal situation was no worse than that of James I.

When the Convention Parliament sought to restore the monarchy, it intended to do so on a sound financial footing. It also intended to take advantage of reforms such as the abolition of feudal tenures and the Court of Wards and of innovations such as the land tax and the excise. The theory of crown finance underwent a subtle shift. While parliamentarians continued to believe that royal government was to be funded out of ordinary revenues, the concept that the king should 'live of his own' was rendered archaic. Fiscal prerogatives gave way to direct grants of taxation, and Parliament, willy-nilly, became responsible for granting a sufficient ordinary income. In 1660 a parliamentary committee investigated anticipated revenue and expenses with the intention of putting them into balance. It concluded that the King needed an annual income of £1.2 million and that this could be provided through enhanced customs, continuation of the excise at lower rates, and a special land tax to make up the loss of revenue from the Court of Wards. There can be little doubt that the Convention intended to provide Charles II with an adequate revenue and no question that it failed to do so. Ledger entries were little more than guesses – most of them uneducated – and members of the committee proved worse mathematicians than prognosticators when they double-counted the income from the excise on wine.

Thus Charles II fell into debt almost immediately and turned to the Cavalier Parliament for relief. As in 1660, there was sympathy for the King's plight, but now there was also resistance to the likeliest means of relieving it. Many country members were themselves in straitened circumstances, while borough members reported that the towns would not endure another increase in the excise. Initial expedients included a benevolence – an extraordinary grant of a year's revenue – and finally the introduction in 1662 of the Hearth Tax. In theory, taxing chimneys was more progressive than raising the excise on beer. The number of hearths correlated to the size of houses, which in turn correlated to wealth. The urban poor would be exempt and the rural poor would be taxed at the lowest rate. But no tax which allowed the gentry to assess each other was likely to be progressive. The Hearth Tax yielded less than a third of the most conservative estimates and was as unpopular as the excise. The King's government continued to run at a deficit.

The most difficult problems faced by the Cavalier Parliament concerned security. The want of an army had made Charles I vulnerable to attack from Scotland and dependent upon Parliament for his survival. The want of clear statutory authority had made possible the Militia Ordinance by which the Long Parliament had raised forces against the King. The Cavalier Parliament wished to remedy these defects. Nevertheless, there was nothing more feared and hated in English society than the army. Too many members of Parliament had had first-hand experience with swaggering soldiers and crippling military taxation to be willing to support a permanent standing militia of the kind that Charles II craved. Every abortive revolt – like Thomas Venner's rising of thirty-five Fifth Monarchists in January 1661 – every farcical plot reported to the Secretaries of State was magnified to prove the need for a royal militia. Especially in 1661, the government gauged the mood of the people exactly. Pathetic as it was, Venner's rising led to a vicious crackdown on religious dissenters, especially Quakers and Baptists, who were imprisoned by the thousands without due process. But demands for a royal army were still resisted. The militia was the purview of the peerage and the local gentry through the structure of the lieutenancy. Attempts to convert it to a centralized force smacked too much of Cromwell. Thus the Militia Act of 1662 vested all military authority in the king through the county militias, although Charles was given money to maintain the lifeguard that had protected him since 1660, for another three years.

Issues of security were also behind decisions taken to regulate corporations. Urban areas – the ‘seminaries of faction’ – had offered crucial support to Parliament against the King. They had also undergone much change under the Protectorate, which granted new charters and allowed the replacement of corporate officers. As with the militia, the government’s inclination was for centralized control, especially over key personnel. A plan which emanated from the House of Lords would have required the reconfirmation of all charters, given the king the right to select town officers, and eliminated boroughs’ exemption from the jurisdiction of county JPs. But the Commons balked at such an extension of royal power. They were more concerned with restoring those who had lost their places and assuring the loyalty of corporate members. The Corporation Act of 1661 was a victory for the Commons. For a period of thirteen months, commissions made up of county élites regulated corporations by imposing the oaths of supremacy, allegiance and non-resistance and by requiring abjuration of the Solemn League and Covenant. Some did their work thoroughly and exacted revenge; other visitations were perfunctory, and the declaration against the Covenant accounted for most of the exclusions of old Cromwellians from town government.

The acts to settle the militia and to regulate corporations demonstrated the limits of royal control over Parliament. Even the strongest predisposition towards cooperation did not ensure passage of the government’s programme, especially when central and local interests conflicted. In no area was this conflict greater than in religion, and in no area were the phases of restoration so different. In the Declaration of Breda, Charles II had offered to accept a tolerant religious policy as determined by Parliament. His own inclination was for leniency in matters of conscience and severity in matters of obedience. Even a broad church would not encompass those who ‘disturbed the public peace’ – groups defined either by their own actions or by others’ reactions. This category included Catholics, Independents and all sectarian Protestants. Whether it also included Presbyterians was the crucial question. Initially, the King and his leading ministers favoured comprehending Presbyterians within the established church. Their motives were political rather than theological. They believed that Presbyterian support was crucial for a successful restoration. The Presbyterians were the largest group in the Convention and a key constituency among London financiers, and General Monck was of their ilk. Charles

offered bishoprics to three Presbyterians and appointed a number of them royal chaplains. He also signalled his favour towards moderate Presbyterians in the Worcester House Declaration of October 1660, which promised a review of the structure and doctrine of the re-established church.

When the Cavalier Parliament met six months later the political situation had radically altered. The Convention had not placed religious conditions upon the crown, and Presbyterian support had not been vital in the initial Restoration settlement. The parliamentary selections of 1661 further diminished the Presbyterians’ strength, while all but one of their clerical leaders had abstained from accepting church office. The conference on reforming the Book of Common Prayer convened at Savoy House in April proved a tower of Babel. Most decisively, the episcopacy had been restored and the bishops had their own ideas about the shape of an Anglican church. William Juxon, who had comforted Charles I on the scaffold, was Primate, but Gilbert Sheldon, Bishop of London, was the power behind Convocation. Sheldon was a tough-minded, practical man who had worked tirelessly to sustain traditional religion during its period in the wilderness. His tombstone would read ‘Protector of the Church’. He was an administrator rather than a scholar, and had kept out of the dispute over Arminianism. This made him an ideal choice as Bishop of London and as Juxon’s successor in 1663. Though no ideologue, Sheldon did not view doctrine as an object of political compromise. The church had its own martyrs, had suffered its own privations, and had not had the luxury of exile. Pastors had stayed with their congregations and had provided the stability and comfort of traditional ceremonies and festivities. When the test of loyalty came, the vast majority of incumbents had upheld the practices of the established church. Despite the Puritan ascendancy, the old religion endured. Upon the solid rock of such churchmen, not the malleable clay of the politicians, would Sheldon build Anglicanism. Thus the revisions to the prayer-book made following the Savoy Conference offered little to even moderate Presbyterians, and Sheldon refused all compromise when they were debated in Parliament.

The independence of Sheldon and the hierarchy of the church was matched by the independence of members of Parliament. There was no consensus on questions of religion. Both Houses included a spectrum of religious adherents, and almost all of the critical decisions were made by a minority of members for a variety of reasons. But it was quickly



apparent that the tolerant policy of 1660 did not fit the intolerant mood of 1661. After the passage of a rigorously Anglican prayer-book, the two Houses agreed to a rigidly conservative Act of Uniformity (1662). Like the officers of corporations, all clerics and teachers were to abjure the Solemn League and Covenant, renounce the right of resistance, and conform to the established practices of the Church of England. Those who did not would be ejected. Though the intention of the act was to exclude dissenters from the ministry, it trapped many others as well. Over 1,000 clergymen in England and Wales were now deprived of their places. Sheldon turned a deaf ear to every plea for leniency and vetoed every exception to the rule. He steeled the courage of Charles II and, with the enthusiastic support of Parliament, beat down the objections of Clarendon to such intolerance. The bulk of exclusions in 1660 had satisfied the demands of equity; those of 1662 satisfied the rigours of law.

King and Chancellor opposed the Act of Uniformity for different reasons. Though both had expressed support for a tolerant church settlement, Charles had done so for the sake of Catholics, Clarendon for the sake of order. Half the King's family were Catholics – he would soon marry a Catholic queen – and he wished to soften the impact of the recusancy laws. Comprehension of Presbyterians might lead to tolerance – though not toleration – of Catholics. Clarendon opposed the Act of Uniformity because he feared the creation of a permanent fifth column, especially in urban areas. By treating moderate Presbyterians the same as radical Baptists and Quakers, Parliament was creating a movement out of splinter groups. Reluctantly, Clarendon supported Sheldon's hard-line approach, and the ejections were accomplished without great difficulty. But the King did not achieve his objectives, and towards the end of 1662 he issued a Declaration of Indulgence which announced his desire to soften the rigours of the law. He requested that Parliament prepare a bill which would allow him to suspend enforcement of the act on an individual basis. A policy of indulgence had the advantage of maintaining the unity of the established church while allowing the crown room for political manoeuvre. It had the disadvantage of establishing the precedent that the king could dispense with the law. On these grounds even Clarendon opposed it.

In fact, the temper of Parliament in 1663 was more obdurate than indulgent. Despite the rigours of the Act of Uniformity, dissenting ministers thundered from their pulpits. Despite the vigilance of L'Estrange

and the censors, Presbyterian polemic poured from the presses. It was scathing and embittered, the wail of an ensnared animal forced to desperate acts of self-preservation. Every cry brought the hunter closer. The royalists had never forgiven the Presbyterians their part in the origins of the Civil War. It was they who had eroded the authority of the church, who had made the pact with the devilish Scots that brought all to ruin. It was they who had incited the Commons to take up arms against their lawful sovereign. Without the prodding of learned divines, wealthy citizens and comfortable gentry there would have been no stampede of mobs and mad prophets. It mattered little that the Presbyterians had recanted: indeed this only confirmed the royalist judgement that Presbyterian conscience was not so much 'painful' as 'prideful'. In the Commons, members introduced bills to extirpate dissent.

These had little chance of passage until government spies and provocateurs revealed the details of a plot in Yorkshire to overthrow the regime. The accounts were such a tangle of misinformation, rumour and lies that it took several months for authorities to believe in the existence of a northern conspiracy. Pre-emptive arrests of suspects and the mustering of Yorkshire trained bands effectively ended the threat, though subsequent investigation revealed that the motley collection of former republicans, Cromwellians, Baptists and Quakers included a substantial group of Presbyterians. This was all the excuse that the leaders of the Cavalier Parliament needed. They revived the bill against Protestant dissent and intensified its penalties. The resulting Conventicle Act (1664) banned religious services other than those of the Church of England. Anyone caught attending a conventicle was subject successively to fine, imprisonment and transportation as an indentured labourer. For the purposes of the act, Presbyterians were to be treated the same as Quakers, and there was to be no leniency afforded those who occasionally attended Anglican services. In the following year Parliament passed the Five Mile Act, which prevented dissenting clergymen from living within five miles of a corporate town, effectively excluding them from their urban bases of support, especially London. The punitive nature of this legislation was justified by Sheldon: 'Those who will not be governed as men, by reason and persuasion, shall be governed as beasts, by power and force.' The only saving grace for dissenters was that all of these acts, which were collectively misnamed the Clarendon Code, were difficult to enforce.

The fractiousness of the second Restoration settlement was a better indicator of the future of Charles's government than the unity of the first. The Cavalier House of Commons had demonstrated its independence, royal government its ineptitude. The King's legislative programme was haphazard, his parliamentary management non-existent. The government's greatest failure was not to secure an adequate revenue when Parliament was inclined to provide one. This meant that every session began with a begging-bowl outstretched to the House of Commons, whose control of the purse weakened the House of Lords as well as the King. The Lords suffered from their own divisions. Court factionalism intensified as government stabilized and the spoils of power increased. Clarendon remained the lightning-rod for opposition, especially as his health began to fail. His hold over the King was based on his strengths as a politician: the grasp of detail, the manipulation of underlings, the ability to know when to stroke and when to squeeze. But the two had no emotional ties, and Charles despised his chancellor's priggishness as much as Clarendon disapproved of his king's debauchery. It was easy for Clarendon's opponents to gain the King's ear. Finally, the religious legislation that separated Protestants into conformists and dissenters masked the far greater hostility of both to Catholics. If the Declaration of Indulgence was a trial balloon, it had burst with a resounding pop.

So too had the protective bubble that surrounded the King. Not only was the court divided, by 1662 public criticism of royal policy was on the rise. Charles's marriage to Catherine of Braganza was initially disliked on the grounds of her Catholicism and subsequently on the grounds that she was barren. There could be no doubt of the King's potency. Though a diplomatic blow aimed at alluring France and repelling Spain, the marriage was a match made for money. The King of Portugal's daughter brought a seemingly large dowry and the strategically significant port of Tangier. Those who marry for money usually earn it, and Charles II was no exception. Much of the dowry went unpaid, Tangier was abandoned in 1684, and England's financial support of Portugal's war with Spain offset trading concessions in the East. Fiscal considerations were also behind the decision to sell the Cromwellian prize of Dunkirk to France. Its capture from Spain represented England's first toehold on the Continent since Queen Mary had lost Calais in 1558. The town had long been a staging-point for privateers, and its capture meant they could no longer target English shipping. Thus Charles's determination to offload Dunkirk offended both

the nation's sense of honour and the merchants' sense of security. At court the disposition was a triumph of foreign policy. The town was too expensive to be maintained indefinitely – it could only be sold or abandoned – and the sale to France further harmed Spain. But in the country the decision was uniformly unpopular.

Charles's ties to Portugal were directed against the crumbling might of the Spanish empire. The Spanish Habsburgs had never recovered from their near-capture of Paris in 1643. The ensuing years had been one long retreat. France was now the great European power, and her robust king, Louis XIV, made plans to acquire territory and *gloire*. To achieve his aims he needed only to prevent all of his potential enemies from uniting against him – a task made easier by their inability to perceive the French menace. England had fought a brief war against Holland and a longer one against Spain, and in both conflicts it sought French aid. The Dutch opposed Spain more naturally than even the British, their hostility the result of eighty years of near-unremitting warfare. They too courted Louis, and successfully concluded an alliance in 1662.

By the 1660s international politics had lost its predominantly confessional motivation. A Europe that had once been starkly divided into Catholic and Protestant had evolved into one dominated by a *realpolitik* so cynical as to make Machiavelli blush. Foreign policy was conducted on few principles other than opportunism. French and Spanish ambassadors were little more than bagmen for their princes, deputed to put as many leading ministers as possible on the payroll. Royal navies were indistinguishable from pirates; the fleets of trading companies behaved no differently from invasion forces. The European powers formed and broke alliances with such regularity that the diplomatic marriages they made were as worthless as counterfeit coin. Monarchs lived openly with their mistresses as if to traduce the kings and princes whose daughters they married. The world was like a playground filled with bullies spoiling for a fight. Every imagined slight was interpreted as a provocation – a matter of personal dignity for the monarch and of national pride for his people.

Such a setting provides an understanding of the Anglo-Dutch war of 1665-7. Its causes were obscure, its objectives illusive. Only its greedy motives were clear, as there was no need to cover them with a shroud of decency. Each nation savoured the possibility of carving a larger share of world trade out of the flank of the other. The English wished to



inherit the Portuguese interest in the East, the Dutch to replace Spanish dominion in the West. Moreover, both sides had their justifications for war: claims for compensation on illegal seizures had not been paid; the conditions of settlement after the war of 1652-4 had not been met. There was new provocation as well. The Dutch would not share the lucrative West African trade, ruining the overseas company set up by the Duke of York and other powerful English courtiers. New Amsterdam smugglers wreaked havoc on North American customs collections, and the presence of the Dutch in the middle of the English settlements was more than a fiscal nuisance.

Nearly everyone but Clarendon supported the war. The naturally cautious Chancellor had no financial stake in the rivalry with the Dutch and he continued to fret over the demands of domestic policies and the budget. He didn't believe that England could afford a war. Against Clarendon stood his son-in-law, James, Duke of York, who was itching for a military engagement in which he could distinguish himself as he had during his European exile. As Lord Admiral, James would lead a war against the Dutch, and he bullied his brother into the aggressive acts that led to the conflict. In 1664 a raiding-party seized New Amsterdam – subsequently renamed New York – and warships sailed to West Africa. Charles summoned Parliament to provide funds to outfit ships of the line, and to everyone's consternation the Commons voted £2.5 million. This allowed James to assemble the largest armada in England's history and to win one of its greatest naval triumphs – off Lowestoft in mid-1665. War fever swept the nation, and the King regained the popularity of the Restoration.

The victory off Lowestoft swelled English pride, though it did nothing to resolve the military situation. The Dutch recouped their strength and settled in for the long haul. Their alliance with Louis XIV meant that the English would have to defend Atlantic shipping from French privateers and thus dilute their energies. It also meant that Charles would have to raise even larger sums of money to keep his fleet in action. The campaigns of 1666 ended in nothing better than a draw, war weariness replaced euphoria, and public support turned to criticism. Plague raged in London; rebellion flared in Scotland. Worse was to come the following year. While the Privy Council discovered that it was easier to begin a war than to end one, the Dutch made preparations for an aggressive campaign. In June their admiral De Ruyter broke the boom that prevented ships entering the Medway and made his way to

the shipyards at Chatham. There he bombarded a stationary fleet – kept in dock for lack of funds – setting fire to three large warships and towing away the *Royal Charles*, the King's flagship built by Cromwell and originally named *Naseby*. Had the old Protector had a grave, he would surely have been spinning in it.

De Ruyter's romp up the Medway disastrously concluded the second Anglo-Dutch war. Everyone connected with government was tainted by the result, the King and his brother coming in for humiliating personal criticism. The war nearly bankrupted the crown and placed the King at the absolute mercy of Parliament. Politicians took the opportunity to settle old scores. In the Lords, the Catholic Earl of Bristol and the dissenter Duke of Buckingham not only reclaimed royal favour, they combined to ruin their common enemy Clarendon. In truth the war needed a scapegoat and Clarendon had outlived his political usefulness. He was unpopular in Parliament and unpopular with the people. On the night that Chatham Docks burned, a crowd attacked his home. Thus the Chancellor was the easy sacrifice, even though he had opposed the war, and it was all his friends could do to prevent capital charges of treason being brought. Two decades before, Clarendon had promised Charles I that he would protect his son. Now he had to be impeached to do so.

# 2

## THE PROTECTORATE

### I Central Government

The Commonwealth was technically to last for an important eight months after the expulsion of the Purged Parliament. Yet there are good reasons for treating the period from April 1653 until September 1658 as a unit. During that time the army, having failed to obtain satisfaction from the body which it had installed in 1648, embarked upon a series of briefer experiments intended to bring about better results. Furthermore, at the moment that he ordered the MPs from the House, Cromwell turned his already considerable importance in British politics into an absolute dominance which was to last until his death. It is appropriate, therefore, to make at this point an assessment of this remarkable personality, by far the most important and influential in the British Isles during his final decade of life.

Three facets of it will have become plain already: his brilliance as a general, his equal dynamism as a politician, and a certain slipperiness of attitude or tactic which made him all the more effective and dangerous in either role. Until the early nineteenth century he was disparaged more often than praised, but since then the chorus of admiration from historians has been more or less constant. The view that is taken of him in this book is slightly more critical than the norm. So often, the alterations of his politics are described as those of a mighty and divided soul, a conservative country gentleman yoked with a millennialist

dreamer. So he was, but he was also a practical politician who yielded to necessities. Repeatedly he would strive for compromise, but as soon as an event appeared inevitable, such as the regicide or the dissolution of the Purged Parliament, he would seize control of the process and so reassert his influence. In the last analysis, he never forgot that his power depended upon pleasing the army. Defenders of Cromwell would suggest that at such times he was waiting to see which way the will of God was tending and then following it. Perhaps he was, but then God clearly always wanted Cromwell to survive politically. Like any politician, he manipulated people and he told half-truths: a reading of his speeches easily illustrates how he remoulded the memory of past events to serve present needs, and altered his persona (squire or saint) to suit his audience. He was by nature expansive, emotional and good-humoured, and employed these attributes as assets, knowing well when to submit others to an outburst of fury, a flight of rhetoric or some boisterous bonhomie. Again, personality and tactic are impossible to distinguish. To say that he aimed at power would be horribly unjust, but he did have a shrewd instinct for retaining it.

The same complex pattern is seen in his choice of clients. As the 1650s wore on, he slowly filled civil and military government with men personally attached to himself. Key army commands went to individuals who had served in his own Civil War regiment. The most favoured were those most closely connected to his own family, his son-in-law Charles Fleetwood and his brother-in-law John Disbrowe. Others among his protégés were former royalists whom he had tempted into his service. The most prominent among these was George Monck, the man who had finished off the conquest of Scotland and then fought so ably at sea. But there were also Roger Boyle, Lord Broghil, son of the Anglo-Irish Earl of Cork, and Charles Howard, one of a prominent Cumberland family. All were unusually talented and all were younger sons, dependent upon public employment to further their fortunes. A third group of clients consisted of his blood relatives, such as his cousins Henry Lawrence, whom he brought into prominence in civil government, and Edward Montagu, for whom he sought a military command. Before long

his two sons would be involved in the regime. It has been noted that Cromwell rejoiced in such a heterogeneous following because it represented a union of different backgrounds and ideologies of the sort that he wished for in the nation. It has also been pointed out that he disliked true ideologies, as barriers to this reunion. Perhaps so, but it also suited his practical purposes to surround himself with able subordinates who had nothing in common save their gratitude to him. And ideologues were difficult people with whom to do deals.

In April 1653 many of the consequences of these traits were still in the future, and the pressing concern of the whole army was to replace the Parliament which had just been ejected. Cromwell's action had been so sudden that no contingency plan had been drawn up. A Council of Officers without any fixed membership, chosen by each other, decided upon a new Council of State to administer the realm and a new national assembly to carry out the reforms canvassed since 1649 and to provide for Parliaments thereafter. The Council of State was overwhelmingly military, and the 'Parliament' was, uniquely, to be named by the Council of Officers itself, thereby side-stepping the problem of creating a friendly electorate. [The rest of the army was persuaded with some difficulty to accept the decisions of its leaders instead of sharing in their debates, and both councils, of Officers and of State, were riven with discord themselves.] But the job was done nonetheless and the nominated assembly called for 4 July. [Cromwell's work during this period consisted of trying to foster good relations between the army and the corporation of London, which might provide loans, and of making sure that his own clients got into the new assembly.]

The latter convened to a speech of welcome from the general, in which he encouraged it to undertake the work shirked by the Purged Parliament and to satisfy both Fifth Monarchists and presbyterians. This was, of course, an utterly impossible brief. The people who received it numbered 140, and can be called a Parliament only because they formally took the title. If this is recognised, they were at once the smallest Parliament in English history and the first imperial one, for eleven representatives were named to it from Scotland and Ireland (almost all of them

Englishmen serving in those countries). In a sense it was the most representative assembly that England had yet known, having a far greater proportion (two-thirds) of people who were not from the traditional ruling families of their regions. Yet most were not commoners, but minor gentry, and the number who were not landowners amounted to no more than a fifth of the whole. Yet in another sense, of course, they represented only the Council of Officers. Historians have usually called them Barebone's Parliament, after one of the most radical and colourfully-named of them, Praise-God Barebone. As he held no formal position of leadership, and was only a member of a faction, the nickname was a slur. Hence the assembly will be referred to here as the Little Parliament.

It had been chosen to act more speedily than its predecessor, and it certainly did. In the six months of its existence it passed thirty statutes, and many of these were based upon proposals made during the previous four years. The ceremony of marriage was removed from the Church and entrusted to JPs, with registrars elected by the propertied in each parish to record each union. Measures were enacted to relieve both creditors and poor prisoners, and others were proposed to reduce the number of central treasuries, produce a simpler legal code and abolish the most inefficient of the central law courts, Chancery. All this progress, nonetheless, failed to mask divisions more bitter than those known in the Purged Parliament. Repeatedly, the House split between a more radical minority, which wished to abolish tithes, codify the law and abolish Chancery, punish royalists and Catholics and reduce the assessment, and a more 'moderate' majority. The latter were only conservative in relation to the radicals, as many belonged to independent churches, and they included most of Cromwell's clients in the House, including his son Henry, and Montagu, Howard and Disbrowe. They were also drawn slightly more from the greater gentry than the 'radical' leaders, who tended to be lesser gentry or merchants. These 'moderates' won most of the actual divisions, but as winter drew on and some of the less dedicated members slipped away, their majorities began to fall. This was the more significant in that the Parliament was now debating the most emotive

issue of all, that of religion. In July it had voted to keep tithes, but in December it called for a bill to abolish the right of patrons to appoint clergy to livings and rejected (by two votes) a plan to have inadequate ministers removed by a central committee. During the same period several of the more 'moderate' members began to wonder about the competence of this Parliament to act as a government at all. It had elected a largely civilian Council of State, which was bungling peace talks with the Dutch. A serious rebellion was spreading in Scotland, while the desire of the 'radicals' to reduce the assessment had annoyed many of the soldiers who might normally have been their allies. Accordingly, some of the 'moderates' decided to destroy the Little Parliament. On 12 December they suddenly withdrew from its chamber and resigned their authority to an amazed Cromwell. Within the next few days a majority of the members gave support to this action, while the minority who remained in the chamber were ejected by soldiers, acting without the authority of the Commander-in-Chief.

It was a feature of this coup, so brilliantly and mysteriously contrived, that a new constitution had been prepared in advance. There was none of the confusion of April, and the successor regime was installed within a week. It had been designed by an individual who thus became one of the most powerful people in the country, John Lambert. Lambert was emphatically not a client of Cromwell, nor of anybody else. He had risen to fame in the North during the Great Civil War, and consistently demonstrated two remarkable talents. One was as a cavalry commander, greatly loved by his men. He had won some of the decisive engagements of the Scottish campaign, making Cromwell's victories possible. The other was as a statesman. He was possibly concerned in the drafting of the *Heads of Proposals*, was prominent in the Council of Officers in April 1653, and was certainly the author of the new *Instrument of Government* which was now enacted. His instinct was to replace the old trinity of King, Lords and Commons with one of King, Council and Parliament, each limiting the others' powers. In discussions during those crowded few days after the 12th, Cromwell and a few trusted advisers amended this blueprint in important

respects. A hereditary monarchy and the name of king were both felt to be unacceptable to the army, and so Cromwell was elected as Lord Protector by the new Council of State. His power was greatly limited by the need to consult and to act with that Council, which was dominated by the men who had led the secession from the Little Parliament, and by a list of soldiers of whom Lambert himself was now the most prominent. Its original members held their places for life. This powerful body had not featured in previous proposals for new constitutions, but the projected Parliaments embodied many of the schemes discussed since the *Heads of Proposals*. They were to consist of one chamber, with 400 English members as the *Agreement of the People* had envisaged, plus thirty each from Scotland and Ireland as the Purged Parliament had proposed in early 1653. The franchise was set at the uniform level determined by that Parliament, as was the proportion of county seats (two-thirds). Royalists were barred from voting or standing for nine years, and no Parliament could tamper with the army, the existing religious liberty or the lands confiscated from Crown and State. New elections would be held every three years and the Protector could veto any legislation. The system of checks and balances in the new constitution made it likely that it would be acceptable to anyone who was not a loyal follower of the Stuarts, a Fifth Monarchist or a 'Commonwealthsman' who believed in full parliamentary sovereignty.

Furthermore, it promised to be a reforming administration, carrying out the settlement of the nation that the two successive Parliaments of the Commonwealth had failed to provide. It permitted Protector and Council to issue 'ordinances' before the first Parliament met, and they declared a total of eighty-two in eight months. The 'Engagement' imposed by the Purged Parliament, which had been much ignored in practice, was now repealed. The ordinance involved condemned all such oaths, thereby holding out satisfaction to those sectaries and Quakers who held that Christ's injunction 'swear not at all' applied not only to profanity. Chancery was reconstructed. The Commonwealth's bench of judges was remodelled to remove four men who had been notoriously harsh to royalists, and nearly thirty of

the latter were released from prison. During the same period a structure was at last imposed upon the national Church. The plan delivered by the Owen group to the Purged Parliament had been for county committees to examine candidates for the ministry and a central committee to eject those already beneficed who had proved inadequate. The scheme was revived in the Little Parliament, and now it was adopted in reverse, with a central board of 'Triers' and local committees of 'Ejectors'. The Triers were a mixture of moderate presbyterians and of men like Owen himself who wanted both a national Church and independent congregations. It even included a few baptists. No common liturgy or doctrine was prescribed, and, of course, the sects were allowed to continue without supervision. Cromwell claimed that only the advice of the Council had stopped him from abolishing tithes. To please all taxpayers, the assessment was at last reduced by a quarter, to £90,000 per month. The hitherto extreme complexity of central government was now tidied up, many committees being abolished or reduced in size, and the revenue system was put under the control of a single Treasury Commission. Several features of the pre-war monarchical administration, such as a Household for the Protector and offices for endorsing documents with a Privy Seal and a Signet, were restored. Much of this was intended to produce simpler and speedier government, but it also provided a symbolic continuity with the old England and Wales which the Commonwealth had lacked.

One problem of a regime which held out something for almost everybody was, of course, that it might satisfy almost nobody. And if it did succeed in earning the goodwill of most of the public, it would still have to reckon with those extremist groups mentioned before, to whom compromise was treachery. Of these, the royalists gave least trouble. Crushed by all their defeats between 1645 and 1651, and offered present leniency and future rehabilitation, the great majority passively accepted the Protectorate. Charles II empowered a group of devoted followers to co-ordinate conspiracy, but these men, the 'Sealed Knot', had little social or political prestige and in any case were realistic enough to perceive that English royalism was at least temporarily out of

action. Much more trouble was caused by those former allies of the army who had been infuriated by the events of April and December 1653, the 'Commonwealthsmen' and the Fifth Monarchists. Both sets denounced the Protectorate in word and print, and five high-ranking officers in the army agreed with them. That the new government did not suffer badly from these attacks was due to a mixture of luck and skill. The officers concerned were scattered across England, Scotland and Ireland, while the regime's initial measures did indeed appeal to a wide enough section of opinion to leave its critics isolated. And those critics were dealt with quietly and ruthlessly. The pattern was set by the fate of John Lilburne, who returned to England in 1653 after the expulsion of the Purged Parliament, unwisely presuming that his sentence of exile was now equally defunct. The Little Parliament promptly had him tried for treason. To keep to legal forms it allowed him a jury, and as in 1649 he was acquitted. This time, however, the Council of State failed to release him, and when Cromwell took power Lilburne was transferred to an island prison, and died in captivity. The army officers who objected to the Protectorate were all swiftly cashiered or allowed to resign. Along with the regime's other vocal opponents, they were hauled before the Protector and Council for a warning, and if they persisted in their defiance they were bundled off like Lilburne to remote fortresses. It has been suggested that Cromwell and his councillors were thereby being merciful, by avoiding trials which would have cost these men their lives and providing the option of releasing them when they calmed down (which happened to several). Perhaps so. But this method was also a remarkably effective way of removing critics with the minimum of publicity and in breach of the most elementary rules of justice.

To substantiate its claims to legitimacy, it was essential that the Protectorate call a Parliament swiftly. It also needed one to obtain a grant of money. The Purged Parliament had not only consumed a huge amount of capital assets in the shape of confiscated land, but spent £1 million more each year than it had earned. The continuation of the Dutch war through 1653, and the Protectorate's cut in the assessment had worsened the debt,



to the extent that nobody was now willing to lend money to the government. The latter did make peace with the Dutch, but still spent £350,000 more than its revenue during 1654. So a Parliament was called, under the new constitution, for 3 September. Few of the Purged Parliament's members, or of the radicals from the Little Parliament, were returned to this one, while enough of the Protectorate's own members and clients were there to form a significant government interest. The bulk of those elected were the sort of gentry whom Pride's Purge had been designed to remove from power, Civil War parliamentarians who would never have supported the regicide. Cromwell's welcoming speech was therefore aimed deliberately at the political middle ground, calling for healing and settlement and lambasting the Levellers, Fifth Monarchists and Ranters. To his horror, the Parliament immediately set about debating the legitimacy of the *Instrument of Government*. The tramp of jackboots was heard again: on the 12th the MPs learned that their House was guarded by soldiers instructed to admit only those who agreed to accept the fundamentals of the constitution.

This got rid of the true Commonwealthsmen like Hesilrige, but the Parliament that remained showed itself very ready to redefine the details of the constitution in a way that Protector and Council found disturbing. Upon two enormous issues the government and the majority of the members slowly drew apart. One was that of religious liberty which most of the MPs believed had become too extensive. They wanted both a doctrine for the Church and a curtailment of the freedom which had been granted to dissenters. The other was the matter of money. From the beginning, the MPs were only prepared to vote an assessment cut by another third, on the understanding that the army would be reduced in proportion. The total financial establishment which they proposed for the regime seemed to its leaders to be quite inadequate to its needs. [On 20 January 1655 the Parliament began to discuss the formation of a militia which might replace many of the army's functions, and resolved to deny use of this body to Protector and Council without a Parliament's permission. Two days later they were summoned before a furious Cromwell, who accused them of fomenting discord and dissolved them.

The fate of the First Protectorate Parliament left the status of the *Instrument of Government* in doubt. On the one hand the Parliament had never finished revising it, and so it had never received legal endorsement. On the other, most of the same MPs had agreed to accept its fundamentals, and it suited the Protector and Council too well to be scrapped. So they set about measures designed to induce the next Parliament to be more co-operative. Initially, these were aimed to conciliate the sort of people whom the last one had represented. A proclamation was issued to restrict religious liberty, to the extent of ordering the punishment of dissenters who disturbed the services of the national Church. [The assessment was cut as the Parliament had wished, to £60,000 per month, and the total size of the army in the British Isles was brought down from 57,000 to 40,000 men. The soldiers' pay was also reduced] but as harvests had improved and food prices were now less than half what they had been in 1649, this proved acceptable. Even as these measures were being enacted, however, the same government was setting about others designed to show the nation that it would deal savagely with extra-parliamentary opposition. The occasion of these was a tragi-comic royalist rebellion on 8 March. It was the product of two sorts of desperation. One was that of Charles II's exiled court, which was now living upon the charity of German states and needed to remind Europe that his cause was still alive. The other was that of a group of royalist hotheads, socially and politically insignificant even in their own party, who were tired of the caution of the Sealed Knot and longed for action. Charles made matters worse by failing to give a clear mandate to his adherents in England either to rise or to wait for a better opportunity. The Protectorate now possessed a patchy but very active network of spies and informers, and had enough intimation of the plotting to arrest many potential leaders. As a result, when the signal for rebellion did come it was obeyed only by tiny groups, all but one of which dispersed as soon as it had gathered and realised its weakness. The exception was in Wiltshire, under John Penruddock, and that was chased into Devon and rounded up by a single horse troop.

This episode should have left the government feeling secure

and confident. Instead it exasperated the Protector and Council and roused them to some very dirty work. They employed trial by jury against Penruddock's band, as the offence of most of these men was obvious enough, and executed only twelve out of the thirty-three found guilty. But they then transported to the West Indies not only all the rest who had been condemned but those who had been acquitted and some who had not yet been tried. The whole body of people who had been engaged in royalism since 1642 were now declared to be under suspicion, although they had so conspicuously failed to support the rising. The wealthier among them were instructed to pay a 'decimation tax' upon their property, for the upkeep of a new militia led by local supporters of the Protectorate and intended to watch them. Furthermore, they were forbidden to come near London, sanctions were tightened up against the use of the old Prayer Book, and any clergy ejected from the Church since 1642 were barred from taking posts as private chaplains or as schoolteachers. In August ten (later eleven) of the leading men in the army were commissioned as Major-Generals, each to supervise a different set of counties. Lambert, Fleetwood and Disbrowe were amongst those so empowered, and they were instructed to improve local government and to reform morals in their areas as well as to provide complete security. Seven months after Cromwell had accused a Parliament of encouraging disunity, his government had wrenched open the divisions of the Great Civil War. The surviving evidence does not permit us to explain such an enormous over-reaction, or (though Lambert has often been named) to identify the moving spirits behind it.

In other respects also, the Protectorate behaved more roughly from the spring of 1655. In May it tried a merchant called Cony, who had refused to pay customs dues to a regime which had no legal basis. Cony could, of course, not be allowed to win his case, but the methods used to cow him disturbed even some who had hitherto loyally served the Protector. They consisted of the simple device of sending to prison all three lawyers who undertook to act for the defence. In June Cony gave up. One of the judges resigned in protest at this behaviour, and at the same time (as described earlier) four others were dismissed for casting

doubts upon the validity of the regime or its actions. They were replaced by more compliant individuals. More former allies of Cromwell and his councillors criticised their actions and were interned without trial. The Secretary of State, a clever client of Cromwell called John Thurloe, was given not only an enlarged espionage system but also powers to censor the press. The Protector himself claimed, as in the case of tithes, to have had the decision imposed upon him by his Council. This may well have been true, but whatever its origins the measure was certainly well enforced. Within a few months the only newspapers to appear regularly were the government journals edited by the timeserver Marchamont Nedham, who had fulfilled the same service for the Commonwealth. But Nedham's style had changed. In the days of the Purged Parliament he had written vivacious, witty propaganda. Now he made his papers as tedious and barren of news as possible: it is a feature of authoritarian regimes that they try to destroy the interest of the ruled in the activities of their rulers. *The Instrument of Government* allowed Protector and Council to issue ordinances only until their first Parliament met. Now they issued 'proclamations' instead, for which there was no legal warrant even by the increasingly dubious authority of the *Instrument*. They compounded the impression of arbitrariness by employing a proclamation to limit the eligibility of people to sit in municipal corporations. The Purged Parliament had only tried to exclude royalists, but the Protectorate now theoretically restricted membership to the 'godly', which apparently meant whatever the government wished.

Nonetheless the Protector and Council followed up these steps with less energy than their pronouncements suggested. The local impact will be considered later: for now it is sufficient to note two developments. First, that once on their beats the Major-Generals were more or less ignored and their constant requests for advice and encouragement went unanswered by the Council or the Protector. Indeed, Cromwell himself was often absent from important Council meetings: whatever his talents as soldier and politician, he was not an administrator. The second development was that the regime drew back from the crucial step of

imposing taxes without a Parliament. Taxes were certainly needed, for not only had the reduction in the army not been sufficient to compensate for that in the assessment, but a new naval war had broken out with Spain. [The decimation tax proved inadequate to pay the new militia, and Cromwell and the Council were unwilling to accede to the proposal of some of his Major-Generals, to lower the threshold of the property liable to it. By early 1656 annual expenditure was outrunning income by £230,000 despite many economies. The options were to extend the decimation tax to non-royalists or to try another Parliament. Cromwell claimed later that he was pushed into the latter course by the Major-Generals, but the evidence in Thurloe's papers makes this claim rather dubious. Certainly, there were protracted debates about the matter in the Council before a Parliament was called, for 17 September.]

Most of the Major-Generals were confident that they could get good men into the House. But then, the greatest strength of the regime lay in its ability to exclude, not include, MPs. According to the *Instrument*, the latter were required only to be of 'known integrity' and not royalists. The Council was by now, however, used to breaking its own rules and altered this to 'integrity to the government'. About a hundred members were thereupon excluded from the House, and as more withdrew in sympathy, this process removed in total about a third of its number. The remainder consisted, by and large, of the sort of individuals who had sat in the previous Parliament. But this one was to be different, characterised not by a struggle between the government party and the backbenchers so much as by a division between the supporters of the regime themselves, over three great issues. The first was religion, embodied this time not in debates over the form of the Church but over the fate of a Quaker leader, James Naylor. More than any other group, the Quakers had called the bluff of the Protectorate's religious settlement. The latter was intended to allow the existence of godly and peaceful nonconformists, who might contribute useful ideas and experiences to each other and the national Church. The Quakers were undoubtedly pious, and their sincerity was only too appallingly clear, but their missionary activity

depended upon confrontation, abuse and dramatic individual gestures. Cromwell himself clearly did not quite know what to make of them, finding their leaders impressive if in some respects deluded. In personal interviews he treated them gently and warily, and he obtained the release of some of them from prison. But he also encouraged the weeding out of their converts from the army and from local government and punished one who challenged the preacher in his own chapel. How little his restraint was shared by some of his own followers was revealed when Naylor was brought before the Parliament in December 1656. He had been arrested at Bristol for staging an entry to the city in the manner of Christ, and only the supreme tribunal of the land was felt to be worthy of dealing with the enormous implications of the action. His appearance permitted an explosion of feeling from all those members who believed that the existing religious liberty was too ample, and it completely shattered the government group. Some of the Protectorate's military leaders, such as Lambert and Disbrowe, and some of its civilian councillors, argued for clemency. Others among the regime's members and supporters wanted Naylor put to death. In the end the Parliament did not choose either option, but decided to have the wretched man flogged, branded, preached at and imprisoned. The case deeply worried Cromwell, who demanded to know by what authority the MPs had acted and got no answer (the true one being that they acted as the entire Protectorate did, by expedient). Perhaps he regarded the process as a danger to his own powers, or perhaps he personally deplored the savagery of the punishment, or perhaps he feared that the gathered churches would begin to feel threatened and domestic instability would increase. Whichever combination of these reasons applied, he could not have been pleased by the disagreement among the ranks of his own followers.

On the day that the Protector sent his message about the unfortunate Quaker, the second great divisive issue surfaced. Disbrowe presented a short bill to lend legal foundation to, and to continue, the decimation tax. He expected it to pass quickly, and was surprised when it became the subject of weeks of debate. [The tax was repeatedly attacked as unjust and divisive and on



29 January 1657 it was rejected by thirty-six votes.] What especially infuriated the Major-Generals was that they had been opposed by civilian clients of Cromwell such as the Anglo-Irishman Broghil, and by quite obscure relatives of the Protector who would not have acted without his countenance. Indeed, Cromwell himself ignored the soldiers' appeals to intervene upon his side, and gave a rich cloak to a cousin who had condemned the tax. Its abolition meant the end of the new militia, and of the Major-Generals, and the latter suspected (quite reasonably) that the Protector had sacrificed them in the hope of conciliating the Parliament and so bringing about a lasting settlement. If so, it was a gesture which promised some success, because the next day the MPs voted the government £400,000 towards the Spanish war.

In fact, people such as Broghil were aiming at something far more ambitious than the end of the Major-Generals' rule: they intended to reconcile the whole nation to the Cromwellian regime by turning it into a monarchy on the pre-war model. On 24 February they suddenly proposed to the Parliament that Cromwell be made King, and the governing team of the Protectorate became apparently hopelessly divided over this new issue. Most of the civilian councillors, and the judges, supported the proposal, whilst most of the soldiers, led by Lambert, opposed it. Lambert himself had apparently been happy to crown Cromwell in 1653. What distressed him about the new initiative was that it was the work of a clique which had nothing to do with the army and which clearly intended that, for the first time since 1648, the running in politics was going to be made by civilians. And it was soon obvious that more than monarchy was aimed at, for that suggestion was followed by others for an Upper House to the Parliament and (once more) for a doctrine to be prescribed for the national Church. The army reacted immediately: four days after that first motion for monarchy, Lambert led the former Major-Generals and a deputation of officers to complain to the Protector. This time, they were going to make sure that he weighed in to support them, as he had not done over the decimation tax. Instead, they encountered all the force of personality which had carried their commander to the summit

of the nation. He accused them, furiously, of having failed to settle the country for four years, exempting himself from any part in that process. He then told them that a final settlement at last seemed possible, and that a second chamber to Parliament might have saved James Naylor. The performance was a magnificent one, and partly successful. It did not convince some of the officers, including Lambert, but it made enough of the others hesitate to permit the debates in Parliament to go forward. The Protector became the target of intensive lobbying, as many of the gathered churches, terrified of any backward step from the Revolution which had guaranteed their survival, added their pleas against kingship to those of the soldiers. Against them were now ranked most of the Parliament and of the Council, who pleaded with equal determination. What happened next is too often explained (like so much else) in terms of the Protector's psychology and beliefs, his instinctual reaction against the title of King because it was precisely the sort of vanity to which his God had so often seemed hostile. The sequence of events indicates that more practical considerations ought, at the least, to be credited with some importance. On 6 May Cromwell at last informally expressed his readiness to accept the Crown, and this aroused the army to a last desperate effort. Lambert, Fleetwood and Disbrowe, the three greatest men in it, all told the Protector that they would resign if he carried out his intention. Then Cromwell heard that Pride, the colonel who had presided over the purge in 1648, had raised a petition against monarchy from most of the regiments in the London area, and was taking it to the Parliament. It had been drafted by John Owen, the churchman who had had so much influence in the early years of the Protectorate. This impending, possibly calamitous, confrontation compelled Cromwell's decision: on the 8th, as the petition reached the House, he removed the need to deal with it by absolutely refusing the Crown.

The result was a compromise, whereby a disgruntled Parliament accepted the Protector's decision against kingship and an unhappy army accepted all the other proposals agreed upon by the MPs. The latter were, however, reinterpreted by Cromwell and his councillors. Although the Protector remained without

the title of King and a crown, he was now enthroned for state occasions, with a royal robe and sceptre. An Upper House of sixty-three members was added to the Parliament, but it consisted not of the traditional nobility but of individuals named by Cromwell. The overwhelming majority, of course, turned out to be his friends and clients. The Protector agreed that a doctrine would be defined for the national Church, by an assembly of divines, and then failed to call such an assembly. He vetoed a bill intended to prosecute anybody who failed to attend the Church's services without presenting a certificate from a minister of an independent congregation. He did accept a savage new law against Catholics, making possible the confiscation of two-thirds of the estates of each one, which nobody then enforced. The chief weakness in the package concerned the revenue. In April the Parliament voted one of £1,900,000 per year, with an extra £400,000 per year until the Spanish war ended. It did not, however, agree upon how to raise all of this, and ignored Cromwell when he pointed out that the armed forces alone currently cost almost £2½ million per year: like the First Protectorate Parliament, the second one did not believe in as much armed force as the Protector did. What it did do was to reduce the assessment still further, to £35,000 per month. Thus, the MPs had effectively done everything except to perform the task for which they had been called together. Nevertheless, the country now had a new constitution, called the *Humble Petition and Advice*. Its net result was to enhance the powers of Protector and Parliament slightly at the expense of the Council. The latter lost the ability to choose Cromwell's successor and to determine whether or not war should be declared (both of which went to Cromwell) and to purge MPs (which was left to Parliament). The crucial issues of who controlled the armed forces or finances were (of course) left undecided. Nonetheless, the *Humble Petition and Advice* did possess a legitimacy, as a decision of Parliament, which the *Instrument* had lacked. This did not necessarily mean that it would work.

For the rest of 1657 Cromwell thought that it would. In June he sent the Parliament into recess, with gratitude and praise. The only damage done to the government team as a result of the

whole political contest of the spring was the dismissal of Lambert. For over three years he had been the second most important person in the Protectorate, a position marked by such symbolic roles as carrying the sword of state before Cromwell on ceremonial occasions and riding with him in his coach to the opening of Parliament. Had the Protector died during that period, Lambert would almost certainly have been chosen by the Council to succeed him. Now he could not forgive Cromwell for the destruction of the *Instrument of Government* and his own loss of influence, and refused to work within the new constitution. The Protector deprived him of his offices, showing little dismay, and thereby turned the Council almost wholly into a body of people who had owed their place in public life to his favour. Into Lambert's place in the regime he promoted his own elder son Richard. Until this point he had deliberately neglected to prepare this young man for any role in politics or war, apparently for fear that this would be taken for a sign of ambition upon his own part. Now, with the tide of opinion apparently running so strongly in favour of a Cromwellian monarchy, or quasi-monarchy, Richard Cromwell was plucked out of an obscure existence as a Hampshire squire, and given the honours due to a prince. John Owen was punished for his part in the affair of the army petition by being dismissed from his post as Vice Chancellor of Oxford University.

On 20 January 1658 Oliver Cromwell remet the Parliament with a confident speech of welcome. He appeared to have forgotten that under the terms of the *Humble Petition*, the Lower House could now be purged only by itself. So, over a hundred hostile MPs were now back in it, while the government had lost about thirty of its best speakers by promoting them to the new Upper House. The Protectorate's enemies at once challenged the legitimacy of that second House. A prolonged debate followed, and an appeal from the Protector, to pay attention to the government's needs, provoked no response at all. Worse, the Commonwealthsmen had perceived in the reactions of the army to the prospect of monarchy a year before, an opportunity to subtract the loyalty of the soldiers from the Protectorate. They prepared a petition which linked the resumption of absolute

authority by the House of Commons, the guarantee of a very wide toleration of religious belief and an undertaking that no members of the army could be cashiered without a proper hearing before a court martial. The further cut in the assessment in 1657 meant that since 1654 it had been reduced by more than half while the size of the army had been reduced by less than a third. The soldiers' pay was now six months in arrear, and it is likely that some of them were genuinely worried by the mildly reactionary character of the *Humble Petition*: for whichever reason, some regiments began to get restless. Cromwell panicked, more severely than he had done over the petition in May 1657. He forestalled the delivery of this one to the Parliament by dissolving the latter, only two weeks after it had remet. He then called together all the army officers in London, to appeal to them for loyalty. All gave it except the six from his own horse regiment, old comrades from the Civil Wars, who condemned the *Humble Petition* and were promptly cashiered (without court martial). Fleetwood, technically the senior officer in the army under Cromwell himself, now worked hard to obtain an address of obedience to the new constitution from the soldiers in England. He succeeded, and a personal appeal from the Protector produced another from the Corporation of London. With this, the crisis passed.

Its consequences were less easy to deal with. After more than four years of existence, the Protectorate had still not managed to make a working relationship with a Parliament. It had just bound itself within a new constitution which apparently did not work, and an atmosphere of the provisional and the unstable still surrounded the regime. In May another madcap royalist plot, work of a few hotheads, was uncovered. A new High Court of Justice, without a jury, was commissioned to try those arrested, and this time all but one of the judges refused to sit in it. It was filled up with other lawyers, and executed five men, but the legality of the procedure was even more patently dubious. With each month the revenue slid deeper into deficit and the pay of the armed forces further into arrear. What was needed to remedy the problem was a massive increase in taxation. Most of the Council agreed that without a Parliament this was not politically

feasible, and it seems unlikely that a Parliament would grant it. The councillors had never quite forgiven each other after the rift which had opened among them over the issue of kingship. The military leaders Fleetwood and Disbrowe remained deeply resentful and suspicious of some of the civilians. Disbrowe expressed his contempt for Richard Cromwell, the heir apparent to the Protectorate, who had little knowledge of politics and none of war. It was becoming obvious that Oliver Cromwell's habit of surrounding himself with people of such differing views and backgrounds meant that they could not work together once his leadership was removed. And that leadership was faltering.

The great Protector had never been a statesman. Throughout his career the main political initiatives had been created, the constitutions drawn up, by others. His genius had been to execute them, and to inspire those involved in the process. Once everybody else was out of ideas, Cromwell was the last man to provide any. After his great effort to save his regime in early 1658, he lapsed into a torpor which became terminal. Repeatedly, his Council failed to agree upon whether to try another Parliament or to impose a tax without one. Repeatedly, it waited for the Protector to make a suggestion or to take a decision, and none was forthcoming. As the summer drew on, it became obvious that the disappointment of the spring had not just stunned Cromwell, it had broken him. His health had been vulnerable for years, especially at times of pressure, so that he had been ill during a long part of the Scottish war and during the kingship crisis of 1657. In mid-1658 he gave observers the impression of being a sick man, long before any physical disease settled upon him. His handwriting turned into that of a geriatric, and when a fever did take hold of him, in August, he showed little will to live. On 3 September, the anniversary of the victories at Dunbar and Worcester, a tremendous storm broke over England. When it had passed, the life of the Lord Protector had gone also. In many ways his tale, like that of his great opponent Charles I, had been a tragedy. Both men had sincerely wished the best for their country, and viewed all of their actions to which others took exception as necessities. Cromwell certainly may be credited with more ability to distinguish

between his country and himself and to recognise that the necessities might be regrettable. But there is a well-known proverb about the way that is paved by good intentions, and the inventions mothered by necessity are commonly crimes.

## II The Localities

At first sight, the relative instability of central politics between 1653 and 1658 was balanced by a relative stability and continuity of local government. The provinces were the scene of far less confrontation and upheaval than Westminster, and it is tempting to suggest that away from all the drama in the metropolis life went on smoothly and peacefully, with the processes of governing carried on efficiently enough. There would be a great deal of truth in this portrait, yet the parallels are as striking as the contrasts. In both spheres there was no great change in the identity of the people who performed the executive tasks of the Protectorate, but they worked in an atmosphere of constant tension and anxiety, confronted with a perpetual and apparently insoluble problem of gaining active co-operation, instead of sullen obedience, from most of the ruled.

So who were the people who ran the provinces for the Protector and Council? As before, it is difficult to provide a general answer. It would be true to say that during the time of the Little Parliament radicals from the minor gentry or non-landed classes tended to be added to the commissions for the peace and the 'assessment'. And that under the Protectorate individuals of more 'moderate' beliefs and of higher social status tended to be put in. It would also be true to say that probably neither of those statements applied to the majority of English and Welsh counties. In Hampshire, the Ridings of Yorkshire, Cumberland, Westmorland, Cheshire and Leicestershire, there was little alteration in the ruling teams bequeathed by the Purged Parliament. In Herefordshire, Cornwall, Kent and South Wales, the 'country bosses' switched allegiance smoothly with the changes of central regime and increased their local power. In Sussex Herbert Morley refused to serve in central

government after the ejection of the Purged Parliament, but he remained an important figure in county affairs. In Somerset John Pyne flatly refused to serve the Protectorate in any capacity, and so his whole clique lost control of local government. It was replaced by an increasing number of gentry of moderate views and from wealthy families, including some sons of royalists. In North Wales and Lincolnshire likewise, some of the main parliamentary gentry returned to the bench in the late 1650s. In Buckinghamshire the fall of the Purged Parliament enabled a group of religious radicals to seize control of the county, and a few of the same sort of individual were added to the commissions of some other shires. But the demise of the same Parliament also allowed the restoration of four justices of notably moderate views to the Warwickshire bench. In Surrey, the Protectorate elevated the Onslow family, part of the traditional county elite, to local dominance. In Devon it at first both retained the radicals added in the time of the Little Parliament and called back prominent supporters of the Purged one. But later it dropped half the radicals and some of the Commonwealthsmen, substituting wartime parliamentary gentry who had been displaced at the Revolution. In Wiltshire the decisive change happened months before the fall of the Purged Parliament. In 1649 a drastic purge had placed power in the hands of a set of political and religious radicals, a mixture of minor gentry and commoners. Then in 1652 a number of these men were replaced by some of the parliamentary gentry removed in the purge, and by newcomers of more 'moderate' views, and this balance endured for the rest of the decade.

So can any overall conclusion be drawn from these case studies? Really only one: that the Protectorate, like the Commonwealth, used almost anybody who seemed prepared to support it. The result in both cases was a patchwork of county administrations, containing varying proportions of greater and lesser gentry, merchants and tradespeople. The fact that the Protectorate's commissions contained slightly more of the traditional elite indicates that it had slightly more potential to satisfy that elite. But three large additions must be made to that last statement. First, that no more than a fraction of the nobility and

greater gentry of England and Wales were still either allowed or prepared to serve the regime, so that the economic and social rulers of the country mostly remained outside the power structure. Second, that no more than under the Commonwealth did inclusion in a commission indicate readiness to serve. In January 1654 seven out of eighty-two people listed in the Hampshire and Southampton assessment commissions turned up to launch the year's work. Mercifully for local administration, it tended to be the most experienced and active justices who survived the changes. In Somerset almost half the bench which had served the Commonwealth had been replaced by the death of Cromwell, but less than a third of those who actually turned up to Quarter Sessions. In Dorset only three of the regular attenders of the Sessions were put out of commission between 1650 and 1659. Continuity in the East Riding of Yorkshire was provided by thirteen JPs (out of eighty-one in the various commissions) who served throughout the Interregnum. These equivalents of local bureaucrats tended either to come from the pre-war elite or to have family connections with it. To some extent, purges were a function of old-fashioned gentry feuding, and the justices or assessment commissioners who were dismissed were often clients of local notables who themselves remained in office. The fact that the idle or the unimportant were the normal victims of changes in personnel explains much of the steady work of local government throughout the period.

There remains, however, a third rider to the statement that the Protectorate was slightly more acceptable to traditional local rulers: that property-owners as a whole would not, given a free choice, have selected the Protectorate's appointees to govern them. This may be illustrated very easily from parliamentary elections. The *Instrument of Government* had followed the intention of reform proposals since 1647, of creating a more independent electorate, less amenable to manipulation by either local magnates or the government. This lay behind the substitution of so many county seats for borough seats. It was an example of how a genuine idealism upon the part of those who made the English Revolution clashed with the realities of their situation. For they were, of course, now the government whose manipulation

of elections was being weakened by the reforms. In practice, the Protectorate got its most important figures, such as councillors and leading army officers, into Parliament as easily as the old monarchy had done, for local communities were usually happy to elect powerful people who would show suitable gratitude. But the bulk of the MPs returned to both the Protectorate Parliaments were considerably more socially prestigious and considerably less devoted to the regime than the individuals whom the government had put in charge of local government. Doubtless they would have included royalists if these had not been specifically excluded by law. As it was, the lack of an electoral register meant that many of the King's adherents turned up to vote, regardless of the fact that this was also prohibited. This made the success or failure of the Protector and Council to come to terms with those Parliaments all the more significant. In 1657–8 it seemed that real progress was being made to establish the regime at a local level, as the *Humble Petition* seemed to be doing at the national one. It was during these years that substantial county gentry were returned to the commissions of the peace and assessment in Somerset, Devon, Lincolnshire and North Wales, and also that attendances by justices at Quarter Sessions were generally higher than at any time since the regicide. But this achievement was no more than a beginning.

Such a portrait also ignores the very important role of the army in the localities. Every local commission, and the local revenue collectors, included a percentage of officers currently in service. They also acted as sheriffs. By this means the regime filled gaps left by a lack of local civilian collaborators and provided individuals who, if necessary, could drive on county government. Already significant under the Commonwealth, this practice increased under the Protectorate, until in 1658 there were more soldiers in the commissions for the peace and the assessment than ever before. Thus, the local government of the Protectorate became more military even while it became more socially respectable: a typical Cromwellian paradox. But then these officers were just one facet of a considerable military presence in the provinces. The coasts, Wales and the Welsh Marches were full of garrisons. London always contained five or

six regiments, while detachments of horse were quartered in a wide ring around it and close to the main towns of the Midlands and the West. The obvious question to ask about this situation is how cheerfully civilians put up with it. The answer (yet again) is that responses varied between districts. In counties such as Kent and Hampshire, which were long accustomed to fortresses and convoys, there seems to have been little tension. Everywhere the money spent by soldiers must have stimulated trade. Some military governors, such as George Fenwick at Berwick or Thomas Kelsey at Dover, made notably good partnerships with the corporations of their towns. Army officers were sometimes themselves local gentry, although minor members of that class, and colonels or governors who were new to a region sometimes became important local figures in it. There is no real evidence in the time of the Protectorate that civilians *en masse* objected to soldiers as such. On the other hand, some civilians objected very much to what particular soldiers did. The great misdemeanour of certain garrisons, in the eyes of the corporations and citizens whom they were theoretically guarding, was to promote religious radicalism in the community. At Exeter, Hull, Poole and Bristol at certain times in the 1650s, the actions of the soldiers in removing popular ministers upon suspicion of disloyalty and in patronising gathered churches provoked the townspeople to real hatred. Yet the latter were not powerless to retaliate, because their complaints and demonstrations often embarrassed the central government into gestures of conciliation. At Hull a governor to whom the corporation especially objected was eventually transferred to Scotland, at Poole the commander was replaced with a less controversial individual and at Bristol the garrison was withdrawn altogether. It can hardly be imagined that the army was ever popular in the mid-1650s as it was maintained by heavy taxation and was a very visible reminder that the regime had no faith in the goodwill of its subjects. Yet to say that it was generally detested may, perhaps, be an exaggeration.<sup>10</sup>

This is the context for that most spectacular episode of military rule in the provinces, the work of the Major-Generals. Yet again, it is difficult to evaluate its impact except in terms of

particular regions and individuals. The Major-Generals themselves had little in common except distinguished war records. They included first-rank politicians like Lambert, Fleetwood and Disbrowe, with figures who had hitherto enjoyed little prominence even within the army. They varied in their quantity of energy, their attitudes to royalists, to religion and to provincials, their social and regional origins, and their notions upon how best to raise and dispose of the decimation tax. At one extreme was William Goffe, who controlled Sussex, Hampshire and Berkshire, and poured out to Thurloe his despair of ever being able to understand his counties, make any impact upon them or secure the co-operation of their leaders. His wails might arouse more sympathy if they had not been uttered upon the second day of his office. At the other extreme was Charles Worsley, put in charge of Cheshire, Lancashire and Staffordshire, who appears to have worked, by all criteria, about three times as hard as any of his colleagues and exhausted himself so completely that he broke down and died after one year. One of the very few characteristics which the Major-Generals did share was that none came from the pre-war ruling elite, for they ranged in their origins from minor gentry to goldsmiths. Likewise, they tended to promote commoners into local power. The new militias raised upon the proceeds of the decimation tax were commanded by army officers under the nominal leadership of a few JPs. Worsley replaced several county officials with very obscure men, while Disbrowe made a brewer High Sheriff of Wiltshire and appointed tradesmen to the Somerset Bench. On the face of things, one would expect that these men would achieve very different results and yet would all be relatively unpopular, as parvenus.

That is more or less what we find. All the Major-Generals had a huge job upon their hands, as their areas of responsibility were very wide and to execute them they had to keep on riding round an average of three or four counties. Fleetwood and Lambert had to appoint deputies in order to cope with their duties in central politics as well. The single task of assessing royalists for the decimation tax was a gigantic one, and the more disheartening in that, as said before, it almost never produced enough to pay

for the new militias. The trouble was that the Council had set the threshold of the tax too high, so that in Kent, for example, out of 500 royalists only 91 were liable. And Kent was the *best* case, the only county in which the yield supported the new militia. It was typical of the Protectorate's curious scruples that, having imposed an arbitrary tax, it feared to alter it without calling a Parliament for the purpose. Furthermore, Cromwell had an irritating way of exempting individuals who appealed to him. Apart from these features, the achievement of the Major-Generals was a pattern of personal variations. Disbrowe and Worsley gaoled several royalists, and exacted large bonds from many others, but James Berry (who controlled Wales) and Edward Whalley (in charge of the East Midlands) took an average twenty small bonds in each county. Worsley forbade race-meetings, Whalley permitted them. Worsley, Whalley and Berry all believed in the improvement of public morals and shut down alehouses (Worsley closed 200). On the other hand, the only discernible impact of Disbrowe's rule upon Wiltshire consisted of an unsuccessful attempt to stop a Whitsun wake and a successful one to muzzle several large dogs. Goffe seems to have done absolutely nothing except to raise the militia. Disbrowe locked up Quaker leaders, Berry released them. Whalley alone seems to have been worried about the enclosure of common lands, Disbrowe alone about the composition of juries. Even when they achieved something, the success was often impermanent. All the militias, of course, vanished with the tax. And at least some of the alehouses closed by Worsley were back in business once he was dead.

The question of their popularity also admits of no simple answer. None of those whose reports survive encountered any ill-will or obstruction during the time of their rule. They did not usurp the traditional work of civilian local government, which continued alongside their efforts. Indeed, they rarely attended Quarter Sessions or Assizes themselves, and campaigns such as Worsley's against alehouses were carried on with the co-operation of local leaders who wanted their areas cleaned up. Disbrowe, Berry, Whalley and Goffe all made great efforts to work in partnership with the JPs. Essentially they were

concerned with security, not administration. Had the Parliament of 1656 been seething with resentment of them, it is hard to see why the MPs took three months to get round to discussing the decimation tax and then only did so when they were propelled into it by Disbrowe. Even then, they denounced the injustice of the tax rather than the actions of the Major-Generals, and during the next two decades the rule of the latter was hardly referred to at all. It was clearly no great trauma for the ruled. On the other hand, if they were not detested then it does not appear that they were wanted. As mentioned above, the Major-Generals and their clients were usurpers within the social as well as the political (and often the religious) order. The comments preserved in the court records of the time as well as in a disparate mass of other evidence illustrate how much the people of mid-seventeenth-century England and Wales disliked being ruled by individuals who were their own social equals or only slightly above them in the hierarchy. Moreover, the debate over the decimation tax in Parliament reveals how firmly many gentry believed that the tax was a foolish reopening of rifts which ought by now to be healing. The verdict of the public upon the whole episode was delivered clearly in the elections to that Parliament. All the Major-Generals succeeded in getting themselves into the House, but everywhere their attempts to bring in their clients (religious or political radicals from the minor gentry or non-landed groups) failed almost totally. This was the more remarkable in view of their control over the timing, location and returning officers of elections. The electorate were (in theory) fairly substantial property-owners, but the total absence of any popular demonstrations in favour of the soldiers' candidates and the occurrence of some furious demonstrations against them indicate that local society as a whole shared in this act of rejection.

A minor aspect of the work of the Major-Generals consisted of the action taken by a few of them to regulate the corporations of some towns. The Council had set up a committee to examine municipal charters, which was potentially quite a serious weapon against the independence of urban government. In 1656 William Boteler, Major-General of the south-east Midlands,



purged the corporation of Bedford and ordered the remnant of members to choose people of radical beliefs to fill up the spaces. Hezekiah Haynes, Fleetwood's deputy in East Anglia, remodelled the corporation of Colchester, and tried to amend the charter of Norwich to confirm the town's domination by members of independent churches. Whalley had an alderman dismissed at Coventry, and Disbrowe obtained the dismissal or resignation of politically suspect members of the councils of Bristol, Tewkesbury and Gloucester. All this added up to a greater interference by central government in town government than had been known for half a decade. But it still did not amount to very much. Even those four commanders named left every other town within their areas alone, and none of their colleagues intervened in municipalities. Lambert's deputy Charles Howard protected four former royalists who had entered the corporation of Carlisle, because he thought them to be good men. The Council ignored Haynes's proposals for the charter of Norwich. And some of the changes which were made proved as transient as most of the Major-Generals' other work: the purged members at Bedford were back as soon as Boteler lost his control of the region. In general, the records of urban government in this period show a studious disinterest in national political affairs, so that there was little reason for the Council or its servants to be roused to great activity in this sphere. The committee for charters remained virtually idle.

It is now time to ask, as was done for the Commonwealth, how effective government was under the Protectorate. On the whole, the same answer may be returned: that considerable results were achieved despite much bickering and some corruption. Most of the all-important assessment was collected very swiftly, so that of £630,000 of it due between June 1657 and December 1658, £571,465 did appear in that time. No matter what the social background or political or religious views of the various JPs happened to be, they performed much the same work as their predecessors over the past century, and just as well. All local branches of the administration had to deal with a central bureaucracy staffed, like themselves, mostly with newcomers who tended to include a higher proportion of radicals under the

Commonwealth than under the Protectorate. Unlike those of the old monarchy, the central civil servants of both the republican regimes held their offices not for life but subject to good performance, and as a result many fewer of them amassed a number of posts solely to maximise income, or were absentee. As the 'reign' of Oliver Cromwell wore on, important advisers of his such as Broghill and Montagu became patronage-brokers within the bureaucracy just as royal favourites had been. On the whole, the government machine had been much expanded by the demands of war and revolution, without being greatly altered in its essential nature, and coped well with the tasks which it was set.

Nonetheless, confusion and misbehaviour remained as noteworthy under the Protectorate as under the Commonwealth. As the pay of the army slid into arrear in the late 1650s, and as that of the navy fell short during the Spanish war, members of the armed forces were given certificates of money owed to them. Some of the officials who issued these soon set up a ready trade in forging them or in buying them back from the recipients at a discount and redeeming them later at face value. Civil servants were careful to conceal their more dubious transactions, but even so some twenty-four cases of embezzlement were discovered among naval officials, while the Pett family's cunning management of the Chatham dockyard made them a fortune. Money continued to stick to the fingers of some provincial collectors, and different county commissions to argue with each other. In Kent, Wales and the North, excise officers became almost a law unto themselves, following their own practices and procedures with such determination that even the Major-Generals could not force them to return to those established by the central government. The Protectorate, like the old monarchy, found difficulty in persuading men to undertake the burdensome duties of High Sheriff, and it increasingly took to reappointing the same individuals. Communications remained faulty, so that in 1656 two former royalists sponsored a horse race in Hampshire, in apparent ignorance of the fact that the central government had just banned such events as security risks. They came to no harm, because the local government was equally ignorant of the ban.



The growth in the size of the governing machinery had not meant any real centralisation of rule: rather, the central regime maintained more agents in the provinces, fitted into local bodies. And even these agents operated in different ways, according to personality and circumstance. The complexity of the Protectorate's strength and weaknesses may be illustrated from one case study, Penruddock's rebellion. The Council had repeatedly warned the militia commissions, JPs and regular soldiers in Hampshire and Wiltshire that a royalist rising was imminent. Yet they were all taken by surprise when Penruddock's band gathered, and all that stopped the royalists from inflicting any damage was the pathetic smallness of their numbers, 400 at their strongest. Once the enemy was in arms, the militia committees went into action, and within two days had 4000 men on foot to attack Penruddock. None were needed, as a horse troop from the regular army did the work unaided. As the militia gathered, they were mocked by some of their fellow villagers, who told them that they would never get paid, and indeed it seems likely that they were not paid in full. From one point of view, these events had been a demonstration of the power and efficiency of the regime. From another, they had been a shambles.

At village level, the rule of the Protectorate would hardly have differed from that of the Commonwealth. With the worst problems resulting from the years of civil war and harvest failure now solved, there was more time for the reformation of manners and morals if local rulers were inclined to take it. As noted, some Major-Generals were ready to lead this work. A number of popular sports and festivities had already been prohibited in the 1640s. The Purged Parliament had extended the terms and penalties of previous acts against the infringement of the Sabbath and they were further elaborated in 1657. At times during the 1650s justices in Sussex, the East Riding, Hampshire and Lancashire made collective orders to enforce and to supplement these regulations. Yet even in those counties, let alone others, no boom in prosecutions followed these gestures, and action against alehouses, merry-making and breaches of the sabbatarian laws remained sporadic and (save for Worsley's campaign) small-scale. Perhaps even many of the Protectorate's

JPs were more interested in security and good neighbourliness than moral reform, and perhaps in many villages there was little that needed reforming. The main novelty in the provinces after 1653 was the effect of the Little Parliament's law instituting civil marriage, which reduced an existing situation of complexity and uncertainty to complete confusion. Before 1640 it had been unclear whether a ceremony of betrothal or a wedding in church represented the true moment of union. Now many people remained equally in doubt upon this issue, while having to cope with the unprecedented experience of being wed by a JP in addition. Officially, the latter form was now the only legal one. In practice, many couples continued to marry in a religious gathering, some in church according to the Anglican Prayer Book or the presbyterian *Directory*, and some in a gathered congregation or Quaker meeting according to such declaration as they chose. Very often this happened as well as the civil ceremony, but sometimes it took place instead of that, and all contemporaries agreed that the idea of marrying before a JP was generally unpopular. Broghil and some others among Cromwell's civilian councillors attacked it in Parliament during 1657. Sometimes ministers got away with conducting weddings, but many were indicted for it. Often parishes drew the local clergyman into the civil process by electing him as the registrar. Others allegedly mocked it by electing the village drunk or fornicator. Some JPs tried to wipe out betrothal ceremonies or to ensure that a couple were fit to wed, while others clearly married people at a glance. The most unfortunate victim of the whole situation was probably the Wiltshire man who was wed before Hampshire justices. When he returned home with his wife, the local magistrates declared the union illegal because it had not taken place before them. He obediently shed his bride, and somehow married another woman. Whereupon the same Wiltshire JPs issued a warrant for his arrest for bigamy. The Little Parliament had furnished the law with an opportunity to make a particularly ill-tempered ass of itself.

If most of the previous few paragraphs have been devoted to the Protectorate's servants and collaborators, who were its inveterate enemies? Who were the diehard royalists who took

part in the conspiracies and risings which did occur? They were not the leaders of the King's regiments or civilian commissions during the Great Civil War, who were either dead, in exile or reduced to exhausted passivity. Nor were most of them members of the traditional social elite, however alienated that elite now clearly was. They were a mixture of younger sons of nobility and gentry, lesser gentry, merchants, tradespeople and artisans. When the Major-Generals noted down individuals as especially worthy of suspicion, they regarded people from the middle ranks of society as just as active and dangerous as those from the landowning class. Innkeepers featured prominently, as their occupation provided excellent opportunities to host conferences and to convey information. The conspirators do not seem to have been distinguished in their political and religious attitudes from those royalists who remained passive. What made them into activists was an exceptional zeal for the royalist cause and a personal taste for an exciting life. They were exemplified by John Mordaunt, one of the most prominent of them both in operations and (as the younger brother of an earl) in his birth. In 1658 he escaped being found guilty and sentenced to death by a single vote in a High Court of justice. He walked out of the courtroom, and commenced a new plot immediately. The presence of a few junior sprigs of the nobility made the active royalists look like a more socially distinguished group than the leaders of the Commonwealth and Protectorate. On the whole, however, both sets were a sample of all ranks of society, with the same relative concentration in the middle layers, and both were an equally unusual group of individuals.

Thus far assembled, this picture of the country under the Protectorate would suggest that although the ruled might not like their rulers much in principle, they had little to worry about in practice. But the introduction of another element into it must alter such a conclusion completely. It is that same factor which gave such a terrible febrility to the whole early modern period in Western Europe, which roused Scotland and Ireland to rebellion in the late 1630s and early 1640s, which made the English Civil War so bitter and which nerved the army which won that war to bring about the English Revolution: the factor of religion. It is

time now to scan the spectrum of faith under the Protectorate as under the Commonwealth, and see what, if anything, had developed in it.

Little had altered in the position of the Roman Catholics. The Council and the Parliament sometimes made savage gestures at them, as the ancestral enemy, but they remained in practice of little concern. The Protectorate continued to levy fines upon them stringently for failing to attend Protestant worship, and yet their financial sufferings were to some extent compensated for, with a novel freedom. The regime had so many pressing worries that as long as the Catholics behaved inoffensively (which they did), they were able to harbour their priests, attend their private masses and travel about the country with more ease than under the late King for whom so many of them had suffered. By contrast, the attitude of the government to the Protestant episcopalians, until 1642 the leaders of the English Church, became tougher as the 1650s wore on. This was not because of any activity by the deposed bishops, who all lived quietly in retirement and ignored appeals from the exiled court to replace those of their number who died. As they were all relatively old men, it appeared that another decade would bring about the natural extinction of the former Anglican hierarchy. Yet there remained considerable energy among the episcopalians. A former Church of Ireland bishop, settled at Cumberworth in Yorkshire, continued to ordain clergy from all over the North who felt happier accepting livings in the Protectorate's Church if they had episcopal approval as well. The author of *Eikon Basilike*, John Gauden, himself, held a benefice and represented an unknown but probably considerable number who were prepared to serve the new religious order but fervently hoped for a counter-revolution. Some, like John Hackett, vented their feelings by preaching against the new system even while they observed its forms. Yet others, such as Henry Hammond, Gilbert Sheldon and Peter Heylyn, refused to deal with the Interregnum Church at all. Most of them took refuge with royalist gentry, and between them they published a long series of works explaining and defending their beliefs. As chaplains, schoolteachers, tutors and parish lecturers, they were potentially

a considerable influence upon a future generation. It was the fear of this that led Cromwell and his Council, as part of their great over-reaction to Penruddock's rebellion, to attempt to drive former royalist clergy out of most of those occupations. For good measure, they ordered their local representatives, including the Major-Generals, to crack down upon use of the pre-war Prayer Book in churches and private services. The effect of this campaign was very limited. A string of prosecutions did result, but use of the Prayer Book continued even in London, and the die-hard episcopalians kept on publishing and corresponding at the same speed. None of this would have been possible without the support of a large number of people from all classes who wanted to have the old style of service, from the old style of churchman.

Still, if the government had only limited success in stamping out the episcopalians, there was some progress in the reconstruction of the national Church which, if completed, might have rendered such conservatives redundant in the eyes of most parishioners. The system of Triers and Ejectors had solved the problem of the provision of clergy, and if there was as yet no national doctrine, then the Protectorate's ecclesiastical policy depended upon the belief that one was best evolved from below rather than imposed from above. Cromwell certainly saw the role of his administration as being to preserve order while Protestants of different opinions debated those differences until they achieved agreement or accepted co-existence within the same national framework. There was still a lot of repairing to be done. In 1654 the Protector and Council set up trustees to continue the Commonwealth's policy of augmenting stipends, but even by the mid-1650s many parishes had no ministers to be assisted. Wales, where proverbial poverty of livings and a language barrier discouraged newcomers, was probably the worst affected region. There 700 benefices were empty and public religion could only be provided by itinerant preachers of the sort established by the Commission for the Propagation of the Gospel. Only two of the national panel of Triers were Welsh. Elsewhere the presbyterian *classes* continued to dissolve. Especially in rural districts of the North, there was a serious problem of decaying church fabric, because parishes were too

demoralised or uninterested to maintain it. Bickering continued between sets of parishioners and between parishioners and ministers over the form of religion which took place in their church. The most celebrated case came in 1657, at the parish of St Bartholomew Exchange in London, where Cromwell himself had become the patron. He chose as the new incumbent the pastor of a gathered congregation, who brought his whole flock with him when he occupied the church building. To the Protector, this was a symbol of the sort of reconciliation which he wanted in the nation. To the parishioners, it was the capture of their church by a sect, and they slammed its doors upon these alleged intruders. Cromwell proceeded to impose the minister, and his old followers, upon the parish by direct command backed with the threat of force.

To some extent, however, the vision of the Protector and his Council was being fulfilled. In towns such as Newcastle-upon-Tyne and York, the number of able preaching ministers was probably greater than ever before. Furthermore, whole sections of the provinces had become grouped in regional associations of clergy, to provide joint action and a common framework for ordination and discipline. Membership was entirely voluntary, and included both beneficed ministers and clerical pastors of independent churches. They appeared in Worcestershire and in Cumberland and Westmorland at the same moment in 1653, and by the time of Cromwell's death eleven other counties had produced them. They united moderate episcopalians, presbyterians, congregational independents and even a few baptists, so that clerics who had condemned each other's existence during the 1640s were now working together. Most parishes were held by men who expressed no strong doctrinal views. During the course of the Protectorate's existence, at least 130 ministers who were also preachers to gathered congregations accepted places in the national Church. In July 1658 presbyterians holding fellowships at the two universities made a joint announcement of desire for concord with the independent churches. All this would have represented a situation of immense comfort to the ministers concerned, to the government and to many laity if it had been a matter of forgiveness and conciliation in a religious world in

which contests had been rendered politically impossible. But it was not. It consisted, rather, of a redrawing of battle lines as old enemies found themselves mutually under attack from new and terrifying opponents.

Some of the latter included the still increasing numbers of gathered churches which rejected the concept of a national organisation altogether. In most towns with large garrisons they were planted and fostered by the soldiers, and missionary efforts or spontaneous interest formed more elsewhere. As before, they tended to appear in urban centres or in rural districts with weak gentry control, but this was not always true. Parishes with traditionally strong manorial authority sometimes threw up sectaries, as a result of accident of personalities: the English and Welsh were not automatically programmed in their beliefs by their environment. It is, as before, the baptists who have left us the best records of their progress. By 1660 their churches numbered 250, including between them perhaps 25,000 people. The latter were probably equally divided between the more numerous but smaller Particular Baptist congregations and the fewer but larger General Baptist meetings. Not only were there now more of them but they were better organised. The Particular Baptists had by 1658 formed four regional associations, covering large areas such as the West Country and Midlands. Although there was no national meeting, London pastors exercised a paramount influence over the whole movement. The General Baptists were more fluidly structured, but they did have a regular meeting of delegates in the capital. This sort of development did not have to worry people of more conservative beliefs. The sects remained divided from each other by a range of doctrinal squabbles, and even the baptists had important differences. Some of the latter made common cause with the official churchmen of Northumberland to destroy a rival baptist group at Hexham. A few baptist ministers, as described, co-operated with parish clergy. Greater organisation meant a better supervision of members, and the control of possible individual excesses or very extreme views. The Fifth Monarchists had been crippled by the arrest of so many of their leaders, culminating in 1657 when Thurloe's agents reported a plan by one of their

churches for an armed rising in London. The entire group was arrested just as it was preparing to hoist a banner of the Lion of Judah, and placed (without trial) in indefinite detention. The sects had always disdained the populace as a whole and placed their hopes in the army and government. After 1654 it was clear that the Protectorate was not going to listen to their demands, and that left them to wait upon events. What made them continue to seem menacing to many in the population was that their programme had been adopted by a much more dynamic and effective group. For 1654 was also the year in which the Quakers came south.

Within four years they had penetrated every county, and indeed most parishes, within England and Wales. Their greatest number of conversions were made to the counties north and east of London, in Somerset and Wiltshire and in Warwickshire and Worcestershire. In 1657 London itself took over from the North as their greatest stronghold, probably followed by Bristol. As before, they tended to spread through networks of existing separatist religious groups and then to work outwards into the public at large. Some commoners in southern England had already, by 1651, rejected the paramountcy of Scripture in favour of personal revelation (as described earlier), so that the Quaker teachings often fell amongst an audience prepared to receive them. Their preachers were soon drawing crowds numbering thousands. The total of actual converts was still relatively tiny, but it expanded far more swiftly than that of any other radical religious group. In 1652 there had been about 500, in 1654 about 5000, and in 1657 there were perhaps 20,000. By 1660 there might have been anything from 30,000 to 60,000. Even the higher figure comprised only just over 1 per cent of the total population, but had such a rate of growth been maintained then all England and Wales would, in theory, have become Quaker in one generation. No wonder their evangelists worked with such high morale and apocalyptic vision. At the time that Naylor was brought before Parliament in December 1656, many of the MPs had never set eyes on a Quaker but all had heard of them. They had replaced Levellers, Diggers and Ranters as the new Menace To Society.

Their strength was in those social ranks which had always supplied most religious radicals, and given them their own membership in the North. They attracted the benevolent interest of a few minor gentry and clerics, but in general they had even less appeal to these groups than had the baptists. The army officers who protected so many gathered congregations were palpably more dubious about the Quakers. There were conversions among the rank and file of the soldiers, and a few of their leaders were sympathetic. But the Portsmouth garrison arrested a preacher and the companies guarding the Isle of Wight prevented any from landing there. The overwhelming majority of early Quakers were yeomen, husbandmen, wholesalers, artisans or retailers, and what distinguished them socially from the various independent churches was the very great appeal which they had to rural people. Most of their male leaders were younger sons, and women continued to supply almost half their evangelists. From the beginning, their founders had been careful to co-ordinate action and to correspond regularly, and in 1657 they instituted general meetings to prevent a loss of coherence resulting from so swift an expansion. Yet it does seem that the historian has to reckon with a different type of 'Quaker' from those who attended such meetings, whose activities are meticulously recorded in the documents preserved in Friends House Library, and who grew into the later Society of Friends. This is the person who was quite happy to absorb the doctrine of personal revelation and the redundancy of a visible Church, while wishing to remain outside the main Quaker movement and rejecting its moral solemnity. They would have overlapped with or sprung from those local sceptics and scoffers who appear with some regularity before the pre-war church courts. Such people feature in the observations of individuals hostile to all religious radicals, especially in 1659 as 'Quakers'. To the Quakers 'proper', and some baptists, they were 'Ranters', a borrowing of the great smear-term of the early 1650s. In this manner a number of semantic traps were unwittingly prepared for the future historian.<sup>11</sup>

Not that the Quakers 'proper' were any less shocking to all other religious groups and to most of the population. The twin

pillars of their faith, the rejection of any visible Church and of the primacy of Scripture, made them almost as appalling to baptists as to presbyterians or episcopalians. By implication their religious beliefs struck at the notion of a social hierarchy, and some of their other tenets did so directly. They denounced all distinctions of dress as worldly vanities, refused to remove their hats to any being except God, and addressed all individuals as 'thee', holding that this form was grammatically correct and ignoring the fact that it was generally used only upon inferiors. They certainly condemned profanity, strong drink, sports, merry-making and sexual misdemeanours, but the flamboyant tactics of evangelism which they had evolved in the North seemed to many to be equally morally questionable. After 1654 no community knew when a Quaker missionary, often naked, might not appear in the market place to denounce the sins of the community or might not interrupt the church service to revile the minister. Their printed words were often just as intemperate, and by 1658 they had published over 500 tracts. Instead of lobbying the government they went straight to the people: by changing humans they intended to change the political system, reversing the attitude of the Levellers and Fifth Monarchists. Yet their political programme (though varied and incoherent) still reproduced many of the demands of those groups, for codification of the law, for the abolition of lawyers and of universities, for a limit to the accumulation of wealth and for annual Parliaments. Upon the question of the legitimacy of armed force, they had as yet delivered no judgement, as peaceful evangelism seemed to be achieving such good results. Their greatest efforts to secure reform, understandably, were directed against tithes, and characteristically they consisted not merely of a campaign for their legal abolition but also of a simple refusal to pay them.

Of the Major-Generals, Fleetwood, Lambert, Berry and Worsley showed the same relative clemency towards Quakers as Cromwell himself, but Haynes, Goffe and Disbrowe were hostile to them and Boteler an active persecutor. Unsurprisingly, Boteler's attitude was shared, and intensified, by most of the social elite. From 1656 onward, justices and corporations across most of the country made efforts to halt them, employing the

laws against the disturbing of the peace and of church services, blasphemy, vagrancy, contempt of court and non-payment of tithes, and refusal of the oaths used for the detection of Catholics (which Quakers could not take as they believed all oaths to be profane). Devout gentry and magistrates saw them as a danger to people's souls as well as to public order, and some sincerely believed them to be agents sent by Jesuits to undermine the Protestant Church. By mid-1659 over 2000 Quakers had been committed to prison. But this hostility on the part of the elite was underpinned by a considerable amount of animosity upon the part of commoners. Mobbing, rather than arrest, was the principal danger faced by evangelists. Ordinary people often detested Quakers as busybodies, killjoys, nuisances, republicans, reputed witches and (above all) as outsiders, commonly with northern accents. Local louts were able to have a great deal of brutish fun with them, encouraged by the very magistrates and constables who normally prevented such horseplay. Pamphlets and seminars impressed upon the public the horror which the Quakers represented. As before, the Quaker movement appealed to a particular type of personality, which was always going to be in a minority. But that did not make it any less frightful to many in the majority, especially as, over the past ten years, minority beliefs had consistently taken over the national government. The Protectorate seemed to be resistant to those of the Quakers, but it was a much more passive resistance than many people wanted. Whatever the feelings of some of its members, the Council obstinately refused to let Quakers be punished for what they said, as opposed to some of the things that they did. By 1658 a lot of the English and Welsh were seriously worried about the situation. Cromwell died leaving a government which was potentially politically and financially bankrupt, and provinces which were the scene of more division and anxiety than they had been at the beginning of his Protectorate.

### III British and European Affairs

After the amazing military achievements of the Commonwealth

outside England and Wales, the work of the Protectorate abroad ought to have been more modest and less onerous, consolidating English rule over Ireland and Scotland and making peace with the Dutch. Matters turned out rather differently. The manner in which the other British realms were settled acquired graver implications for the English than would have been expected in 1653, a fresh war had to be fought in Scotland, and a new conflict was begun with a Continental power which was to be at once more glorious and more damaging than that with the Dutch.

In Ireland the Protectorate displayed as little interest in the Catholic majority as the Commonwealth had done. By 1657 priests were returning to the country in large numbers, amazed that so little was done to stop them or to convert their flocks. Most of the efforts of the new government and the controversies which resulted were focused upon the new Protestant elite, and upon the practical needs of the administration. The dominant figure from 1652 until 1655 was Fleetwood, as Lord Deputy, who was prepared to support a large-scale programme of installing preachers and opening schools, using radicals from England as his agents. Instead, all the money at the disposal of the government was needed to keep up the army of occupation, so that the reform programme was virtually stillborn. All that resulted was a rapid growth of gathered churches within the army, founded by the officers whom Fleetwood employed as his trusted subordinates. The baptists became particularly powerful, so that by 1654 they were thought by many to have a stranglehold upon the system of promotion. But in that year Fleetwood's system began to crumble, because Cromwell sent out his younger son Henry to command the army in Ireland. This individual rapidly became the guiding personality in the land. Fleetwood, feeling undermined, left it in disgust the next year and in 1657 Henry obtained the title of Lord Deputy for himself.

Ireland's new master was twenty-six years old when he landed at Dublin, and therefore, like Thurloe and some of his father's other civilian councillors, had never fought in the English Civil War. The fervour which had produced the English Revolution was quite unknown to him, and he had no feeling either for



reform or for charismatic religion. Instead, he sought stable government based upon a reconciliation of all parties. As a result, as soon as he arrived he ended the supremacy of the baptists in his army. Because they would not accept a position of mere parity with other groups, they instantly became his determined enemies, forcing him to turn to more conservative individuals who were in any case more companionable to his temperament. At first he found them among those of his council in Dublin who believed in independent churches but also in the continued co-existence of a national body. Soon, however, he was becoming even more closely associated with the pre-war ('old') Protestant settlers of the island, the most politically active of whom, Lord Broghil, was already such a favourite of his father's. Most of these people, had, like Broghil, been royalists, but they received very different treatment from those in England. The 'Old Protestants' of Munster were pardoned *en masse* by the Protector and Council in 1654, because so many of them had defected to Cromwell soon after his initial victories. The others were theoretically liable to heavy fines, but Henry Cromwell studiously neglected to collect these. From 1656 he set about the work of re-establishing the Church of Ireland. Henceforth he showed open hostility to all sectaries and halted Quaker penetration of the country by arresting their missionaries and dismissing or browbeating any army officers who showed an interest in their message. Since the conquest, the state Church had consisted of a set of ministers paid from a fund provided by the lands of the defunct bishops, deans and chapters. It was clear that this money was insufficient to pay for very many, and that more had to be found. To the young Cromwell the obvious solution was to restore tithes, a decision which not only drew upon him the unwavering hatred of the sects but alienated those 'congregational independents' who had accepted the state Church. His main ecclesiastical adviser was now a former dean of the old Church, Edward Worth, who had founded an association of ministers in Munster similar to those in England, save for the significant difference that it was closed to all pastors of gathered congregations. The pre-war Scottish settlers in Ulster, who had set up a presbyterian system like their native Kirk, were encouraged by

Henry to extend and to consolidate this. In 1658 these two groups dominated an assembly of churchmen in Dublin, which formally reimposed tithes upon the nation. Parallel to this process took place the restoration of old-fashioned secular government. In 1655 experiments in Munster, of putting judges upon salaries instead of letting them take fees, and streamlining of legal procedures, were halted as too controversial. At the same time Justices of the Peace were recommissioned all over the island, mixing 'Old Protestants' with present and former soldiers and new settlers, all chosen for their loyalty to the regime. Henry Cromwell tried, with some success, to make sure that they were also personally loyal to himself. By 1658 he firmly believed that he had stabilised the country and established his father's government securely there, by taking the pre-war Protestant ruling elite into partnership irrespective of its previous political record. In the process he had jettisoned the sort of people who had made the English Revolution, and scrapped their ideas as well. What was particularly significant was that he made it plain to everybody that he wished the same policy to be employed to settle England.

It was also significant that during the same period Henry Cromwell himself believed that he had a legitimate cause for grievance, and that the source of this lay in the government at Westminster. In part this was due to the usual negligence, carelessness and stupidity with which most English administrations undertook their share of ruling Ireland. Although all legislative power had now been transferred to the Parliament at Westminster, executive power was divided ill-definedly between the Protector and Council and the Lord Deputy and his council, the former in theory being responsible for major decisions of policy. Repeatedly, Henry sent his father requests for advice or action, and repeatedly followed them with irritable reminders, because no replies had been received. The most glaring example of this came in 1657, when Ireland technically had no government at all for two months, because Fleetwood's commission as Lord Deputy had expired but Henry's had not been sent to replace it. Like monarchs before and after him, Oliver Cromwell gave the administration in Dublin palpitations by making grants

of land in Ireland to followers in England, without any notion of the damage which the subtraction of these rents would do to the Irish public revenue. Protector and Council also ignored several appeals to do something about the debased state of the nation's currency or to divert warships to chase away pirates who were hunting along the coasts. On the other hand, Henry's administration could sometimes use its distance from Westminster for its own ends, just like other Dublin-based governments before and after. In 1657 the Second Protectorate Parliament decided upon the grandiloquent gesture of imposing an oath abjuring the Pope upon all Irish Catholics. Both the Lord Deputy and the 'Old Protestants' protested vehemently that this was a pointlessly provocative scheme, and when they were ignored, they simply neglected to enact it properly.

The young Cromwell was still more annoyed by political problems, arising directly from his father's failings as a statesman. Oliver liked, as said above, to have followers of opposed opinions and principles, balanced against each other. This would have been perhaps a wise tactic if they had represented powerful interests in the nation, but as it was he was creating divisions and rivalries in an already small and embattled ruling circle. At least in England it had the effect of enlarging the sources of advice given to him, but in Ireland the same tactic could hardly have had even that benefit. His original action in taking the army away from Fleetwood's direct command and giving it to his own not very experienced son could only have been to strengthen his own influence in the land and to balance two clients against each other. He may also have wished to check the radicals, whom his son-in-law favoured, with the views of Henry, who had been a prominent 'moderate' in the Little Parliament. Yet having allowed his son to supplant Fleetwood, he gave him no support in his efforts to settle Ireland in a different fashion. Henry carried them out anyway, enraged not only by the lack of response to his appeals to the English government, but also by the fact that he had no control over the membership of the council which was supposed to advise him in Dublin. Oliver had ultimate responsibility for that, and saw to it that all the enemies whom Henry's policies had made remained

upon it, unable to do more than hamper the Lord Deputy and create a greater bitterness between him and them. Even more than in England, the example of Ireland reveals the Lord Protector's talent for ensuring that none of his followers could blame him personally for anything, while they all became steadily more at odds with each other. This was the more worrying in that the government in London had also landed Henry with a very serious problem which threatened to undermine his authority. The Commonwealth had paid for its rule over Ireland by imposing an assessment of £30,000 per month upon the country and shipping over an average £22,000 per month in addition. As part of its general policy of reducing assessments and armies, the Protectorate brought the Irish tax down to £10,000 per month in 1654. Just as in England, the soldiers were not disbanded to a number that the new level of taxation could pay, so that a deficit appeared. Just as in England, also, the Second Protectorate Parliament made the situation worse. It reduced the Irish assessment to £9000 per month, and the financial difficulties of the English government meant that henceforth no more than £8000 per month could be sent to Dublin. Yet nobody thought that any further disbanding of the army of occupation would be safe. The result was that, as in England, the gap in the public revenue became serious. During 1658 it amounted to £96,000, and the army's pay fell nine months into arrear. And a badly-paid army was always a worry to its commander. In both realms the Protectorate had achieved a level of taxation which the public felt to be too high and yet which provided far less than the state needed.

So, if the Cromwellian regime created both successes and difficulties in Ireland what did it achieve for the land itself? One reply would be that it confirmed the Commonwealth's establishment of the Protestant Ascendancy. Under the Protectorate the massive transfer of land ordered by the Purged Parliament was carried out and Protestants were commissioned as JPs and constituted as urban councils over the island. It was under the same regime that other steps (or the failure to take some) ensured that those Protestants would remain a minority. The lack of any drive to convert the Catholics has been noted. It was

accompanied by an equal inability to attract over large numbers of English to swamp them. The Commonwealth had expected to settle more than 35,000 soldiers, and 1000 people to whom the state owed money. At the end of the next decade, when a survey of the result was taken, 7500 of the former and 500 of the latter were actually present. Nor had English tenants and traders arrived as expected, and in default of them the new landlords and municipalities were anxious to retain the local Catholics instead of deporting them as the Purged Parliament had wished. The only contribution made by the Protectorate to the welfare of the whole land was to abolish some duties on imports, to permit farmers to restock their lands. By 1658 the total volume of Irish trade was back to 80 per cent of that recorded in 1638, despite the hideous destruction of the 1640s. But the English government was also determined, as before and after, to stunt Irish exports to prevent them from competing with English products. Political union did not include any compensating economic benefits. By no stretch of argument could the English conquest of 1649–53 be said to have been 'good' for Ireland.

In Scotland the Protectorate initially did not merely have the task of settling the country, but also that of preventing it from slipping out of English hands once again. As has been said, Cromwell and Monck effectively conquered the Lowlands, and then accepted the formal submission of the Highland chiefs, who no longer had a royal government to obey. This situation left most of the clans behind the Highland Line with their fighting strength and stocks of weaponry intact. It was liable to explode as soon as one of two developments occurred. The first was that the English began trying to interfere seriously with the Highlanders. The second was that an exiled royalist government reconstituted itself, to legitimise Scottish resistance. Both happened in the course of 1652. In late 1651 the Purged Parliament had appointed a commission of eight important soldiers and politicians to manage Scotland, headed by Lambert and Monck. It had also imposed an assessment, of £13,500 per month, two and a half times as heavy as any tax previously laid upon the country, and prepared to unite the two nations formally. During 1652 it restored the municipalities, and

appointed a Supreme Court (mostly Englishmen) and High Sheriffs (half of whom were English army officers). Officials were only installed if they swore loyalty to the Commonwealth, and municipalities only allowed to function if they accepted the union with England. A wholly English commission was established to approve all appointments to the national Kirk. During the summer two English columns paraded through the Highlands in an attempt to overawe the chiefs and to receive the submissions of those few who had sent none. Having done all this, the Commonwealth considered that the settlement of the nation was well under way, and reduced both the assessment and the occupying army by over a fifth. To supervise the country, it appointed a capable if rather querulous soldier, Robert Lilburne, and then more or less turned its back upon it to concentrate upon the Dutch war. At that point the explosion occurred.

The Commonwealth's mistake had been to humiliate the Highlanders and then to run down its army. Before the end of the year a group of chiefs led by Angus Macdonald of Glengarry had contacted Charles II to ask for commissions to rise in his name. The exiled royalists showed a skill which was to be missing from their dealings with English conspirators, in encouraging, reconciling and co-ordinating the different activists. More and more chieftains joined, and a respected Lowland nobleman, the Earl of Glencairn, became the formal leader of the rebellion. As soon as the snows melted in 1653, they went into action, striking from the mountains in small parties and evading all attempts by the English forces to contain them or to bring them to battle. Lilburne responded with as much energy as the limitations of his genius and of his resources allowed. He granted reductions in the assessment of those chiefs who collaborated with him, and tried to make an alliance with those Scots who had been most reluctant to work with Charles II. He also harassed ministers who still prayed for the King and made landowners, parish officers and JPs responsible for stopping the people in their jurisdictions from joining the rebels. All these efforts probably succeeded in making the rebellion slightly less serious than it actually became, but that was quite serious

enough. Lilburne proved unable to stop the royalists, who were employing tactics and a terrain which had defeated every invader since the Romans. By early 1654, their bands were roving across the entire country as far as the Border, and Charles II had sent a relatively capable and respected soldier, John Middleton, to draw them together.

In reality, Middleton's task was impossible and it is unlikely that the rebels could ever have done more than to maintain an indefinite guerilla war in the mountain and hill areas. They never possessed the manpower and equipment to take on the Commonwealth's soldiers in a straight fight, and they could not co-operate with each other for long. Ruinous quarrels kept breaking out between their leaders, while similar personal rivalries, plus some shrewd calculation, meant that the majority of Highland chiefs (let alone Lowland magnates) remained neutral or helped the English. But then, this decentralised and chaotic nature of the rebellion was the very thing which made it so hard to deal with. An exceptional general and a proportionate military effort were required from the newly-instituted Protectorate, and they were provided. In April 1654 Cromwell sent George Monck back to command in Scotland, with about 3000 more men and £50,000 to pay them. Monck's tactics were to send his soldiers into the Highlands in separate columns, with sufficient supplies to permit them to keep moving swiftly through the passes, unhampered by any need to return to bases to revictual. Each soldier had a week's bread in his knapsack, while packhorses carried more bread and some cheese alongside them. In this fashion they covered almost a thousand miles in three months, burning the crops and killing the cattle of the royalists and trying to catch them. Exhausted and starving, the rebels began swiftly to despair. Monck was all for putting their leaders to death, but the Protector and Council wisely coupled political clemency with his military ruthlessness and promised a complete pardon to all who submitted. A few diehards held out through the winter, but in May 1655 the last came in and Middleton fled back abroad to his royal master.

As the campaign progressed, all the reforming energy of the early Protectorate was bent towards completing the settlement of

the country. Ordinances formally united it to England, gave relief to debtors and improved the provision of justice. From the beginning a role in government was given to some Scots, by the decision to permit Highland chiefs and Border lairds to police their own areas: the futility of trying to disarm the hill and mountain people and to rule them directly was recognised. Over half the MPs returned from Scotland to the First Protectorate Parliament were Scots, and the royalists were treated almost as leniently as those in Ireland, their fines usually being collected only in part or not at all. In May 1655, as the war ended, the Protector and Council transferred executive power from Monck himself to a Council for Scotland, mixing army officers, English officials and Scots. It was instructed to settle the finances of the country and also the Kirk, and was chaired by that ubiquitous Anglo-Irishman, Lord Broghil. It imposed an Excise, got the assessment collected more efficiently, and stabilised the public revenue at £8500 per month. The return of local power to the Scots was continued with the appointment of many gentry as JPs, although as in England most of the nobility and greatest lairds had to be excluded because of their hostility. Only attempts to introduce a system of Triers for the Kirk failed, not because of hostility to the government but because of the divisions between different groups of Scottish churchmen. In the end the appointment of ministers was left to the Council for Scotland. During the last two years of Cromwell's life, Scotland was a peaceful if resentful land. Broghil and most of the Council returned to England, leaving Monck once again the leading figure. He had no trouble with the Scots, his only problems being similar to those of Henry Cromwell, resulting from slow attention to his request by the government in England, the appearance of Quaker missionaries (whom Monck deported) and reduction of the assessment by the Second Protectorate Parliament to a level which could not quite support the army. But the deficit on the public revenue was smaller than that in England or Ireland and by 1658 the administration in Scotland was in many ways the best off of all those in the three British realms.

The Commonwealth had left nothing more in the British archipelago for the Protectorate to conquer: instead, Cromwell's

regime extended English territory overseas. He began his tenure of the Protectorship not with an act of war but one of peace, by coming to terms with the Dutch. The struggle with them was clearly reaching the point of exhaustion, and had never been popular with the army officers. Perhaps this was because they were uneasy about a war against a Protestant neighbour, and perhaps they disliked a struggle which turned the limelight away from them onto the navy. Whichever reason was paramount within each individual, the clear result of their attitude was the Treaty of London, signed in April 1654. It was, on paper, a remarkable triumph for the English. They obtained the island of Pula Run in the centre of the East Indies, the area providing the spices which represented Asia's most valuable commodity. Compensation was granted for injuries done to English merchants in that region and in the Baltic, while none was offered for the mass seizures of Dutch shipping. The United Provinces promised to salute English warships, to refuse any help to Charles II and to exclude from power the Dutch House of Orange which had formerly given him assistance. It was all a little less impressive in practice. Pula Run was never actually delivered, the terms of the salute remained ill-defined, and the Dutch government was already determined to have no dealings with Charles and to render the Orangists politically impotent. But as a way out of a deadlocked conflict it saved face handsomely and further boosted English prestige abroad. Six days later a commercial treaty was signed with Sweden. There followed another with Portugal in July and a third with Denmark in September. The Navigation Act continued to be enforced with great ruthlessness, and in 1655 sixty Dutch ships were seized for contravention of it, this time with the glum acquiescence of their government. This group of measures ought to have made the Protectorate a time of increasing prosperity for English foreign trade.

In fact, it was the reverse, and this was entirely the fault of the government. Within four months of the Treaty of London, the Protector and council had decided to launch an utterly unprovoked attack upon Spain, the strongest power in Europe, the best remaining market for English goods and the controller of the most efficient privateer fleet in the world. Any historian who

wishes to believe that this decision was the result of noble vision and shrewd calculation needs to come to terms with some notes of the meetings concerned, taken for the benefit of the absent Montagu.<sup>12</sup> A mere fifteen days after the Anglo-Dutch treaty, the Council met to discuss what to do with the 160 warships left in pay at the end of the conflict. It was agreed to turn them against a Catholic power, and of the two greatest, France and Spain, the latter was less tolerant to Protestants and more vulnerable as its territories were much more extensive. Some adventurous sea captains were produced who insisted that the island of Hispaniola in the West Indies would be an easy prize. When somebody objected that the loss of trade with Spain would be enormous, the Council decided that the Spanish would be happy to confine the war to the West Indies and to go on trading with England in European waters. On 20 July it reconsidered the question, Lambert pointing out that the proposed expedition was likely to be difficult and that in the current state of its finances the Protectorate could not afford it. Cromwell himself countered, by saying that God would favour so worthy a cause and that a war would only cost as much as paying off the warships not needed in peacetime. With this incredible suggestion, the resolution to fight appears to have been taken. Had all English foreign policy been conducted with comparable foresight and common sense, then England would probably not now exist.

The expedition against Hispaniola sailed in December 1654. So confident or careless was the government that it put into the preparations none of the care which had been devoted to all the republic's campaigns in the British Isles since 1649. The training, equipment and victuals of the force were all deficient, and it faced a hard-bitten bunch of Spanish colonists who were used to tackling pirates and privateers. The English were driven back to their ships and, for lack of anything better, seized the nearby island of Jamaica instead. This was much more weakly held by the Spanish, for the good reason that it was a much less desirable property: in 1655 its most noteworthy product was mosquitoes. It would take decades to develop, and the Spaniards soon gave notice that they would make a sustained effort to expel the English from it. Meanwhile, the Protectorate was behaving

like the bully of Europe. France was locked in a war with Spain which was now two decades old, and Cromwell's government apparently believed that it could rob both with impunity. In 1654 the colonists in New England took neighbouring Acadia from the French, and the Protector and Council refused to give it back. Instead they sent Admiral Robert Blake into the Mediterranean in 1655 to plunder French merchantmen, punish Berber pirates and make a commercial treaty with Tuscany. They were indulging in a game of international smash and grab rather like the regimes controlling Germany and Italy during the late 1930s, and like those regimes they pressed their luck too far. In September 1655 they heard of the humiliation at Hispaniola and of the expensive acquisition of Jamaica. This news was followed by more, that the King of Spain had banned trade with England and unleashed his privateers upon English shipping. Within a few months the Protectorate's customs receipts had suffered a catastrophic fall. Meanwhile Charles II took up residence in Belgium, as the guest of a Spanish government now willing to invade England in concert with a royalist rebellion.

For Cromwell and the Council, apology and the restitution of Jamaica were politically impossible. They pumped money, conscripted soldiers and convict settlers into Jamaica and declared full-scale war against Spain. The trouble was that the Spanish wouldn't offer a fight. Their nimble warships ran rings around the English navy, capturing merchantmen and then making off home. The Council considered a range of attacks upon Spanish territory, such as the capture of Sicily or Cadiz,<sup>13</sup> but eventually settled for trying to intercept the treasure fleets sailing to Andalucia from the Spanish American empire. As Blake's sailors had not been paid for their 1655 expedition, they had to be hunted down and captured to get them back aboard the ships in 1656, a lengthy process. In September of that year some of them (and England) did strike lucky by capturing vessels loaded with silver. The morale of the fleet was raised because the crews concerned got a legal share of the loot (and embezzled more) but the proceeds were nothing like sufficient to solve the government's financial problem. Further progress was only made possible by two developments. One was the decision

of the Protector and Council, in November, to accede to a request of the French to send them a brigade of soldiers to help their fight against the Spanish on land. The other was the Second Protectorate Parliament's grant of £400,000. To a government with an already inadequate regular income, fighting a war which cost about £1 million per year, this was not exactly generous. But it combined with extended credit to get the fleet out again.

The results, in 1657, were deeply frustrating. In April the dying Blake accomplished his last great victory, one of the finest in English naval history. Off the Canaries he found and sank an entire treasure fleet, upon which the Spanish had depended to pay their armies. The treasure, however, was ashore in fortresses, from which it could not now be shipped to Spain but which could not be reached by Blake. The beneficiaries were Portugal, which might otherwise have been conquered by a Spanish army that year, and France, which could now at last make some headway in its own long conflict with Spain. The French accordingly used their English brigade to capture two towns in the Netherlands for themselves and one small fort which they handed over to the English. Still, Spain was now crippled, and the next year the Anglo-French force reduced most of West Flanders. Of the towns that fell to it, the French kept five and gave the English one, the port of Dunkirk. The news of this was the only event in the closing months of Cromwell's life which gave him any pleasure.

What, then, was the sum of the Protectorate's achievement abroad? In theory it was spectacular. It had secured England an island in the centre of the East Indies, another in the centre of the West Indies, and the first continental European town which the English had owned for a hundred years. Yet none of these conquests were unqualified assets. Jamaica consumed much more than it yielded for many years, while Pula Run never yielded anything more than the title deeds. Dunkirk had a poor harbour and was badly sited for trade, so that its own utility to the Protectorate was as a sally-port into Europe for expeditions which it could not afford. In fact, it was by no means obvious that the Protectorate could afford Dunkirk. The town would cost £70,000 per year to maintain, adding to the deficit of a public



revenue which by the time of Cromwell's death was about £2 million in debt. Perhaps half of this debt had been caused by the war with Spain, and that war was not yet over. After their losses in 1658 the Spanish were ready to agree to France's terms, but not to write off their losses to England. The French accordingly prepared to jettison their English allies and to make peace, leaving the Spanish privateers to continue their inroads into English shipping. The reactions of the public were realistic throughout: none of the Protectorate's victories made it really popular with its subjects, even for a time.

Before leaving this survey of foreign policy between 1653 and 1658, one further set of questions ought to be asked of it. How much was it really a matter of the interests of governments? Were there no economic pressure groups working upon the Council? Did merchants play a part in the formation of its decisions? The answer to all seems to be negative. Of the great trading companies, the Levant, the East India and the Eastland Companies all wanted the Navigation Act, while the Merchant Adventurers and the traders with the English colonies opposed the passage of it. What led the Purged Parliament to choose between their views was not the relative influence of these bodies in politics, but the attitude of its own members towards the Dutch. The only commercial interest which might theoretically have gained from the Spanish war consisted of the traders with Spain, for whom the Protectorate was seeking further opportunities and privileges. But they, apparently uniformly, opposed the conflict. The only 'private interest' to wield some influence was the handful of rather disreputable adventurers who told the Council what most of it already wanted to hear, about the ease of an attack upon the Spanish West Indies. Nor did the Commonwealth or the Protectorate do anything to alter the terms of either domestic or overseas commerce. The Levellers and some of the other radical groups had agitated for the abolition of monopolistic companies in both spheres. Nothing was done, and the rules regulating apprenticeship, guilds, chartered companies and the fixing of wages remained what they had been under the early Stuarts. There was no 'Puritan Revolution' in economics, any more than in morality.

There still remains a need to recount the Protectorate's dealings with a group who could be described, at the time, neither as British, domestic nor part of a foreign power: the Jews. In the thirteenth century they had been expelled from England and never invited to return, although by the 1650s there was a small colony of Sephardic traders living quietly in London. Cromwell was known by 1654 to be favourably disposed towards them himself, but the turning point in his position was the war with Spain. As soon as it broke out, Antonio Fernandez Carvajal, the leader of the London Sephardim, offered the services of his community to the Protector for espionage, employing their strong commercial connections with Spain. A rabbi publicly asked Cromwell for the legal readmission of adherents to the Jewish religion and he referred the matter in turn to a meeting of the whole Council, enlarged by clergymen, merchants and judges. They proved to be so deeply divided over it that the Protector withdrew the question for his own further consideration. In fact, the judges had already supplied him with the answer that he needed, by stating that the medieval expulsion had no enduring validity in common or statute law. So, with a true heroism and magnanimity of vision, he told the Jewish community that they had a legal right to be in England and that he would protect them from prosecution for failing to attend a Christian church service. With his usual political deviousness, he then refused to put this in writing when they asked him to do so. But nobody thereafter questioned the legality of his statement (though some writers vilified him) and the history of modern English Jewry may formally be dated from that moment in 1655. Cromwell's conquest of Jamaica ultimately became one of the most important contributions to that Afro-Caribbean culture which has come to be such a dynamic part of modern English life. His response to the Jews established another cultural tradition, of giving asylum even to strangers who might be ideologically unpalatable to some of the existing population. For that, more than anything else he did, he perhaps deserves to be honoured now.

(preceding pages) *Prospect of a Popish Successor*: Whig print from the Exclusion Crisis which brilliantly encapsulates the central themes of Whig propaganda. The Janus-faced figure 'Mack' (i.e. Irish Catholic) is half Duke of York, half Devil, and is burning Protestants at the stake and setting fire to the City of London. To his right is a figure who is half Anglican bishop, half Pope, who is driving Protestant nonconformists out of the Church of England. Sitting astride the roof of the church is a group of Anglican clergymen riding 'Tantivy' towards the Devil – hence the origin of the nickname 'Tantivy' for a Tory clergyman. The dog to the right with a broom tied to his tail and fawning at a Jesuit represents the Tory propagandist Roger L'Estrange, whose publisher was Henry Brome.

## I

### The Nation Would Not Stand Long

*Weaknesses of the Restoration  
Monarchy in England*

*I ever thought that the Methods us'd in King Charles's Reign, to introduce Popery and Slavery, were a thousand times better laid, and more natural to effectuate the Design, than those afterwards made use of by King James. The one was too bare fac'd, and obvious to every Bodies Reason; but the other was of a finer Texture, and not so easily discerned, though far more dangerous.<sup>1</sup>*

The Restoration of monarchy in the spring of 1660, contemporaries and modern historians alike agree, was popular. Republicanism had had shallow roots in England, and, although Oliver Cromwell managed to hold things together reasonably well until his death in September 1658, it proved impossible to establish a credible regime following the fall of the Protectorate with the resignation of Oliver's son Richard in May 1659. First the Rump Parliament was recalled (May), next the republican army seized power (October), then the Rump was restored again (December), and by the end of the year England seemed to be drifting into anarchy. In the autumn and winter of 1659–60 there was considerable agitation out-of-doors – in the form of demonstrations, riots and petitions – against rule by the army and the Rump as people campaigned for a full and free parliament and a return to constitutional propriety. The English were finally put out of their misery by General Monck, commander of the forces in Scotland, who marched into England on 1 January and headed for London, where he forced the Rump to readmit the secluded members (February) and then vote for its own dissolution

(March), thereby paving the way for the calling of the Convention (April) which everyone knew would call back the King. Yet in carrying out these actions Monck was as much responding to popular pressure as pursuing any clear agenda of his own; in that sense the Restoration happened because people wanted it to, and most were glad to see the final demise of the republic. When Charles II was solemnly proclaimed king in Boston, Lincolnshire, in the second week of May, the 'yonge men' of the town took down 'the States armes' and proceeded to drag them up and down the streets, first having the beadies whip them, before they in turn 'pissed and sh[itted] on [them]', 'such was there malice to the States armes in that towne'; only then was the sordid debris thrown on to the bonfires which the locals had made 'for joy' at the recalling of the King.<sup>2</sup> Charles's eventual return to England at the end of the month prompted enthusiastic rejoicing throughout the realm; the Kentish gentleman Sir Edward Dering recorded in his diary that he believed 'there never was in any nation so much joy both inwardly felt and outwardly expresst, as was in this Kingdom from the day of His Majestie landing at Dover' on 25 May 'to his coming to London' on the 29th.<sup>3</sup> There were similar scenes throughout the three kingdoms. According to an account written by an Irish Jacobite of Old English stock in the early eighteenth century, there was 'nothing now to be seen or heard but joys and jubilees throughout the British empire, for the royal physician [was] come to heal the three bleeding nations, and to give them the life of freeborn subjects'.<sup>4</sup>

Charles II had tried to cement his popularity by appearing to be all things to all men. Thus in a declaration issued from Breda in the Low Countries on 4 April 1660, just before his restoration, he had promised to heal the wounds which had been kept bleeding for so long by offering 'a free and general Pardon' to all supporters of the republic (save those who might subsequently be excepted by parliament) and 'a Liberty to tender Consciences'.<sup>5</sup> The trouble was, the royal physician was unable to effect a cure – a failure that was all too apparent by the late 1670s. In June 1677 the radical prophetess Anne Wentworth heard 'a most dreadfull and terrible voyce' warning that there would soon be 'an overturning . . . in this Nation', which would not 'stand long as it is'.<sup>6</sup> Over the next several months she received

several revelations concerning the imminent day of judgement, which would affect not just England, but 'all Europe', including also Scotland and Ireland. Thus on 8 October 1678 she foretold how 'In Scotland Judgments first there begun, / But upon England greater now will come,' and how 'Ireland surely will also deeply suffer then,' as likewise Holland, France, Italy, and Spain, none of which would be able to gain 'by all our loss'.<sup>7</sup> Wentworth believed that God's wrath was about to fall upon these nations for their ungodliness, and that Jesus Christ would come to the rescue of the oppressed minority who were the true believers. To us she might seem like a crank; most of her contemporaries condemned her as 'a Proud, Passionate, Revengeful, Discontented, and Mad Woman'.<sup>8</sup> Yet in crucial respects she was to be proved correct, if not quite in the way she predicted. By 1677–8 the Restoration regime did appear to be slipping into crisis, and there were many who were coming to feel that the nation could not 'stand long as it is'. There were to be great overturnings, not just in England, but also in Scotland and Ireland, over the next dozen or so years – 'mighty Revolutions', as contemporaries observed;<sup>9</sup> yet, despite this, none of the great powers of Europe was to profit at England's expense.

The purpose of this and the next chapter is to explore how 1660 became 1677–8: that is, to investigate how it was that a regime that had seemed overwhelmingly popular at the time of the Restoration could seem on the verge of falling apart by the eve of the Exclusion Crisis. What, exactly, had gone wrong? The present chapter will focus on the problems facing the restored monarchy in England. Three main factors, it will be suggested, contributed to the weakness of the restored monarchy in England: a legacy of political and religious division, a lack of effective royal power, and a loss of prestige. The following chapter will deal with Scotland and Ireland, in order to highlight the different sorts of problem that the restored monarch faced in his other kingdoms, as well as the ways in which the difficulties bequeathed by Charles's multiple-kingdom inheritance created problems that were of a genuinely British nature.

## THE POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS LEGACY OF THE CIVIL WAR AND INTERREGNUM

Restoration England was a society that desperately wanted to be able to forget its past, but which forever remained haunted by it. Most will have an image of an England after 1660 reacting against the austerities of Puritan rule, presided over by a 'merry monarch' (albeit one leaning towards the debauched) determined never to go on his travels again but who at the same time was going to enjoy himself after his years in exile. Things that had been out of fashion or proscribed for so long were immediately brought back – such as Christmas, may-poles and the theatre (now with actual women playing the female parts). In short, people were allowed to have fun again – and more. Indeed, in this respect, the Restoration did not so much restore an old cultural world as usher in a new era whose hedonism far exceeded anything that had been seen before the outbreak of the Civil War. At the centre of this world was a libertine court – a society of Restoration rakes given more to drinking, gambling, swearing and whoring than to godliness – presided over by the King himself and his equally rakish brother, James, Duke of York.

The contemporary Whig historian Gilbert Burnet – one of William III's propaganda geniuses, who was to become Bishop of Salisbury after the Glorious Revolution but who had briefly served as a royal chaplain under Charles II – later wrote that 'the ruin of [Charles's] reign, and of all his affairs, was occasioned chiefly by his delivering himself up at his first coming over to a mad range of pleasure.' Nevertheless, Burnet was balanced enough to recognize that Charles possessed a number of positive attributes. It was true the King had 'no sense of religion' – although Charles 'was no atheist', Burnet wrote, 'he could not think God would make a man miserable, only for taking a little pleasure out of the way.' However, he 'had a very good understanding', and 'knew well the state of affairs both at home and abroad', while 'his apprehension was quick, and his memory good'. He also 'had a softness of temper that charmed all who came near him', and 'was affable and easy'.<sup>10</sup> Charles II was clearly possessed of certain personality traits – intelligence, quick-wittedness and flexibility – that his father had lacked;

although Charles II may have been less fit than Charles I morally speaking, he was arguably more fit to be a king.<sup>11</sup> Whatever the personal attributes of the man at the helm, however, he was always going to face difficulties because of the troubled legacy bequeathed by the experiences of the 1640s and '50s. Could a way be found of, if not forgetting the past, then at least living with it?

Politically, the Restoration was a self-conscious attempt to put the clock back. Charles II's rule was dated as having begun immediately upon the demise of his father in January 1649; for the legal record, 1660 became the twelfth year of the new king's reign. Likewise, the English Convention which recalled Charles II did not impose any conditions on the restored monarch; it simply sought to return to the position on the eve of the Civil War – the last time a valid constitutional framework could be said to have existed – and start all over again. Thus all innovations that had been introduced without the King's free consent were deemed null and void; constitutionally, it was as if the last nineteen years had never happened. However, this did mean that the reforming legislation passed during the early months of the Long Parliament back in 1641 remained on the books. This left the crown shorn of prerogative courts such as Star Chamber and High Commission, and also of the ability to raise extra-parliamentary levies (such as ship money) during times of emergency. The desire to return to constitutional propriety helps explain why, in the end, the Convention chose not to exact any concessions from Charles as the price of his restoration. Since it had not been called by the King, the Convention was not a legal parliament; any measures it passed might therefore be deemed null and void once the King was restored. By a similar logic, it had no power to undo the reforms of 1641. The working-out of the political and religious settlement, and any further reforms or additional legislation that might be needed, would have to wait until monarchy had been restored and a legal parliament had been brought into being. The Convention made a start once the royal assent had been received to a bill declaring it to be a full and legal parliament in June.<sup>12</sup> Its most noteworthy achievement was the passage of a generous Act of Indemnity and Oblivion in August, offering pardon for crimes committed against the monarchy over the past two decades. The act exempted a mere thirty-three

individuals from the pardon, of whom only a third were executed;<sup>13</sup> this did enough to satisfy the nation's thirst for revenge without instigating the type of bloodbath that might have been counterproductive. One of the last acts of the Convention was to order the exhumation of the bodies of Oliver Cromwell, Henry Ireton, Thomas Pride and John Bradshaw, so that they could be duly hanged and decapitated for their role in the regicide – a sentence which was carried out on 30 January 1661.<sup>14</sup> The main task of sorting out the details of the Restoration settlement in Church and state, however, was left to the Cavalier Parliament, which sat from May 1661 – a proper parliament, called in constitutionally correct circumstances, that could choose to usher in a new beginning or to restore more of the past, depending upon what the King, Lords and Commons saw fit.<sup>15</sup>

Although rejoicing at the return of the monarchy was widespread, it was not universal. In Lincolnshire, as most locals celebrated following the official proclaiming of Charles II in the second week of May, Mr Vincent, the minister of Cawthorpe and Covenham, tried to extinguish his neighbourhood bonfire, kicking the fire about with his feet and proclaiming, 'Stay! The rogue is not yet come over.'<sup>16</sup> In Herefordshire, Thomas Baskerville of Eardisley, a Commonwealth JP, took a list of the names of those who made bonfires on the news of the King's arrival in England and threatened them with punishment.<sup>17</sup> On hearing of the King's return, Cuthbert Studholme of Carlisle decided to make haste for London, laying his hand on his sword and announcing before he left, 'This is the sword shall run Charles Stuart through the heart blood.' It was a threat the government took seriously enough to issue orders that Studholme should be immediately seized and allowed nowhere near the King.<sup>18</sup> Local court records provide numerous examples of individuals accused of speaking out against the restoration of monarchy. On 22 May 1660 Edward and Alice Jones, a shoemaker and his wife from Westminster, acknowledged 'it was the King's time now to raigne,' but believed 'it was upon sufferance for a little time, and it would be theirs agine before itt be long.' Others from the greater London area – presumably former Cromwellian soldiers – threatened that, given the opportunity, they would run the King through with their rusty old weapons.<sup>19</sup> In the north of England an indictment was pressed against Margaret Dixon of Newcastle upon

Tyne for allegedly saying on 13 May 1660, 'What! can they finde noe other man to bring in then a Scotsman. What! is there not some Englishman more fit to make a King then a Scott?' She clearly did not have a very high opinion of Charles Stuart: 'There is none that loves him but drunk whores and whoremongers,' she averred. 'I hope he will never come into England, for that hee will sett on fire the three kingdoms as his father before him has done. God's curse light on him. I hope to see his bones hanged at a horse tayle, and the dogs runn through his puddins.' One Richard Abbott appeared before the northern assize circuit for saying on 20 May, 'If I had but one batt in my belly, I would give it to keep the King out, for Cromwell ruled better than ever the King will.' Puritan divine John Botts predicted in a sermon delivered at Darfield church in Yorkshire on 13 May that 'the man . . . the Parliament were about to bring in, would bring in superstition and Popery' and urged his congregation to 'feare the King of heaven and worship Him, and bee not so desirous of an earthly King, which will tend to the imbroileing of us againe in blood.'<sup>20</sup> Similar sentiments can be detected in most parts of the country – from the south-east to the West Country, through the Midlands to the far north – though the survival of the relevant court records is too patchy to allow any systematic analysis.<sup>21</sup>

The government received numerous reports of alleged plots against the monarchy by disaffected radicals across the country in the early years of the Restoration. However, it is difficult to know how widespread popular disaffection was. Some of those accused of seditious activity were victims of malicious prosecution, while a number of the rumoured plots were no more than fabrications by unscrupulous paid informers trying to feed off the government's own insecurities in an attempt to make money. There were, of course, some genuine conspiracies, but they were hardly of a scale to cause serious trouble to the security of the new regime. Thus there was a small uprising of perhaps some fifty Fifth Monarchists in London in January 1661, and a somewhat larger, though equally ineffective, rising in Yorkshire in 1663. But most historians remain sceptical about the extent of the survival of republican sentiment after 1660.<sup>22</sup>

Two points need to be made, however. The first is that, although those who were never able to accept the return of monarchy probably



never posed much of a real threat to the security of the restored regime, they did succeed in frightening the government. The Restoration monarchy lived in continual fear that erstwhile supporters or clients of the old republican or Cromwellian regimes might rise in arms against it, and was particularly worried about the possibility that discontented elements in England might combine with the disaffected in Scotland and Ireland to mount a more significant challenge. This conditioned the Restoration regime's attitude towards questions of security, and helps explain why there was a desire to have a reliable, professional army in all three kingdoms to prevent any possible rumblings, why the authorities were so concerned about the problem of dissent (since most of the radicals were dissenters), and why there was a tendency to take an unduly harsh approach to the suppression of crowd unrest if there was ever the slightest suspicion that republican elements might be involved.<sup>23</sup> The second point is to warn against any desire to label critics of royal government according to a professed preference for a specific type of political arrangement in the state, such as a monarchy or a republic, and from that to assume that if fewer people seemed to be advocating a republic after 1660 then the platform of the so-called republicans of the 1650s must have been becoming less popular. Instead, we need to deconstruct what the political and religious opponents of the Stuart monarchy stood for, and recognize that they might endorse different political solutions, at different junctures, in order to achieve the same goals. In the context of the late 1640s and the 1650s, a settlement in which there was no hereditary monarch seemed to many radicals the best strategy to pursue – and it became a viable option after Colonel Pride's purge of the Long Parliament in December 1648. In the changed context of the Restoration, seeking the abolition of monarchy made little practical sense. Yet there were still many who continued to promote the cause of greater political, religious and economic liberty and justice, and who challenged the authority structures in both Church and state, even if they accommodated themselves to working within a monarchical framework. In other words, the champions of the 'Good Old Cause' might have come to favour a republic in the 1650s, whereas after 1660 support for a republic might have all but disappeared, but this should not lead us to conclude that support for the 'Good Old Cause' had necessarily all but disappeared.<sup>24</sup>

Even though the out-and-out republicans were a small minority, it should not be assumed that the desire to bring back the monarchy reflected the existence of a political consensus. There were some – mainly Presbyterians and old Puritans – who would have liked to have seen the monarchy reconstructed and stripped of many of its prerogatives, along the lines of the Treaty of Newport of 1648, which had proposed giving parliament control over the militia and the right of appointment to all offices of state. In this camp were influential Presbyterian peers such as the earls of Manchester, Bedford, Anglesey and Northampton, as well as commoners like Sir Gilbert Gerard, Sir Harbottle Grimston, Sir Denzil Holles and Sir Anthony Ashley Cooper (the future Earl of Shaftesbury). Then there were ultra-royalists – men like the Earl of Peterborough, Charles Berkeley and Henry Bennet (later Earl of Arlington) – who wanted to reinvest the crown with all the powers it had enjoyed in the 1630s, undoing the reforms of 1641. Proposals made in the early 1660s that Star Chamber should be revived came to nothing, though in 1664 the Triennial Act of 1641, which had compelled the king to call parliament every three years (and required the sheriffs to issue election writs if the king failed to do so) was repealed, and replaced by a measure which, while still stipulating that parliaments should be called at least once every three years, removed the machinery whereby this could be enforced. Tensions survived in the Restoration era, therefore, between those who believed that the authority of the crown should be limited and those who wanted to see it strengthened. Moreover, the nature of the relationship between the crown and parliament remained ambiguous as a result of differing interpretations as to what had actually happened when the monarchy was restored. To some it seemed obvious that the Convention had called back the King, with the implication that parliament, ultimately, was supreme. Anglican-royalists, however, tended to the view that the King had been restored by divine providence, and that the Convention had simply acknowledged Charles's rightful position as king, which he had technically been since the execution of his father on 30 January 1649.<sup>25</sup> Indeed, an act of August 1660, ordaining that 29 May (Charles's birthday and day of restoration) be kept as 'a Perpetual Anniversary Thanksgiving', declared that it was 'Almighty God' who 'by his all-swaying providence and power' had



brought about 'his Majesty's late most wonderful, glorious, peaceable and joyful restoration'.<sup>26</sup>

The biggest source of contention was religion. The Restoration occurred in a climate of intense reaction against the sects, as reflected by many of the petitions of late 1659 and early 1660 against the army and the Rump, and also a number of crowd attacks on Baptist and Quaker meetings at this time.<sup>27</sup> Yet, beyond the desire to be rid of the sects, there was consensus on little else. Anglicans wanted the restoration of the old Church of the bishops and the Prayer Book. Indeed, without waiting to see what the settlement in the Church would be, episcopalians began to revive the Book of Common Prayer service, even before the King's return, and Anglican ministers took repossession of the livings they felt had been illegally taken from them during the Interregnum. The lead may have been taken by the Anglican gentry and the clergy, but there is plenty of evidence of grass-roots Anglicanism, as people welcomed back their old ministers, pranced around maypoles as a way of taunting the Presbyterians and Independents, rejoiced as local communities burned copies of the Solemn League and Covenant in accordance with a parliamentary proclamation of May 1661, and even enthusiastically cheered their bishops when they ventured back into their dioceses.<sup>28</sup> The Presbyterians, by contrast, although they recognized that the bishops would return, argued for limited episcopacy and some concessions to the Puritan reformist agenda, in the hope of comprehending as many as possible within the Church establishment. Indeed, some of the petitions against army rule of late 1659 seemed to intimate a Presbyterian reform agenda: that from the London apprentices of 15 November, for example, called for the restoration of the religion established by 'our three last Princes, with some amendment in Discipline'.<sup>29</sup> Yet, although the Presbyterians wanted comprehension, they did not, any more than the Anglicans, think it appropriate to tolerate those who worshipped outside the Church. Separatists, quite naturally, hoped at least to be allowed to worship freely, according to the dictates of their conscience. They thus put their faith in the promise which Charles had made in his declaration from Breda of April 1660 to grant 'a Liberty to tender Consciences'.

In the end, the Anglican vision won out. A narrow and intolerant

episcopal Church was re-established, backed up by a severe penal code – known to history, somewhat misleadingly, as the Clarendon Code, after Charles's leading minister of the period 1660–67, the first Earl of Clarendon – designed to guarantee an Anglican monopoly of office-holding, worship and education. The first measure came in December 1661, when parliament passed a Corporation Act stipulating that all municipal office-holders take the Anglican sacrament and renounce the Presbyterian Covenant. This was followed in May 1662 by the Act of Uniformity, which required all clergymen and teachers (from the masters and fellows of Oxbridge colleges down to village schoolmasters and private instructors and tutors) to conform to the liturgy of the Church of England, as prescribed by the Book of Common Prayer, and to renounce the Presbyterian Covenant, setting a deadline for compliance of 24 August (St Bartholomew's Day). Nearly 1,000 ministers – roughly 10 per cent of the clergy – found themselves unable to comply and were forced to give up their livings, among them many Presbyterians and moderate Puritans who would have preferred to remain part of the national Church. Separatist religious meetings were outlawed first by the Quaker Act of 1662, followed two years later by a somewhat broader Conventicle Act, which was to last for three years after the end of the parliamentary session in which it was passed and which provided for a series of escalating fines for any who attended nonconformist religious meetings – £5 (or three months' imprisonment) for the first offence, £10 (or six months' imprisonment) for the second, and £100 (or transportation) for the third. A second Conventicle Act, passed in 1670, reduced the fines for those who merely attended nonconformist conventicles (to 5 shillings for the first offence, 10 shillings thereafter), but laid down stiff penalties (£20 for the first offence, £40 thereafter) for those who preached at nonconformist meetings or allowed such meetings to be held in their houses. To stop ejected ministers from continuing to serve their old flocks or else establishing new congregations in major population centres, the Five Mile Act of 1665 forbade them from residing within 5 miles of their old parish or any corporate town.<sup>30</sup>

In addition to the new legislation, the pre-Civil War laws against recusants and separatists remained on the statute book. Most of these

had been aimed against Roman Catholics, but there was also scope for their employment against Protestant nonconformists. The most hated of such measures was an act of 1593 (35 Elizabeth) stipulating that those convicted of not coming to church or of holding separatist religious meetings had either to conform within three months or abjure the realm, forfeiting their lands and goods to the crown, with failure to abjure being a capital offence.<sup>31</sup> As concerns grew about the threat of popery in the 1670s, parliament decided to introduce a religious test for office to protect the political establishment from subversion by Catholics, though in the process it imposed further disabilities on Protestant dissenters as well. Thus the Test Act of 1673 required all office-holders under the crown to take the Anglican sacrament and make a declaration against transubstantiation. A further Test Act of 1678 disabled all Roman Catholics from sitting in either house of parliament, although the King's brother and heir to the throne, the Duke of York, was excluded from its provisions.<sup>32</sup>

The Restoration settlement in the Church, it has been argued, was a victory for the Anglican squirearchy that dominated the Cavalier Parliament elected in 1661.<sup>33</sup> Yet, although there was considerable agreement in this parliament concerning the need for harsh measures against separatists, legislation aimed at moderate dissenters proved more controversial and was passed only after close divisions.<sup>34</sup> The divide that emerged in Restoration politics, in other words, was not a simple one between Anglicans and dissenters, but depended upon where one stood on the issue of dissent. Some Anglicans were sympathetic to the plight of dissenters, and favoured a relaxation of the penal laws against fellow Protestants; others were fiercely intolerant, and believed in the need for a strict enforcement of all laws against all forms of religious nonconformity. Nor was the dividing line between these two types absolute; attitudes towards dissent shifted over time, according to political contingency – normally dependent upon whether the greatest threat to the Established Church at any given time was perceived as coming from Catholics or from Protestant nonconformists. Such considerations explain why it is so difficult to calculate the size of the dissenting interest in Restoration England. Out-and-out separatists may well have been a small minority, as the Compton Census of 1676 alleged. When we include those

who identified with the dissenters or sympathized with their plight – because they were old Puritans themselves, were partial conformists or occasional nonconformists, had nonconformist relatives or friends (or even business associates) or had come to believe (in a given political context) that the persecution of dissenters was undesirable – then the proportion becomes much larger.<sup>35</sup> The important point to understand is that the relative size of this group was never stable. Indeed, mobilizing the population at large either to be in sympathy with or to feel hostile towards the dissenters was to become one of the major political and ideological battlegrounds of the Restoration era, as will become apparent later in this book.

The argument for intolerance, furthermore, was political, not religious. Protestants did not believe in persecuting people for their religious opinions; that was a popish principle. Nonconformist conventicles were hunted down because they were regarded as nests of sedition – places where 'Seditious Sectaries and other disloyall Persons' met 'under pretence of tender Consciences' to 'contrive Insurrections', as the 1670 Conventicle Act put it.<sup>36</sup> The reality, however, was that most English nonconformists were not political subversives. The biggest group by far, the Presbyterians, had opposed the regicide and actively welcomed the restoration of monarchy, and most Independents, Baptists and Quakers were prepared to make their peace with the restored monarchy and merely wanted to be allowed the liberty of conscience they had been promised in Charles's Declaration of Breda. The trouble was, pursuing a policy of religious intolerance out of a fear of political subversives ran the risk of making the potentially loyal disloyal and creating the very problem that such a policy was designed to prevent.

A major problem facing Charles II in England, therefore, was that he had to rule over a divided people. Even in 1660 there was no true consensus beyond the desire to bring back the monarchy, and handling the legacy of political and religious tensions bequeathed by the Civil War would have been no easy task for any government. Things were made worse by the fact that the particular settlement reached in the Church was something that Charles himself did not want. Although personally he had little time for the Presbyterians, whom he held responsible for the outbreak of the Civil War in 1642 and hence

ultimately for the death of his father, he would have preferred a more eirenic solution, so as not to unnecessarily alienate significant sections of the population right from the start. Instead, he got trapped into a partisan settlement – one that seemed to make him king not of all his subjects but only of those who conformed to the re-established Church. The issue of dissent was to prove a major source of political discord throughout his reign. The problem was that the King was in a no-win situation: a strict enforcement of the penal laws ran the risk of alienating substantial sections of the population (not just the non-conformists themselves, who might, it was feared, be pushed into rebellion, but also moderate Anglicans who felt that the measures against dissent were unduly harsh), while any moves to help the dissenters would provoke the opposition of the Anglican hardliners, whose support no restoration monarch could afford to lose.

### CONSTRAINTS ON ROYAL POWER

Let us now move to a consideration of the nature and extent of royal power in Restoration England. Many contemporaries criticized Charles for his pretensions to absolutism, or for governing in an arbitrary way. One MP suspected as early as 1663 that there was an intention 'to change the constitution of the government of this kingdom and to reduce us to the model of France [where] they have lost all their liberties, and [are] governed by an arbitrary and military power'.<sup>37</sup> In 1675 the Earl of Shaftesbury, who had recently fallen from grace and moved into opposition, complained of a long-standing design to make the government 'absolute and Arbitrary' and to establish rule by a standing army, while in 1677 Andrew Marvell produced his famous *Account of the Growth of Popery*, bemoaning what he saw as a drift towards popery and arbitrary government under Charles II.<sup>38</sup> In theory, the powers of the restored monarch appear to have been considerable. In reality, however, there remained severe constraints on what he could do in practice, especially during the 1660s and '70s, which left Charles II vulnerable to the criticisms of the competing political and religious interests identified above, and made it difficult for him to assert his own will in

government and to pursue policies he saw as in the best interests of the monarchy in England.

Before proceeding, we need to say something about what contemporaries understood by the words 'arbitrary' and 'absolute'.<sup>39</sup> Both terms possessed a variety of resonances, from the neutral to the derogatory. An 'arbitrary' power was one that was unbounded by law. Most seventeenth-century legal theorists believed that there was some degree of arbitrary or discretionary power vested in the monarch, by dint of his prerogative, normally to be used only in emergencies. Thus Sir Philip Warwick, writing in 1678, spoke of 'the usefulness and unavoidableness of arbitrary prerogative' to deal with cases 'that cannot be foreseen, or that come seldom, and clothed with divers circumstances, or fall under no certain rule, or are of great import or danger, and can stay for no formal council'. Such a power was arbitrary because it was not 'limited under strict forms or process of Law'. But it would be 'a piece of ignorance', he continued, 'to think, because a decision is arbitrary, therefore it is unjust'. The whole point of the king having an 'arbitrary prerogative' was so that he could promote justice or else preserve the interests of the state without causing injustice. 'No arbitrary power, or decision, or reason of state', Warwick insisted, 'must want justice, for the standing laws, and the arbitrary determinations of Sovereignty must both be reasonable and just'.<sup>40</sup> However, if the king repeatedly showed little respect for the rule of law or flouted existing constitutional conventions, this was arbitrary government, and no better than tyranny.

To say that the king was 'absolute', by contrast, meant that he was accountable to no human power. He was *ab legibus solutus* – exempt from the laws. This did not mean he could ignore the laws at will; he was supposed to rule according to law, and would be held accountable by God if he did not. But he could not be resisted by his subjects if he failed to observe the law, and he could not be tried in a court of law. The king was in that sense the supreme power within the state; he was sovereign. 'Absolute' also carried the meaning of 'complete': an absolute ruler had complete power, in the sense that he did not share it with anyone else. He did not share sovereignty with parliament, for example. Many people could champion the Restoration monarchy as absolute and mean it positively, without any negative

connotations; they certainly did not believe that an absolute monarch should rule arbitrarily. Hence Warwick could acknowledge that the king was absolute and possessed certain arbitrary powers, but remain adamant that he was 'not an arbitrary Monarch'.<sup>41</sup> Marchamont Needham, writing propaganda for the royal administration in the mid-1670s in an attempt to discredit the position of Shaftesbury and his adherents, insisted that divine-right absolute monarchy did not exclude all limitations by human laws or mean that the king was under no obligation to his people. 'A Father hath a Divine Right to Rule his Son, and a Master his Servant,' Needham explained, 'else the Scripture had never made Divine Injunctions, investing them with Rights of absolute power over them; and yet the same Scripture also signifies . . . there are Obligations also upon the Father and Master, to the Son and Servant.' It was 'such a Personal, absolute Divine Right', Needham asserted, 'that the Kings of England have claimed and exercised over their Subjects, as that in all times . . . the Laws have generally run in course, for preservation of all the Rights and Liberties of the People, as well as those of the Crown'.<sup>42</sup>

Yet the dividing line between absolute and arbitrary was becoming blurred, especially in the minds of those people – such as Shaftesbury and the other members of the 'country' opposition of the mid-1670s – who did not believe that the king was absolute. If the king could not be held accountable, then not only was his power absolute but he could rule in an arbitrary way. Moreover, the meaning of 'absolute' as 'complete' carried with it the connotation that an absolute sovereign had total control over the government and could rule his kingdom according to his own whim. Thus in April 1678 the French ambassador, Paul Barillon, wrote to Louis XIV expressing his view that it was not in the interest of France 'that a King of England should be absolute master, and be able to dispose according to his will of all the power of the nation'. Revealingly, Barillon recognized there were different degrees of absoluteness; a week later he wrote to Louis saying that he did not believe Charles II cared much 'for being more absolute than he is'.<sup>43</sup>

At first glance, the powers of the restored monarch appear to have been fairly extensive. The return to the position of 1641 meant that the king was re-established as the chief executive, with control over the appointment of all officers of state and the right to determine all

questions of policy (both foreign and domestic). The king could not tax or enact legislation without parliament, but he had the power of veto over parliamentary legislation, and he alone determined when to call, prorogue or dismiss parliament. He was also supreme governor of the Church, by dint of the powers vested in him by the Elizabethan Act of Supremacy of 1559. Additional legislation enacted by parliament in the early years of the Restoration sought to shore up the powers of the monarchy even further. Two Militia Acts, of 1661 and 1662, gave the king sole command of all armed forces within the country.<sup>44</sup> The Corporation Act and the Act of Uniformity reinforced the doctrine of non-resistance by requiring that municipal officeholders, clergy and teachers take an oath declaring it was 'not lawful upon any pretence whatsoever to take arms against the King'.<sup>45</sup>

The government also made efforts to restrict both public involvement in and discussion of politics. An Act against Tumultuous Petitioning of 1661, which blamed such activity for 'the late unhappy wars, confusions and calamities in this nation', made it illegal to solicit the hands or consent of persons 'above the number of twenty or more to any petition' to the king or parliament 'for alteration of matters established by law in Church or State', unless the petition had first been approved and ordered by three or more JPs from the area, or the greater part of the grand jury, or, in the case of London, by the Lord Mayor, aldermen and common council. The act also stipulated that no more than ten people were allowed to present a petition.<sup>46</sup> The Licensing Act of 1662 made it illegal to print anything heretical, seditious or schismatical, or any doctrine or opinion contrary to the Christian faith or the doctrine and discipline of the Church of England, and required all books to be licensed by the Stationers' Company of London, by one of the archbishops or the bishop of London, or by one of the chancellors or vice-chancellors of the universities.<sup>47</sup>

It was possible, within this legal framework, to take a very exalted view of monarchy. Many Anglican divines, in their sermons, preached up the divine-right nature of monarchy, insisting that kings were 'God's vice-gerents' and thus 'accountable to none but God'.<sup>48</sup> Most royalist writers vehemently condemned the theory of coordination, or mixed monarchy – the notion that the king was but a coordinate power who shared his sovereignty with the Lords and Commons. As



the Lord Chief Baron Sir Orlando Bridgeman put it, at the trial of the regicides in October 1660, the king was 'not only Caput Populi, the head of the people; but Caput Republicae, the head of the Commonwealth, The Three Estates'. 'All must know,' Lord Chief Justice Sir Robert Hyde concurred, 'that the king is above the two houses.'<sup>49</sup>

However, the Restoration monarchy was nowhere near as strong as such rhetorical flourishes were intended to imply. A major cause of weakness was lack of money. The crown suffered from an inadequate system of finance. In 1660 the Convention had worked out a seemingly generous financial settlement whereby the crown was to receive £1.2 million per year in the form of receipts from customs and excise; this was double what Charles I's ordinary revenues had been in the late 1620s and early 1630s. But the Convention had miscalculated; the yield fell short by almost a third, and an additional tax on fire hearths imposed in 1662 made up only half the difference. It proved impossible for the crown to make ends meet, while wars with the Dutch of 1664-7 and 1672-4, coupled with Charles II keeping larger military and naval establishments than his father, pushed the monarchy further and further into debt. Indeed, in January 1672, when Lord Ashley (the future Earl of Shaftesbury) was Chancellor of the Exchequer, the government had to order a Stop of the Exchequer, unilaterally cancelling payment to government creditors in order to release funds for the third Anglo-Dutch War. Shortage of funds left the crown dependent upon parliament for grants of extraordinary supply. Although parliamentary sessions remained irregular, Charles II found himself having to meet with parliament virtually every year between 1660 and 1681 (the exceptions being 1671 and 1676). Moreover, unlike their early Stuart counterparts, Restoration parliaments were not coy about using the power of the purse to bring pressure on the crown to change its policies. On a number of occasions in the 1660s and 1670s parliament either threatened to or actually did withhold supply to try to force a change in royal policy.<sup>50</sup>

To free himself from dependence upon parliament, Charles II would have to make the crown financially independent; this was something he was not able to do until after 1681. The only other option was to try to control or manage parliament in such a way as

to ensure its compliance with the crown's interests. This was difficult for a number of reasons. The legacy of ideological division bequeathed by the upheavals of the 1640s and '50s meant that contests at parliamentary elections became more frequent (replacing the older system whereby the local elite had reached a consensus over who should be 'selected'),<sup>51</sup> and the large electorates of the shire constituencies and the open boroughs' electorates were not easily susceptible to management from above. This is why Charles, having been presented with the return of a predominantly Cavalier-Anglican parliament in 1661, decided to keep it in existence for so long (it was eventually dissolved in January 1679), even though the large numbers of by-elections needed to replace MPs who had either died or been promoted to the upper house meant that it was becoming a body increasingly less sympathetic to the crown as time went on. In the mid-1670s the King's then chief minister, the Earl of Danby, tried to build up a loyal following in the Commons by doling out pensions and offices to potential supporters or those he wanted to buy off. Although Danby was heavily criticized by opposition peers and members for subverting the independence of parliament, the element of bribery should not be exaggerated. In days when MPs were unpaid, gifts or offices were regarded as fair compensation for past services rendered; they would not necessarily buy someone's support in the future. Danby was successful in building up a court interest or 'party' in the Commons because he pursued policies – a defence of the Church, the eradication of dissent, an aggressive stance against France – that were supported by the Cavalier-Anglican gentry who dominated the Cavalier Parliament.

Charles found it easier to control the House of Lords than he did the Commons. The bishops were restored to the upper house by an act of 1661;<sup>52</sup> there were twenty-six of them when all the seats were filled, and they were all royal appointees. Furthermore, the crown could always seek to extend its interest among the lay lords through new creations; Charles II in fact created a total of sixty-four peers between 1649 and 1685 – more than either his father or his grandfather.<sup>53</sup> Once appointed, however, the bishops enjoyed tenure for life, while it was virtually impossible to remove existing lay peers, short of a successful conviction for treason (though Catholic peers, as

we have seen, were barred from sitting in the Lords by the Test Act of 1678). When the mood of the electorate led to the return of a Cavalier-Anglican House of Commons in 1661, the House of Lords still contained a number of Presbyterian peers, or peers with moderate Puritan sympathies, such as the earls of Devonshire, Manchester and Northumberland. Indeed, Charles promoted several former parliamentarians, and even erstwhile servants to the Protectorate, to the peerage as a reward for their services in helping to bring about the restoration of the monarchy – the most famous example being Sir Anthony Ashley Cooper (the Earl of Shaftesbury from April 1672), who first took his seat in the Lords as Baron Ashley in May 1661. Although careful management meant that Charles could typically rely on support from the upper house, and even use it to suppress or modify legislation initiated in the Commons of which he disapproved, the Lords were never mere pawns, and at times could mount a significant challenge to the royal will.<sup>54</sup>

The Restoration, for most people – former parliamentarians and Cavalier Anglicans alike – meant not just the return of the King, but also the restoration of parliaments and the rule of law. As the first Earl of Clarendon put it in the Lords in May 1661, 'We have our King again, and our Laws again, and Parliaments again.'<sup>55</sup> It was, nevertheless, the king's law: the Commons proposed, but it was the king who enacted legislation. Moreover, the men who interpreted the law, the judges, were all royal appointees. One of the sources of conflict between Charles I and his Long Parliament had been over whether judges should hold their office at royal pleasure (*durante bene placito*) or at good behaviour (*quamdiu se bene gesserint*), which made their tenure more independent. Although at first Charles reverted to his father's practice of 1641 of appointing judges at good behaviour, from about 1668 onward he made appointments at royal pleasure, enabling him later to dismiss or suspend judges at will.<sup>56</sup> The independence of juries from judicial interference, however, was established by Bushell's Case of 1671, which ruled that a judge's decision to imprison a jury for finding against the evidence in the prosecution of the Quaker William Penn in 1670 was illegal.<sup>57</sup>

The king, most agreed, possessed the power, under certain circumstances, to dispense individuals from the penalties of the law, if a

greater injustice would follow if the law were strictly enforced. There were certain restrictions, however, on the scope of the dispensing power. The king could not dispense with a matter that was *malum in se*, that is, inherently wrong, and against the law of God or nature (such as murder); he could dispense only with something that was *malum prohibitum*, that is, which had been made criminal by statute. Even then, the king could not issue dispensations that aimed to destroy the intent or spirit of the original statute, or which would prejudice the interests or property of his subjects; for example, he could not dispense an individual from a law that allowed a third party to collect a fine by way of compensation.<sup>58</sup>

Whether the king could suspend the operation of a statute completely was another matter. Charles and some of his advisers appear to have believed that the royal supremacy, as confirmed by the act of 1559, implied a royal power to suspend penal statutes 'in matters ecclesiastical', though this was something Charles never managed to get recognized.<sup>59</sup> His attempt in December 1662 to issue a Declaration of Indulgence suspending the operation of the penal laws against nonconformists and Catholics provoked a storm of opposition when parliament reassembled the following February, the Commons complaining that it was 'a thing altogether without precedent' and 'inconsistent with the methods and proceedings of the laws of England', and he was forced to back down.<sup>60</sup> The same thing happened when he issued a second Declaration of Indulgence in March 1672. When parliament reconvened in February 1673 it withheld supply until Charles agreed to withdraw the Indulgence.

The precise legal situation is worth clarifying, since the royal pretence to a suspending power was to emerge as a major issue in the Revolution of 1688–9. Historians have typically argued that technically the king did possess the power to suspend ecclesiastical laws, under the terms of the royal supremacy. This was the view taken in 1673 by Shaftesbury, by now Charles's Lord Chancellor, who backed the Indulgence because he believed that the king's supremacy in ecclesiasticals 'was of another nature than that he had in Civills, and had been exercised without exception' by Charles I, James I and Queen Elizabeth.<sup>61</sup> The Commons, however, concluded by a vote of 168 to 116 that the suspending power was illegal.<sup>62</sup> Resolutions of the



Commons, of course, do not make law; the House might be able to force the King to back down, but they could not denude him of a power which he legally possessed. Yet, in taking their stand against the suspending power, the Commons did not think they were declaring something to be illegal that had formerly been recognized as legal; rather, in forcing the King to withdraw his Indulgence they believed they were getting him to acknowledge that this was a power which no king had ever legally enjoyed. On 14 February 1673 the Commons petitioned the King, informing him that 'Penal Statutes in Matters Ecclesiasticall' could not be suspended but by act of parliament. When Charles angrily replied that this suspending power in ecclesiastical matters had never been questioned 'in the Reigns of any of His Ancestors', they quickly sought to disabuse him of this notion. No such power had ever been claimed by his predecessors, they insisted, 'and if it should be admitted, might tend to the Interruption of the free Course of the Laws, and altering the Legislative Power, which hath allwayes been acknowledged to lodge in Your Majesty and the Two Houses of Parliament'. Charles at last gave way, withdrew his Indulgence, and promised 'that what hath been done . . . concerning the Suspension of Penal Laws' would 'not for the future be drawn into Consequence or Example'.<sup>63</sup>

Another major limitation on the power of the crown concerned its ability to police its subjects effectively and to protect itself against the possible threat of subversion at home. Although the Militia Acts had restored crown control over all armed forces within the kingdom, these acts dealt primarily with the militia, an amateur body of part-timers which when put to the test often proved to be far from an effective fighting force. Parliament tended to the view that if the militia could be reformed – kept better supplied with weapons, and with its members better trained – this would be adequate for domestic security; the Civil War and republican experiments had, besides, engendered a deep-seated antipathy towards standing armies among most English people. Charles II, however, as newly restored monarch of a kingdom that over the previous two decades had not shown itself the greatest friend of monarchy, saw the need to have well-trained, professional troops at his disposal. There was no technical reason at law why the king should not keep his own standing forces, if he could

afford to pay for them. If he could not, however, he would need to get parliament to vote taxes to support them. Furthermore, the Petition of Right of 1628 had established that both the quartering of troops on private householders and the imposition of martial law in time of peace were illegal. In practice, these proved quite significant constraints. In 1660 the Convention voted a considerable sum for the disbanding of the Cromwellian army; however, it gave nothing specifically to pay for anything to put in that army's place. Charles managed to keep a force of about 3,000 to 4,000, paid out of his ordinary revenue, who were referred to as 'guards' rather than by the more opprobrious term 'army'. This was tiny: the Interregnum military establishment had peaked at 60,000, while by 1675 Louis XIV in France had an army of about 100,000. Whenever Charles sought to expand his armed forces, as he did in 1666 (in anticipation of a Dutch invasion), in 1672 (on the outbreak of the third Anglo-Dutch War) and again in 1678 (supposedly in readiness for war with France), suspicions immediately arose that he intended to rule through a standing army. Moreover, it proved impossible to house all of the expanded forces in garrisons, and so soldiers came to be quartered not just in public houses, but also on private householders, in violation of the Petition of Right. Parliament naturally proved reluctant to approve taxes to support such additional forces, unless they were needed for war. On 7 February 1674 the Commons resolved 'That the continuing of any Standing Forces in this nation other than the Militia, is a great Grievance and vexation to the people', and petitioned the King to disband all those troops raised since January 1663.<sup>64</sup> Parliament was to push again for the disbandment of the standing army in 1678–9.<sup>65</sup>

The King's guards were sometimes used to perform basic policing functions. In 1663 the royal horse guards were sent to disperse conventiclers in York, while in 1670 the life guards were used to break up various nonconformist meetings in London in the aftermath of the passage of the second Conventicle Act.<sup>66</sup> The government was particularly worried about the threat of possible disorder in the capital – now a large, sprawling metropolis of some half a million people. On the eve of the Civil War, in early 1642, crowd unrest had forced Charles I to abandon London, whose streets he could no longer

police, and Charles II was determined not to succumb to the same problem. When thousands of (mainly young) people, armed with iron bars, pole-axes and other weapons, rioted against bawdy houses in the London area in Easter week of 1668, chanting 'Reformation and reducement' and threatening to pull down Whitehall if the King did not give them liberty of conscience, the government (fearing the riots had been instigated by former Cromwellian soldiers) immediately dispatched the life guards to restore order.<sup>67</sup> The problem with relying on parish constables, or even the local militia, was that they often did not have the requisite muscle to deal with larger-scale disturbances – and, besides, they had the infuriating habit of taking the rioters' side when their grievances seemed just. When thousands of weavers rioted in London in August 1675, to protest against the use of mechanized looms, the local peace-keeping forces simply refused to act. In the end, troops under the command of the Duke of Monmouth had to be called upon to suppress the riots.<sup>68</sup>

What happened in 1675 highlights another major structural weakness of the restored monarchy, namely the limitations to the effective coercive power of the state. Seventeenth-century England did not possess a professional civil service or police force, and for the implementation of government policy and the enforcement of law and order the crown was heavily dependent upon the cooperation of unpaid, part-time officials in the localities: from the Lord Lieutenants and their deputies who ran the local militias, the JPs and magistrates of the counties and boroughs who presided over the quarter sessions, down to the humble parish constables, beadles and nightwatchmen who were responsible for basic police work. Appointments to the lieutenancy and to the magisterial bench were in the gift of the crown, and undesirable types could be removed and replaced by men deemed more trustworthy. Thus the restored Lord Lieutenants appointed in 1660 were chosen for their known loyalty to the crown, the vast majority being staunch Anglican-royalists; their deputies, admittedly, came from a slightly more mixed political background – but only slightly.<sup>69</sup> The county JPs were a more varied group, however. A systematic purge of the magisterial bench in 1660 sought to restore control of the counties to their 'natural leaders' – namely the greater gentry – though in the interests of rapprochement a significant

number of parliamentarians and former Cromwellians were retained alongside the Anglican-royalists who were brought in, and not all of these could be totally relied upon to carry out the crown's will. There was a series of minor purges in the 1670s aimed at ousting some of the politically less reliable types – that of 1670, for example, was carried out with an eye to remove those reluctant to enforce the second Conventicle Act – but it was not until 1680 that the crown attempted another systematic reconstruction.<sup>70</sup> It was more difficult to control the corporations, which enjoyed considerable rights of self-government protected by royal charter. A commission set up to enforce the Corporation Act in 1662–3 led to the expulsion from town governments of those who would not take the Anglican sacrament, renounce the Covenant, or swear the oaths of allegiance and supremacy (acknowledging the reigning monarch as supreme in both spirituals and temporals, and promising to bear allegiance to the King and his heirs and successors); yet the purge failed to remove all who sympathized with dissent, while others who technically failed to qualify themselves under the terms of the Corporation Act nevertheless managed to intrude themselves back into office thanks to a combination of connivance and a loose interpretation of the law. As a result, by the 1670s many corporations were to become hotbeds of partisan strife, often opposing intolerant Anglican zealots against those who saw little need to enforce the penal laws against Protestant nonconformists.<sup>71</sup> With town and even county magistrates not always trustworthy, it is hardly surprising that the humble parish constable might sometimes drag his feet when asked to enforce laws of which he disapproved. In particular, complaints were frequently made about the reluctance of constables to enforce the laws against nonconformist conventicles. Indeed, the government itself recognized this as a problem: hence its introducing a scheme of financial incentives to informers under the terms of the 1670 Conventicle Act – informers were to receive one-third of the fine that resulted from a successful prosecution – in an attempt to remedy this.

## THE LOSS OF PRESTIGE

Failing institutional innovation, the only way to make the central government more powerful was to secure the support and cooperation of these unpaid brokers of central authority in the localities.<sup>72</sup> Purging local government of those suspected of disaffection and trying to compel local officials to perform their duties were part of the solution, but the crown also needed to ensure that those men it did have in place were convinced of the merits of government policy if it wanted them to carry it out. In short, the central government had to sell itself to the people. The king had to convince his subjects that it was in their best interests to see his policies enforced, but this also meant that, to a degree at least, the king had to pursue policies that his subjects wanted him to pursue. In short, he needed both to persuade and to satisfy. He could hope to do this successfully only if he could control the media through which royal policy came to be represented.

The traditional way in which monarchs had tried to sell themselves to their subjects was through an appropriate display of pomp and ceremony. On the eve of the Restoration, the Duke of Newcastle had advised Charles that he should show himself 'Gloryously' to his people, 'Like a God', since then the people would pray for him 'with trembling Feare, and Love, as they did to Queen Elizabeth', for 'nothing Keepest upp a King', Newcastle continued, 'more than seremoney, and order, which makes Distance, and this bringes respecte and Duty.'<sup>73</sup> Charles appeared keen to follow Newcastle's advice. He did his best to tap into the popular enthusiasm for the return of monarchy in the spring of 1660 and promote an appropriate image of royal splendour and majesty. Hence the drawn-out nature of his triumphant return to his kingdom in May 1660, from his first landing at Dover on the 25th to his eventual entry into his capital on his birthday on the 29th.<sup>74</sup> Later that year the Convention established Restoration Day as an annual day of thanksgiving, and in the early years of the reign 29 May became the occasion for bonfire celebrations in a number of communities throughout the land. On 29 May 1661, for example, there were reportedly 'many thousand Bonfires in London, Westminster, and places adjacent (and proportionately all

over the kingdom)', where crowds burned copies of the Solemn League and Covenant and, at some locations, images of Oliver Cromwell.<sup>75</sup> Charles II's coronation, in the spring of 1661, was an elaborate and meticulously planned three-day celebration, designed to revive the cult of monarchy after over a decade of republican government: there was a royal progress from the Tower to Whitehall on 22 April, the coronation itself on the 23rd (St George's Day), and a fireworks display the day after, and according to one contemporary 'the sumptuousness of it' exceeded 'the glory of what hath passed of the like kind in France'.<sup>76</sup> Charles also revived the practice of touching for the King's Evil – the royal touch supposedly being enough by itself to effect a cure for scrofula – in order to confirm the legitimacy of his rule in the eyes of his people. From April 1669, when records become complete, until the end of 1684, Charles touched a total of 28,983 persons, or an average of some 1,800 per year.<sup>77</sup>

At the same time, the Restoration regime did its best to ensure that it had control over the interpretation of political news. Thus the government had its own newspaper, the *London Gazette*, from 1666, and also engaged in a certain amount of pamphleteering – notably under Danby in the mid-1670s – to explain and justify its policies. In addition, it sought to silence critical voices by clamping down on illicit preaching, seditious publications, and collective agitation out-of-doors (in the form of petitions and demonstrations). However, it found it impossible to establish a monopoly over the interpretation of the news. Nonconformist preachers could not be silenced, and, although many no doubt simply ministered to their flocks peacefully, some undoubtedly did use their conventicles as opportunities to launch a critique of government policy and even to urge resistance in the face of oppression.<sup>78</sup> Nor could ministers of the Established Church always be relied upon to adopt a position in support of the government. When Charles issued his 1672 Declaration of Indulgence – a measure designed to relieve Catholics as much as Protestant nonconformists – the bishops responded by instructing their clergy to preach against popery. Charles complained to his archbishop of Canterbury, Gilbert Sheldon, that 'this preaching on controversy' was 'done on purpose to inflame the people, to alienate them from him and his government'; Sheldon, after consultation with some of the

clergy, was ready to stand firm and tell the King that it would be unprecedented for him to 'forbid his clergy to preach in defence of a religion which they believed' while the King himself 'said he was of it', though Charles, in the end, decided not to force the issue and backed down.<sup>79</sup> The only way to prevent the clergy from broaching controversial topics and thereby possibly inflaming the people against the King and his government – the lesson appeared to be – was for the King not to pursue policies they would find controversial.

The Licensing Act did limit the output of the printed press. Whereas some 2,730 titles appeared in 1660 and 1,584 in 1661, by 1663 this figure had fallen to 1,035 and by 1666 to a mere 633 (though the Great Fire of London bore some responsibility here). There was then a small recovery, and output was hovering at around 1,000 to 1,200 titles per year by the 1670s. But it was not until 1679 – the year the Licensing Act lapsed, when there were 1,730 titles published – that the figure for 1661 was exceeded.<sup>80</sup> Nevertheless, manuscript newsletters, pamphlets and political poetry circulated through the coffee houses, disseminating what were sometimes heavily critical views of Charles II, his court or royal policy.<sup>81</sup> To meet this threat, on 29 December 1675 Charles took the dramatic step of issuing a proclamation ordering the closure of all coffee houses. Ten days later he announced that in future such establishments would be allowed to operate only under government licence, with all coffee-house owners being required to take the oaths of allegiance and supremacy and to take out bonds not to allow on their premises any scandalous papers or libels or to permit the uttering of any scandalous reports concerning the government or the ministers of state.<sup>82</sup> The initiative appears to have been of limited practical effect.

A major reason for Charles's inability to persuade and satisfy was that the policies he pursued, or the things he did or accomplished, were hardly persuasive or satisfying. As a result, over the period 1660–78 the crown experienced a considerable loss of prestige. What, then, lent a monarchy prestige at this time? At the basic level, majesty was supposed to be majestic. More particularly, a king was expected to achieve glory for his nation (normally this would be achieved in foreign policy), to defend the true religion (which, in the English context, of course, was the Protestant faith), and to protect and promote

the secular well-being of his subjects (that is, guarantee them what they regarded as their due at law, which by the later seventeenth century was coming to be defined in terms of the trilogy of life, liberty and property). In all these respects the Restoration regime proved a bitter disappointment.

Charles's foreign policy was most inglorious – by any standard – and certainly appeared disastrous compared to what had been achieved under Cromwell in the 1650s. The war of 1664–7 against the Dutch (and also, from 1666, the French) went humiliatingly badly: much of the English fleet was destroyed, and colonial possessions were lost, while in June 1667 came the ultimate disgrace when the Dutch fleet managed to sail up the Medway to Chatham and destroy four of the English navy's biggest vessels and capture the flagship, the *Royal Charles*. In the ensuing peace, England ceded Surinam, on the north-east coast of South America, to the Dutch, and had to acknowledge Dutch claims in West Africa and the East Indies. The fact that England managed to keep the New Netherlands (modern-day New York) – seized from the Dutch by the English government in August 1664 – hardly seemed much of a consolation at the time. England also had to give up Nova Scotia to the French – though England did regain possessions lost to the French in the West Indies.<sup>83</sup>

From the late 1660s, following Clarendon's fall from grace in 1667 and during the administration of the Cabal (1668–73) – so-called after the initial letters of the leading ministers of the time: Thomas Clifford, Arlington, Buckingham, Ashley Cooper and Lauderdale – Charles moved into an alliance with the French. At Dover in 1670 he made a private treaty with Louis XIV whereby he promised, in return for French subsidies, not only to join France in declaring war on the Dutch, but also to announce his own conversion to Catholicism. (Only Clifford and Arlington of the Cabal were privy to the secret treaty; a fake treaty had to be concluded for the benefit of the rest of his ministers and his English subjects, concealing the religious clause.) The ensuing Dutch War of 1672–4 achieved no positive gains for the English, though by its end – thanks in part to a highly successful propaganda campaign by the Dutch themselves – most people in England had come to believe that fighting the Protestant Dutch was against the national interest, and that the much greater threat was posed by



Catholic France. Louis XIV's expansionist ambitions had become all too apparent during the late 1660s and early 1670s, and it was coming to be feared that he had pretensions to universal monarchy.<sup>84</sup> By the mid-1670s, parliament was clamouring for a more aggressive stance to be taken against France. Indeed, Danby, Charles's chief minister from 1674, did his best to take England out of the French orbit, and by 1678 was on the verge of declaring war on France in alliance with the Dutch. Charles remained reluctant, and continued to take bribes from Louis XIV behind his first minister's back. Yet Charles was not the only one playing a duplicitous game; so too was Louis XIV, who kept a number of opposition MPs in his pay, so that he could put the screws on the English king whenever it proved to his advantage. England had become little more than a client of the French king. What was worse was that most people knew it.

The government had also fallen down on its duty to defend the true religion. Charles's own sympathies for Roman Catholicism had become readily apparent, not only as a result of his foreign-policy alliance with Catholic France, but also through his attempts to relieve the plight of Catholics through the use of the royal suspending power. There also seemed to be an alarming number of Catholics at court, and these were feared to have an undue influence on royal policy. During the early 1660s the most prominent Catholic at court was the erratic Earl of Bristol, part of the Queen Mother's circle, although he never gained the influence he craved. More worryingly, during the administration of the Cabal, a time when the government seemed bent on pursuing policies at home and abroad designed to promote the interest of Catholics (notably the Indulgence of 1672 and the war with France against the Dutch), one of the King's leading ministers (Clifford) was a Catholic and another (Arlington) was a Catholic-sympathizer.

Of equal concern, however, were the royal mistresses. As that most notorious of Restoration rakes, the Earl of Rochester, John Wilmot, put it with his typical indelicacy, Charles's 'sceptre and his prick are of a length, / But she who plays with one may sway the other'.<sup>85</sup> The problem was that those women who had most intimate access to the King's person were Catholics. Charles's leading mistress from 1660 to 1668 was the Catholic Barbara Villiers, Countess of Castlemaine

(later the Duchess of Cleveland), five of whose children Charles acknowledged as his own. From about 1663 Charles also developed a passion for Frances Stuart, the daughter of a Scottish Catholic royalist, described by Charles's sister the Duchess of Orléans as 'the prettiest girl in the world, and the best fitted to adorn any court'. Although it is unclear whether they ever actually became lovers, there was talk at one time of Charles divorcing his wife and marrying Frances, until she eloped in the spring of 1667 with the King's relative the Duke of Richmond.<sup>86</sup> From the early 1670s the King's most influential mistress was the French Catholic Louise de Kéroualle (typically Anglicized as 'Carwell' by contemporaries), created Duchess of Portsmouth; she was actually 'married' to Charles in a mock ceremony in 1671, and was to bear him a son – Charles Lennox, Duke of Richmond and Lennox – in July 1672.<sup>87</sup> The orange-girl and actress Nell Gwyn, who became Charles's mistress in the late 1660s, was conspicuous for being 'the Protestant whore', as she herself famously quipped.<sup>88</sup> All told, Charles had fourteen natural children by various mistresses during his lifetime.

Charles's sexual exploits became the subject of much scurrilous verse, which typically circulated in manuscript. Some of this, to be sure, was written by fellow rakes who were as much celebrating as condemning the activities they were describing. Some of it, however, carried a biting, critical edge, and all of it served to help degrade the monarchy in the public eye and to encourage the perception that the political failings of the regime were linked to the moral failings of the court. Rochester was partly rejoicing when he recalled how 'the Isle of Britain' was 'long since famous grown / For breeding the best cunts in Christendom', and perhaps even when he described Charles as 'the sauciest one that e'er did swive, / The proudest, preremptoriest prick alive'. But he overstepped the mark when he referred to his 'merry Monarch' as someone 'scandalous and poor', who rolled 'about from whore to whore', and concluded with the lines 'I hate all monarchs with the thrones they sit on, / From the hector of France to the cully of Britain'; this earned him a banishment from court for his pains.<sup>89</sup> Many rhymesters pointed out how Charles's whoring was ruining the country. Charles's mistresses, after all, cost a lot of money: during the 1670s Cleveland and Portsmouth and their children were

in receipt of permanent grants worth more than £45,000 per year.<sup>90</sup> One anonymous rhymester had 'Old Rowley the King' saying, 'The making my Bastards so great / And Dutchessing every Whore / The surplus and treasury cheat / Has made me so wonderfull poor.'<sup>91</sup> Another asked, 'Why art thou poore O King?' and concluded, '... imbezzling C—t, / That wide mouth'd, greedy Monster that has don't.'<sup>92</sup>

England's foreign-policy disasters seemed naturally linked to the degeneracy of the court. One poet, writing about the Medway disaster, rhymed:

So our great prince, when the Dutch fleet arriv'd,  
Saw his ships burn and, as they burn'd, he swiv'd.  
So kind was he in our extremest need,  
He would those flames extinguish with his seed.<sup>93</sup>

In c. 1673, at the time of the third Anglo-Dutch War, a mock advertisement which circulated for a public sale at the Royal Coffee House near Charing Cross proclaimed that the following items were for sale:

One whole peece of the Duchess of Cleveland's honesty . . . Two Ells of Nell Gwin's Virginity . . . Two whole peeces of new fashioned paradoxes, the one to suppress popery by the Suppression of the Protestant interest abroad, the other to maintain libertie by the raising of a standing Army at home . . . Two dozen of French wenches, the one half paid by his Majesty to keep him right to the Protestant religion, the other to incline him to the Catholics.<sup>94</sup>

There was thus no underlying mirth when the republican poet and future Whig conspirator John Ayloffe bemoaned in c. 1674–5 how 'A colony of French possess the court' and Charles's 'fair soul, transform'd by that French dame [i.e. Portsmouth], / Had lost all sense of honor, justice, fame' so that the King sat 'Besieg'd by whores, buffoons, and bastard chits'.<sup>95</sup>

The prominence of Catholics in high places and the pro-Catholic leanings of the court inevitably created the impression that popery was on the increase. In fact, it probably was not, but this did not stop parliament from introducing a series of measures during the 1660s and 1670s designed to check its growth, culminating in the Test Acts of 1673 and 1678 aimed at excluding Catholics first from office and

then from parliament.<sup>96</sup> What made matters worse was that the heir to the throne was a Catholic. Despite all his swiving, Charles was unable to produce any legitimate offspring, since his wife, Catherine of Braganza, was barren. Thus the next in line remained his younger brother by three years, James, Duke of York, who sometime during the late 1660s or early 1670s became reconciled to Rome, his conversion finally being publicly acknowledged following his non-compliance with the Test Act in 1673.<sup>97</sup> In October of that year York married a young Catholic princess, Mary of Modena – a French client – his first wife, Anne Hyde, who had given him two Protestant daughters, having died two years earlier. The marriage not only seemed to tie the Stuart dynasty firmly to the French interest, but also raised the prospect of a never-ending succession of Catholic monarchs, should Mary be able to bear James a son.

Developments in 1673 placed the issue of the Catholic succession firmly on the political agenda. In midsummer, Charles told the French ambassador that he feared that when parliament next met it would introduce bills to send his brother into exile and exclude Catholics from the succession.<sup>98</sup> In October 1673, when parliament convened for the first time after the Modena match, the Speaker found a wooden shoe in his chair, with 'the arms of the king of France carved on one side and those of his Britannic Majesty on the other, with a crown and a crucifix'. Inside was a note with the words 'of one of the two'.<sup>99</sup> In early 1674 a group of opposition peers – spearheaded by Viscount Halifax and the earls of Salisbury and Carlisle, and backed all the way by Shaftesbury – tried to introduce legislation into parliament that would have provided for the education of the Duke of York's children as Protestants and prevented in future any king or prince of the blood from marrying a Catholic without parliamentary consent – with the penalty for non-compliance being exclusion from the succession. On this occasion, however, they backed down in face of stern opposition from the bishops, who would countenance no breach in the hereditary principle.<sup>100</sup> The prospect of a Catholic successor nevertheless continued to be a destabilizing factor in politics. Indeed, it was in large part to deal with this threat that in 1677 Danby arranged the marriage between York's eldest daughter, Mary



(at the time second in line to the throne, after her father), to her cousin the staunchly Protestant and anti-French Dutch stadtholder William of Orange (who himself was fourth in line, by dint of being the son of Charles II's sister Mary). Danby even came up with a scheme himself that year for imposing limitations on a popish successor; this would have given the bishops control over all ecclesiastical appointments in the event of a Catholic coming to the throne (in effect, temporarily undoing the royal supremacy in the Church), but it was abandoned in the face of opposition from those who distrusted the Anglican bishops as much as they did the Catholic heir.<sup>101</sup>

Particularly galling was the fact that, while the government seemed to be making little serious effort to meet the Catholic threat, peaceable Protestant dissenters continued to be harassed for worshipping outside the Church of England. The penal laws against nonconformists were not consistently put into execution throughout this period; enforcement came in waves, with the first half of the 1660s, the year following the passage of the 1670 Conventicle Act, the mid-1670s, and then the years of the Tory Reaction in the 1680s seeing the heaviest persecution. Yet, when the laws were being enforced, the suffering could be immense. Nonconformists faced heavy fines, often imprisonment, and even death. In Huntingdonshire, in 1670, some eighty Quakers were fined a total of £254 5s. for violations against the Conventicle Act; their inability to pay meant that they had their goods distrained to cover the amounts owed (and often more) – 'Sheep, Cowes, Horses, Hoggs, Wool, Oatmeal, Carts, Pewter, Panns, and Potts, and other Goods'. One John Arthur had all his possessions taken away, leaving him with not 'so much as a Dish, or Spoon, nor the Dung in his Yard'.<sup>102</sup> These were arguably the luckier ones. Many were hauled off to prison in lieu of non-payment; there the cells could be so crowded after a round-up of conventiclers that there would be standing room only, with no space to lie down when someone needed to sleep. During one clampdown on Quakers in York, for example, the castle prison was so full that two of the Friends 'were forced to Lay in a great Oven which stood in the Castle yard wall'.<sup>103</sup> Persecution was thus a threat to both liberty and property. It could also be a threat to life. Indeed, under the provisions of the Act of 35 Elizabeth separatists could technically be sentenced to death. In fact

no one did suffer the ultimate sanction during the Restoration, although there were some close calls. In 1664 twelve Baptists (two of them women) from Aylesbury, Buckinghamshire, were sentenced to death for refusing to conform or to abjure the realm, though when Charles learned of this he granted a reprieve. Likewise in 1682 a Quaker merchant from Bristol lay under sentence of death until William Penn used his influence at court to get the sentence quashed.<sup>104</sup> Nevertheless, several thousand nonconformists did die for their beliefs. A rare few were victims of murderous anti-sectarian bigotry. Thus the 'rude Company' which disturbed the Quaker meeting at the Bull and Mouth in Aldersgate Street, London, in October 1662, actually killed two of the worshippers, though the law obviously did not sanction such violence and the murderers were arrested and sent to prison.<sup>105</sup> The vast majority were the victims of incarceration at the hands of the state, the conditions in Restoration jails being so wretched that many never made it out alive. Others, though they did not forfeit their lives, nevertheless lost their livelihoods and thus the means of keeping body and soul together. One writer estimated that Quakers in Yorkshire suffered losses totalling some £2,381 os. 3d. under the Conventicle Act, although this was nothing 'compared to the Loss of their Trades, many of them being Trades men, and Labouring Poor men, who have had their Looms, Leads, and Tenters taken away, which was the Upholders of their Families', while 'some poor Women had their Goods taken, who were hardly able to get Food and Necessaries'.<sup>106</sup> The New England Puritan divine Cotton Mather claimed that 'by a modest calculation' the persecution resulted in 'the untimely death of 3,000 Nonconformists, and the ruin of 60,000 families' within a twenty-five-year period.<sup>107</sup> Dissenters thus quite rightly came to complain that they were suffering in their lives, liberties and estates.<sup>108</sup>

It was not just their personal liberty but also their political liberties that were in jeopardy. Particularly resented in this respect was the 1670 Conventicle Act, which, although it reduced some of the penalties proscribed by the 1664 act, allowed conventiclers to be convicted by two JPs acting summarily, thereby denying nonconformists the right to a trial by jury as guaranteed by Magna Carta. One pamphleteer alleged that the act was 'directly against our Fundamental Laws, and our

English Rights' and was therefore 'illegal'.<sup>109</sup> Rather than blame the King, who on a number of occasions showed himself sympathetic to liberty of conscience, nonconformists and their sympathizers tended to hold the high-Anglican interest in parliament, and especially the bishops, responsible for the intolerant attitude towards dissent. Increasingly, more moderate Anglicans began to doubt the wisdom of harassing Protestant dissenters when a more dangerous threat to the Protestant religion seemed to be posed by the international threat of popery.

In fact by the mid-1670s political liberty appeared under threat for a number of reasons – and not just to dissenters, but also to many mainstream Anglicans. Charles had demonstrated an open preference for the French style of government, he had attempted to set up a standing army, and he had tried to suspend parliamentary statutes. During the mid-1670s Danby had threatened to subvert the independence of parliament through a system of pensions and bribery, and he seemed intent on introducing measures that would have made legitimate political opposition almost impossible. Thus when, in 1675, Danby tried to introduce a Test Bill into the Lords, which would have required all office-holders and members of both houses to make a declaration against resistance (either to the king or to those commissioned by him) and swear never to endeavour to alter the government in Church and state, Shaftesbury, Halifax and other opposition peers vehemently attacked the measure, insisting that there might well be occasions when it could be legitimate to resist those commissioned by the king and that the non-alteration oath was against 'the very nature, being, and ends of Parliament', which was to make alterations.<sup>110</sup> In a pamphlet which appeared later that year, and rapidly became a best-seller, Shaftesbury charged the Danby administration with wanting to 'declare the Government absolute and Arbitrary, and allow Monarchy, as well as Episcopacy to be *Jure Divino*, and not to be bounded or limited by humane Laws', and represented this as part of a long-term design by 'the High Episcopal Man, and the Old Cavalier' dating back to the Restoration.<sup>111</sup>

In short, then, the honeymoon period for the Restoration monarchy did not last long. Things were already looking gloomy by the mid-to late 1660s, as the political and religious failings of the restored

regime – the Medway disaster, the pro-Catholic leanings of the court, the persecution of Protestant nonconformists – led many of those who had initially rejoiced at the monarchy's return to realize that they had not got quite what they had hoped for. On top of this, a series of natural disasters began to make some wonder whether the Stuarts, who had seemingly been miraculously restored by God's providence, had already forfeited divine favour. In November 1663 the bubonic plague was reported in Great Yarmouth – introduced by ship from Holland – and in the following spring there were cases in London. The mass outbreak, however, occurred in London in 1665; by the end of the year perhaps as many as 100,000 of the city's inhabitants had died.<sup>112</sup> The London-based nonconformist divine Thomas Vincent wrote of death riding 'triumphantly on his pale Horse through our streets', breaking 'into every House almost, where any Inhabitants are to be found'; people were falling 'as thick as leaves from the Trees in Autumn', he observed, so that 'we could hardly go forth, but we should meet many Coffins, and see diseased persons with sores and limping in the streets.'<sup>113</sup> In September 1666 occurred the Great Fire of London, destroying most of the built-up area of the City proper and causing damage to property estimated at some £10 million. The fire started by accident in a baker's shop in Pudding Lane; the instinct, however, was to blame the catastrophe on the perceived enemies of the state. Thus there were rumours that the Fifth Monarchists or alternatively the Catholics had been responsible. Indeed, a French Catholic watchmaker named Robert Hubert confessed to having started the fire as part of a conspiracy hatched in Paris, and was hanged as a result, although he was almost certainly deranged.<sup>114</sup> Preachers, however, were quick to see both the plague and the Fire as God's judgement upon the nation's sins, stretching from sabbath-breaking, swearing, drunkenness, fornication, adultery and pride through to persecution. The Anglican divine Richard Kingston, preaching about the plague, blamed the sin of uncharitableness for provoking God's wrath: 'The Turk cannot hate a Christian with a more Vatinian hatred,' he proclaimed, 'then we persecute one another, though baptized into the same Faith, and equally Professors of the same Gospell'; we had affronted Christ's injunction which bid us 'love one another'.<sup>115</sup> Similarly the minister of St Lawrence

Pountney, Robert Elborough, preaching on the Fire, alleged that 'Times of oppression and cruelty' were occasions when God was likely to be more severe in his judgements: 'It's an hard thing for us to be hard-hearted', he warned, 'and God to be tender-hearted.'<sup>116</sup> Yet, predictably, it was the Puritan divines who went furthest in their criticisms. Gilbert Burnet commented on how nonconformist ministers had taken over the pulpits left empty by Anglican clerics who had fled the plague and had begun 'to preach openly . . . on the sins of the court, and on the ill usage that they themselves had met with'.<sup>117</sup> Thomas Vincent, himself an ejected Presbyterian minister, produced a lengthy tract arguing that the plague and the Fire were visitations from God for the slighting of the Gospel; he not only bemoaned the rise of sectarianism and the lukewarm formalism of the Established Church, but also decried the Bartholomew Day ejections of 1662, the driving of God's ministers from the towns by the Five Mile Act of 1665, and the persecution of the godly.<sup>118</sup>

By the mid-1670s, with the threat of popery and arbitrary government seemingly confirmed by the King's Declaration of Indulgence, the Anglo-Dutch war fought in alliance with the French, the prospect of a popish successor, and the blatant attempts by the court to build up a standing army and subvert the independence of parliament, things appeared to have gone from bad to worse. Serious political and religious tensions had re-emerged in England, and voices calling for a return to a republic began to be heard. One poem of 1674, which circulated in the coffee houses, claimed that the miracle of the King's restoration had now become England's 'curse and punishment', and expressed the hope that the English would send Charles back to Breda and re-establish a commonwealth.<sup>119</sup> In another poem from the same time, John Ayloffe pleaded for the erection of a Venetian-style republic: 'To the serene Venetian state I'll go,' he has Britannia proclaim, 'From her sage mouth fam'd principles to know.'<sup>120</sup> Significantly, the republican poetry of the mid-1670s evinced a marked anti-Scottish – in the sense of anti-Stewart – bias. Ayloffe refers to the present dynasty as 'this stinking Scottish brood' after Britannia bemoans how she has tried 'too long in vain' to divide 'the Stuart from the tyrant'.<sup>121</sup> Another poem from 1676 (possibly also by Ayloffe) alleged that tyranny would 'be our case / Under all that shall reign of the false

Scottish race', and boldly proclaimed that the author was 'for old Noll' (i.e. Cromwell), for, 'Though his government did a tyrant's resemble, / He made England great and its enemies tremble.'<sup>122</sup> 'The Isle was well reform'd, and gain'd renown,' another rhymester asserted, 'Whilst the brave Tudors wore th' Imperial Crown, / But since the race of Stewarts came / It has recoil'd to Popery and shame.' He therefore concluded, 'Let Cromwell's Ghost smile with Contempt to see / old England struggling under Slavery.'<sup>123</sup>

Perhaps more worrying than the disaffection of the radicals, however, was the growing alienation of moderate opinion in the nation at large. The government was losing its hold over the middle ground. Within parliament, a broad country coalition had begun to emerge, embracing Presbyterian politicians, disgruntled former courtiers and old Cavaliers, and a younger generation of political aspirants who were distrustful of Danby's political and religious agenda. Its members were united in their concerns about the security of the Protestant interest at home and abroad and the liberties of English people in the face of the government's foreign policy, attitude towards France, stance on dissent, and efforts to subvert the independence of parliament. Moreover, this opposition was beginning to organize, holding meetings in advance of and during parliamentary sessions to coordinate tactics and to plan the best ways to bring pressure to bear for a change of royal policy.<sup>124</sup>

The mid-1670s also saw a revival of popular political agitation out-of-doors, especially in the capital. For example, there were widespread anti-Catholic demonstrations in London on 5 November 1673, as crowds burned effigies of the pope and his cardinals to protest against the Duke of York's marriage and England's alliance with France; one observer counted 200 bonfires between Temple Bar and Aldgate alone.<sup>125</sup> There was another pope-burning in Southwark on 26 November, the day that York's new bride arrived in England.<sup>126</sup> To demonstrate their growing concern about the threat of popery, Londoners also revived the commemoration of Elizabeth's accession day, 17 November – associated in people's minds with the restoration of Protestantism to England following Mary I's attempted Counter-Reformation of 1553–8 – and there were pope-burnings on this day at Temple Bar in 1676 and 1677. There were also signs of growing links between the

country opposition in parliament and discontented elements out-of-doors. Some of the pope-burnings may well have been organized at the Green Ribbon Club, a meeting place for country and, later, Whig politicians which was just up from Temple Bar in Chancery Lane, and seems to have been founded in about 1674.<sup>127</sup> The enigmatic Duke of Buckingham, Shaftesbury's ally in the Lords, had connections with the London radical underground, including erstwhile Levellers such as John Wildman. It was at Buckingham's instigation that Francis Jenks, a London linen-draper, gave a sensational speech at the annual election of sheriffs in June 1676, during the long prorogation of the Cavalier Parliament between November 1675 and February 1677. Jenks warned of a threat to London from arsonists, impending economic ruin at the hands of the French, and a 'danger to his majesty's person' and the Protestant religion; he closed by calling upon the Lord Mayor to petition the crown for a new parliament, citing statutes from Edward III's reign which required annual parliaments.<sup>128</sup> When, in February 1677, Shaftesbury and Buckingham pressed in the Lords that the Cavalier Parliament was *ipso facto* dissolved because it had been prorogued for more than one year, 'a prodigious rabble' of their supporters gathered outside the House, ready 'to proclaim through the city with triumphant shouts and huzza, that the Parliament was dissolv'd', should they have carried their point.<sup>129</sup>

## CONCLUSION

There is no reason to doubt the genuineness of the enthusiasm with which people greeted the return of monarchy in 1660. Most welcomed the restoration of Charles II, firm in their belief that he would make their world a better place. Many – perhaps a large majority – did so from a conviction that monarchy was both the natural order and the best form of government, and that this was why things had never been right since the setting-up of a republic. Others may have done so out of desperation as things seemed to go from bad to worse following the fall of the Protectorate, believing that the return of the house of Stuart was the only viable alternative to the anarchy that threatened to grip the country by late 1659. There were, to be sure,

some who never wanted monarchy back, but these were a minority (and a relatively small one at that). We should not downplay their significance, but we cannot explain why things began to go wrong for the Restoration monarchy simply in terms of the survival of an underground republican tradition in England after 1660.

Instead, this chapter has sought to emphasize various structural problems that bedevilled the Restoration regime. One was the legacy of political and religious division bequeathed by the Civil War. Charles II was popular on the eve of his return because he could appear to be all things to all people. Yet he could not *actually* be all things to all people, and the partisan nature of the Restoration settlement and the fact that there were many whose expectations of the Restoration came to be disappointed – and who came to experience persecution as the price for having lost out – go a long way towards explaining why disaffection soon re-emerged. A second problem was the practical restraints on royal power, which served to frustrate efforts to rebuild royal authority effectively after 1660. Charles's lack of fiscal independence made him vulnerable to criticism from parliament, while his lack of a professional police force or bureaucracy made him heavily reliant on the cooperation of unpaid agents of the executive (from the lofty Lord Lieutenants to the humble parish constables) to enforce the royal will in the localities. On top of all this were the problems created by the King's style of government and the policies he chose to pursue. The various efforts he made to try to confront the political weaknesses of the crown served only to make matters worse – such as his experiments with religious indulgence, his efforts to manage parliament, his attempts to build up a standing army, and his decision to ally with the strongest power in Europe, Catholic France. Nor was he helped by his own personal weaknesses, such as his penchant for ladies of pleasure who happened to be Catholic, or by accidental contingencies which could hardly be laid at his door – such as the plague and the Great Fire, and, most importantly, the barrenness of his queen, which left his younger brother (who for his own reasons had decided to convert to the Catholic faith) as next in line to the throne. By the mid-1670s, as a result, many English people had grown concerned about what they perceived to be a drift towards popery and arbitrary government manifested by a

pro-French foreign policy; a desire to help Catholics at home; a Catholic heir; and various efforts to subvert cherished English liberties by issuing royal proclamations suspending certain laws, attempting to subvert the independence of parliament by bribing members with offices and pensions, and imposing an oath promising never to endeavour any alteration in Church or state. It was in this context that, in 1677, Andrew Marvell launched his scathing indictment of the record of Charles II's government, alleging that since the early years of the Restoration there had been a design carried on 'to change the Lawfull Government of England into an Absolute Tyranny, and to convert the established Protestant Religion into down-right Popery' – pointing to the pro-Catholic leanings of the court, the attempt to draw England into the French orbit, the threat posed by political management to the independence of parliament, and the efforts to establish a standing army.<sup>130</sup>

Developments in England seemed bad enough. Yet people did not judge the Restoration monarchy solely by its record there. For Charles II was also king of Scotland and Ireland, and when developments in these two kingdoms were added to the equation the situation – to large numbers of British Protestants – seemed highly alarming indeed.

## Popery and Arbitrary Government

### *The Restoration in Ireland and Scotland and the Makings of the British Problem*

*It cannot be denyed, but that the Roman Catholicks of Ireland have infinitely suffered, during the late Usurped Governments; But they have done it cheerfully . . . having had all that time, as Companions in Suffering, not only some of the Nobility and Gentry of England and Scotland, but the King himself, and all the Royal Family . . . But now since His Majesties happy Restauration, and during the universal Jubilee of Joy over all the British Monarchy, that the Irish alone shou'd be . . . condemned to a perpetual Sufferance, far surpassing those they formerly endured under the Government of Cromwel, is a Calamity rather to be deplored than exprest.<sup>1</sup>*

*The Bishops of England were like the Kings of Judah, some good, some bad; but the Prelates in Scotland were like the Kings of Israel, not one of them good, but . . . who made Israel to Sin.<sup>2</sup>*

The Restoration in Ireland and Scotland – as in England – was welcome to broad cross-sections of the population. Yet in both kingdoms the eventual settlement in Church and state was highly partisan, and left substantial numbers of those who had supported the return of monarchy dissatisfied. In Scotland the re-establishment of episcopacy, coupled with the way the government chose to deal with the problem of Presbyterian nonconformity, created severe political and religious tensions. In Ireland there were a cluster of political, economic and religious grievances, though the most contentious issue by far proved to be the